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Abstract 
Portugal’s involvement in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars resulted 
in substantial economic, political and social change revealing interconnections 
between state and economy that have not been acknowledged fully within the 
existing literature.  On the one hand, economic and political change was 
precipitated by the flight of Dom João, the removal of the court to Rio de Janeiro, 
and the appointment of a regency council in Lisbon: events that were the result of 
much more than the mere confluence of external drivers and internal pressures in 
Europe, however complex and compelling they may have been at the time.  
Although governance in Portugal had been handed over to the regency council 
strict limitations were imposed on its autonomy.  Once Lisbon was occupied, and 
French military government imposed on Portugal, her continued role as entrepôt, 
linking the South Atlantic economy to that of Europe, could not be guaranteed.  
Brazil’s ports were therefore opened to foreign vessels and restrictions on 
agriculture, manufacture and inter-regional trade in the colonies were lifted 
presaging a transition from neo-mercantilism to proto-industrialised capitalism.  
The meanings of this dislocation of political power and the shift of government 
from metropolis to colony were complex, not least in relation to the location and 
limits of absolutist authority.  The immediate results of which were a series of 
popular insurrections in Portugal, a swift response by the French military 
 
 
government and conservative reaction by Portuguese élites, leading to 
widespread popular resistance in 1808 and 1809 and, subsequently, Portugal’s 
wholesale involvement in the Peninsular War with severe and deleterious effects 
on the Portuguese population and economy.  Ultimately, these events would lead 
to demands for constitutional reform and civil war but not, as yet, the dismantling 
of mercantilism, the abolition of slavery or the separation of Portugal and Brazil 
as independent states.  Ironically, the forces for change in this regard, in the years 
immediately following the Napoleonic Wars, would appear stronger in the 
metropolis and weaker in its former colony. 
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Preface 
The idea for this dissertation arose out of a determination to set the French 
invasions of Portugal in context with particular reference to economics, politics, 
government policy, diplomacy and their various and profound effects on 
Portugal and Portuguese society.  As the research and writing progressed, it 
became increasingly apparent that the origins and effects of the French invasions 
were not only highly complex and multifaceted they were also either poorly 
recognised or misrepresented within the existing literature in English.  In 
comparison, much has been made of the contradistinction and complementarity 
of continuity and change in the long eighteenth century within other European 
countries, for example the routes of transition from absolutism to democracy and 
the development of the modern European state.   
Similarly, the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars have received 
substantial attention.  This period has often been represented as a disconnected 
and well-defined discontinuity shaped by (and itself shaping) political-military 
events and, in some cases, the coalescence of ideology and violence impacting on 
and shaping more gradual longer term, social, economic, cultural and political 
developments.  That there is a need to combine aspects of these various 
approaches within historical studies of Europe in both the early-modern and 
modern periods is incontestable.  The purpose and method of this research, 
ii 
 
therefore, was to build upon these approaches and locate Portuguese experiences 
of the Peninsular War within a broader contextual framework encompassing 
both pan-European and extra-European perspectives.  1 
There were three defining moments in drafting.  The first came with the 
recognition that the transfer of the Portuguese court to Rio de Janeiro was the 
result of much more than the mere confluence of external drivers and internal 
pressures in Europe, however complex and compelling they may have been at 
the time.  The consensus is as follows.  On the one hand, Napoleon demanded 
compliance with the Continental System and threatened invasion to impose his 
will.  On the other, Britain sent a fleet and a strongly worded ultimatum to 
Portugal: accede to the request to re-locate the court to Brazil or face the possible 
bombardment of Lisbon, the loss of the Portuguese fleet and isolation from her 
Empire.  Meantime, relations between Portugal and Spain vacillated between 
military and economic conflict, both on the continents of Europe and South 
America, often involving one or other of these two European super-powers.  
However, although it is indisputable that small countries can often depend, or 
become dependent upon, larger and more powerful countries, they are often, 
also, capable of self-determinism and of having a specific trajectory, 
                                            
1.  Stuart Woolf, The construction of a European world-view in the Revolutionary-Napoleonic 
years, Past & Present, vol. 137, no. 1, 72-101, esp. pp. 73-81. 
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economically, politically, socially and ideologically, for transition. 2  I argue here 
that in order to understand these external drivers, internal pressures and seminal 
events correctly, they need to be re-examined critically, not just in relation to 
other European powers but also in the context of north and west Europe’s 
relations with the world’s other continents and, in particular, the Atlantic and the 
political economy of Empire.  3 
The second moment came with the identification of interconnections 
between state and economy in the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth 
century that have not been acknowledged fully within the existing literature.  In 
earlier periods, war had been driven by struggles of a religious nature and to 
preserve or challenge royal lines and, throughout the long eighteenth century, 
dynastic succession and the defence of absolutism.  But the defining 
characteristics of conflict in the Seven Years War and after, the period often 
referred to as that of enlightened despotism, were economic, political, ideological 
and, increasingly, global in nature as well as military.  In this, the French 
invasions of Portugal, Britain’s response, and Spain and Portugal’s involvement 
in the Peninsular War, were symptomatic of the convergence of highly complex 
developments in relation to commerce and trade - for example capital 
                                            
2.  Barrington Moore jnr. Social origins of dictatorship and democracy: lord and peasant in the making of 
the modern world, (London : Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 1967 - pbk version, 1973).  
3.  John H. Parry, Trade and Dominion: the European overseas empires in the eighteenth century, 
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971) 
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accumulation and investment, expertise in finance, shipping and insurance - and 
their interconnection with imperialism and military conflict.  Suffice to say that 
the scale and costs of the latter for major European powers had become the single 
largest item of state expenditure.  4  The interactions of state, ideology and 
political economy therefore must therefore be taken into account and critically 
assessed. 
Viewing these developments in the two decades spanning the eighteenth 
century fin de siècle in these ways, and accepting economics as an increasingly 
important component of ideology, if not ideology in its own right, allows us to 
establish the links between mercantilism and the theory of free (or free-er) trade, 
within and between cores and peripheries, that defined and shaped this new age 
of global imperialism.   5   The examination of these shifting and unpredictable 
contingencies, political and diplomatic relations, and complex alliances, helps us 
to understand why Portugal ultimately aligned with Britain, rather than France, 
and why the Portuguese court transferred to Brazil. But we also need to consider 
                                            
4.  C.A. Bayly, ‘The first age of global imperialism, c. 1760–1830’, The Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History, 1998, vol. 26, no. 2, 28-47 (especially pp. 29-33) and George Modelski, The 
Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 
1978, vol. 20, no. 2, 214-235. 
5.  For a review of the impact of state policy on economic development, trade and Empire see 
Ralph Davis, The rise of the Atlantic economies, (London : Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973) and for 
the origins and ideology of classical political economy and imperialism see Bernard Semmel, The 
Rise of Free Trade Imperialism: Classical Political Economy the Empire of Free Trade and Imperialism 
1750-1850, (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1970 - pbk version, 2004). 
v 
 
these issues were mediated through multifaceted and often competing 
ideologies, for example the development of political economy as a science and 
form of discourse and the fundamental nature and meaning of Empire.  6 
The third defining moment came with the proper appreciation of the 
rebellion of the Portuguese people in 1808, the reaction of the French and 
Portuguese élites and popular resistance in 1808 and 1809 and the need to explore 
these in terms of causes, lived experiences and effects.  There is, still, no modern 
investigation of the Portuguese insurrections in English.  Within historiography 
they have, in the main, been consigned as insignificant events; and their main 
impacts viewed extremely negatively - for example, their role in undermining 
formal military mobilisation and discipline.  While they need to be seen in terms 
of their location within military conflict, they also need to be explored in terms of 
prevailing property relations, forms of land tenure and the social relations of 
production: the material conditions upon which the absolutist state was founded 
and perhaps also expressions of social consciousness such as agricultural unrest.  
7  In the absence of access to archival material, best use has been made of 
published primary and near contemporary sources by way of historical and 
                                            
6.  Semmel, The Rise of Free Trade Imperialism,  pp. 6-15 and Bayly, ‘The first age of global 
imperialism’, pp. 28-30 
7.  Charles J. Esdaile (ed.), Popular resistance in the French Wars: patriotism, partisans and land pirates, 
(New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) and Ronald Fraser, Napoleon’s Cursed War: Popular 
Resistance in the Spanish Peninsular War, (London - New York : Verso, 2008).   
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critical review.   Of course this means taking the limitations and potential bias of 
these types of accounts into consideration: for example, their polemical and 
ideological form and intention. 
That being said, there was clearly a groundswell, albeit uncoordinated, of 
popular uprisings and support for informal and formal military opposition to the 
French.  That these insurrections have been deliberately misrepresented by 
Portuguese historians and incorporated into a nationalist narrative in the late 
nineteenth century, as in other countries, is not denied.  8  But these issues have 
also been reviewed and analysed critically, and different conclusions about them 
have been reached, over the last hundred years or so, as examples of patriotic 
resistance or social and political revolution.  9  They did happen and do need to 
be investigated fully.  While they appear to have commonalities with 
insurrections in other countries there are also a number of particular features that 
cannot be fully understood by making generalisations with reference to other 
specific instances of similar insurrections taking place elsewhere.  For these 
reasons, in order to examine the instances of rebellion, reaction and resistance 
                                            
8.  Mendo Castro Henriques, ‘1812 e a geopolítica da guerra peninsular’, in Instituto da Defesa 
Nacional, Guerra peninsular, novas interpretações: da Europa dividida à união Europeia, (Lisboa : 
Tribuna de História, 2005), 171-194, pp. 171-76 and 193-94,. 
9.  The overall conclusions, respectively, of Artur De Magalhães Basto, ‘O Pôrto contra Junot’, in 
Damião Peres (ed.), Revista de Estudos Históricos, 1.º Ano, n.º 4, 1924, pp. 51-61; 88-120; and 121-147 
and Vasco Pulido Valente, ‘O povo em armas: a revolta nacional de 1808-1809’, Analise Social, vol. 
XV, no. 57, 1979, 7-48. 
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fully and correctly, we will need to inverse both the line of approach that has 
been taken thus far within military histories and critically examine the causal 
relationships and effects that have been attributed to them.   
That the Portuguese insurrections and popular resistance during the French 
invasions need to be identified, described and explored then is undisputed. 10  As 
we have seen, a range of contemporary sources, nineteenth century histories and 
more recent texts validate their existence, providing evidence for the scale and 
nature of the insurrections and affording insights into the complexities of their 
causes and effects.  11  A common link between left and right in later nineteenth 
century Portuguese literature was a growing resentment of British involvement 
in Portuguese affairs and, specifically, her role in precipitating the transfer of the 
court to Brazil, the loss of Portugal’s foremost colony, and the development of 
underdevelopment within Portugal as a British protectorate or, worse still, 
informal colony.  12  The Portuguese historian Soriano, though, in contrast to the 
more strident republicanism of other late nineteenth century writers concludes 
that, despite the energy and enthusiasm of the Portuguese people, taking into 
account the lack of armaments, experienced officers and - above all - the lack of 
                                            
10.  Charles J. Esdaile (ed.) Popular resistance in the French Wars, pp.207-08 - although Esdaile’s 
assertion that “not a single Lusitanian historian appears ever to have investigated the issue of the 
‘people’s war’ at all”, p.215, is incorrect.  
11.   See the discussion below: das Neves, Chaby and Soriano, p. 5; Valente and Matos, p. 62; and 
Basto p. 68. 
12.  Henriques, ‘1812 e a geopolítica da guerra peninsular’, pp. 172-75  
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military discipline, Portugal would not have been able to overthrow the French 
without the support of Britain.  13  Moreover, and notably, all of these 
fundamental inadequacies were exemplified in Soriano’s description of the 
defeated uprising in Évora.  In comparison, other writers have asserted 
(somewhat unconvincingly) that Portugal overthrew the French alone and British 
intervention was neither requested nor needed. 14  In resisting the temptation to 
hypothesise about the outcomes, were Britain not to have intervened, I would 
note that British motives were not solely, if at all, altruistic.    
 While the structure of the dissertation is broadly defined by the chronology 
of events leading up to and during the three French invasions of Portugal, there 
is an inordinate focus on the first two invasions.  The rationale for this is twofold.  
Firstly, I have not set out to define or describe military conflict between 1807 and 
1811: rather my primary interest lies in its causes and effects.  Secondly, the 
almost wholesale militarisation of Portugal in the period 1810 to 1811, apart from 
one or two exceptional cases, precluded the sorts of spontaneous, popular 
insurrections and resistance that took place in 1808 and 1809.  That these 
insurrections were prompted by the impositions and exactions of military 
                                            
13.  Simão José da Luz Soriano, Historia da Guerra Civil e do estabelecimento do governo parlamentar em 
Portugal: comprehendendo a historia diplomatica, militar e politica d'este reino desde 1777 até 1834, 
(Nineteen Volumes, Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional, 1866-1890). 
14.  See Soriano, História da Guerra Civil, 2.ª época, vol. 1, pp. 353-54 and Henriques, ‘1812 e a 
geopolítica da guerra’, pp 175-76. 
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government in 1808 rather than developing as measures of self defence in the face 
of invasion is unquestionable.  However, the hectic, frenzied and - at times - 
rebellious, nature of these insurrections prompted, in turn, not only a ruthless 
reaction from the French but also a powerful response from Portuguese élites to 
harness and control excesses and direct, in some cases through coercion or social 
conditioning and in others through the promulgation of a fervid Franco-phobia, 
popular animosity towards the French invaders.  Whilst it would be an 
exaggeration to claim total opposition to the French and support for the war 
effort by the Portuguese people, by 1809 the extent and intensity of popular 
resistance to the French was such that a non-military resolution to conflict was 
unthinkable.  By 1810, despite the emergence of specific internal political conflict, 
in both Portugal and Britain, and disagreements as to the implementation of 
military strategy, the “common cause” prevailed.  15  It would be unwise to claim 
total political support for, and popular compliance with, wholesale military 
conscription and mobilisation: but when in history has this ever been the case?  
Moreover, there are numerous examples in eyewitness accounts demonstrating 
                                            
15.  See, Donald D. Horward, ‘Wellington as strategist, 1808-14’, in Norman Gash, (ed.), Wellington: 
studies in the military and political career of the first Duke of Wellington, (Manchester : Manchester 
University Press, 1990) and ‘Wellington and the Defence of Portugal’, The International History 
Review, vol. 11, no. 1 (Feb., 1989), 39-54.  We await a similar study from the Portuguese 
perspective.  
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opposition to recruitment, reluctance to serve, desertion and insubordination.  16  
But again, why would Portugal, and popular responses to recruitment to the 
army, be any different to that in other comparable European country at the time?  
These issues are not conveniently ignored here, and they do deserve an objective 
review at some point in the future.  But the balance of political and popular 
resolve to oppose the French from the summer of 1808 in Portugal had, in overall 
terms, undeniably, convincingly and decisively tipped away from collaboration 
towards resistance.  17      
This dissertation is organised as follows.  An introductory chapter reviews 
the bibliography.  We then set out and explore the origins of the French invasions 
in the long eighteenth century.  The middle section of the dissertation takes up 
the analysis of political conflict between the various factions at the court of Prince 
João, explores the extension of conflict into the economic and social spheres, the 
Portuguese insurrections, and the establishment of the juntas.  We also consider 
the mobilisation of the Portuguese military, the contribution of ordinary people 
to the war effort and the effects of the war on Portugal and its population.  A 
final chapter provides a recapitulation of the research and some tentative 
conclusions and suggestions for further investigation. 
                                            
16.  See, for example, Charles J. Esdaile, Peninsular Eyewitnesses: the experience of war in Spain and 
Portugal, 1808-1813, (Barnsley : Pen and Sword, 2008).   
17.  And therefore away from the “inner” Empire: Michael Broers, Europe under Napoleon 1799-1815, 
(London and New York : Edward Arnold, 1996). 
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For Melvin: a much loved brother, historian, artist and friend. 
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Chapter one: bibliographical essay 
 
A great many books in English on the Peninsular War have appeared in the 
last century or so.  These publications have ranged from the seven volume study 
written by Professor Sir Charles Oman 19 and published in a period spanning 
Britain’s colonial wars and the depression between two great world wars, to the 
single volume survey by Professor Charles Esdaile in the first decade of the current 
century.  20  Two common characteristics of these standard texts, if not shared by a 
significant proportion of books that have appeared in the intervening years between 
their publication (or since), is that they attempted to provide a balanced account 
from the point of view of the major protagonists involved.  Oman’s study was not 
only substantially more comprehensive in scope than that undertaken by Napier (a 
participant in the conflict) and the near contemporary account offered by Southey 
(poet-laureate and Iberian traveller) it was also considered to be a major departure 
from the standard approach to historical work by his contemporaries in British 
                                            
19.  Throughout the twentieth century this work had remained the most important study on the 
Peninsular War, readily available in English, Sir Charles Oman, A History of the Peninsular War, 
(Seven volumes, Oxford : The Clarendon Press, 1902-1930).  It is probably important to note that 
although Oman insisted that this “new history” was not intended to supplant Napier’s account, it 
did indeed prove to be a useful corrective to that work if not fully revisionist in nature.  It is not 
coincidental that Oman acknowledged the support and insights of the military historians 
Commandants Balagny and Martinien (of the Section Historique in France) and the Spanish General 
Arteche and their respective supporting academic infrastructures.   
20.  Charles J. Esdaile, The Peninsular War: A New History, (London : Allen lane, 2002). 
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universities.  21    Oman corrected many, if not all, of Napier’s prejudices: most 
particularly curbing his extreme anti-Spanish bias and obvious tolerances in 
relation to Soult and Napoleon.  However, the first two volumes, and in particular 
his coverage of the first French invasion and occupation of Portugal in 1807 and 
1808, were less comprehensive and authoritative than subsequent volumes.  This is 
unfortunate given their seminal importance to this dissertation.  Oman did make 
good use of the work of the Portuguese historian Soriano in later volumes, but non-
military subject matters, and relatively obscure operations and campaigns, 
including those undertaken by irregular Portuguese and Spanish forces, often 
received uneven treatment throughout his work.  22   Griffith’s edited volume 
contributes substantially to our understanding of the strengths and limitations of 
Oman’s history and of the milieu in which he worked, provides some very useful 
essays and is an invaluable secondary source for more detailed investigation of 
specific aspects or periods of the war in which Oman was less thorough. 23  In terms 
                                            
21.  William Francis Patrick Napier (1785-1860), History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of 
France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, (Six volumes, London : 1828-1840); Robert Southey (1774-
1843), History of the Peninsular War, (Three volumes, London : John Murray, 1823-1832).  Both Lord 
Byron and Southey espoused, romanticised and politicised opposition to Napoleon in Iberia, 
extolling Spanish patriotism and English heroism whilst denouncing French betrayal and treachery 
(although Byron also, famously, censured Britain’s involvement in the Convention of Cintra). 
22.  David Gates, The Spanish ulcer: a history of the Peninsular War, (London : Pimlico, 2002), is a useful 
single volume survey that attempts, albeit not always successfully, to address some of these latter 
limitations – certainly in relation to Spain if not Portugal.  
23.  Paddy Griffith (ed.), A History of the Peninsular War volume IX: modern studies of the war in Spain and 
Portugal, 1808-1814, (London : Greenhill Books, 1999). 
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of the subject matter of this dissertation, the essays by Griffith himself, and those of 
Esdaile, Livermore and Muir, are particularly enlightening.  24  
Despite being dated, and highly prejudiced, Napier’s account still reveals 
some useful insights for the specialist politico-military historian.  Meanwhile, 
Southey’s account remains valuable, particularly in relation to the earliest years of 
the conflict and Portuguese and Spanish perspectives and, more specifically, for his 
detailed analysis of the first French invasion and occupation of Portugal in 1807 and 
1808 (for much of which he follows das Neves).  But Southey’s overt Romanticism 
and Hispanicism, and that of other contemporary and near contemporary British 
accounts, need to be borne in mind, 25  just as we should view critically diaries, 
journals, memoirs and histories written later in the nineteenth century from specific 
authors of whatever nationality.  26  
                                            
24.  Paddy Griffith, ‘Oman’s Peninsular War today’; Charles J. Esdaile, ‘Oman’s history in its Spanish 
context’; Harold Livermore, ‘Portugal on the eve of the Peninsular War’; Rory Muir, ‘Britain and the 
Peninsular War’; in Griffith (ed.), A History of the Peninsular War volume IX.    
25.  See Juan L. Sánchez, Byron, Spain, and the romance of Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage, European 
Romantic Review, vol. 20, no. 4, 2009, 443-464, Lynda Pratt, Robert Southey, Writing and 
Romanticism, Érudit, no. 32-33, November 2003 - February 2004 and Diego Saglia,’ "O My Mother 
Spain!": The Peninsular War, Family Matters, and the Practice of Romantic Nation-Writing’, ELH, 
vol. 65, no. 2, Summer 1998, 363-393. 
26.  The bibliographical appendices in Griffith provide some useful information in this regard: Griffith 
(ed.), A History of the Peninsular War, and see Ian Fletcher, ‘Wellington’s army: a bibliographical 
essay’, in Ian Fletcher, (ed.), The Peninsular War: aspects of the struggle for the Iberian Peninsula, 
(Staplehurst : Spellmount, 1998) and Sir Charles Oman, Studies in the Napoleonic Wars, (London : 
Methuen, 1929).  Unfortunately, the readily available literature is both in English and Anglo-centric.   
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A number of French histories have been published throughout the last 
century.  The French generals Foy and Thiébault, both of whom participated in the 
first French invasion, subsequently published detailed surveys of the campaign, 
while Foy also wrote an incomplete history of the war and his memoires were 
posthumously published.  27  From that time, standard French military histories 
almost consistently focused on those aspects of the Peninsular War in which the 
Emperor was personally involved, and therefore the struggle for Spain.  Indeed, in 
French the war is generally referred to as La Guerre d’Espagne: see for example the 
work of Balagny, Grandmaison and Grasset.  28  Balagny later wrote a very useful 
article on the battle of Bussaco, which clearly influenced and enhanced Oman’s 
account of the conflict, while the work of his colleague at the Section Historique of 
the French army staff, Martinien, provided Oman with very useful empirical 
evidence of the extent of French officer deaths, casualties and losses from volume 
three onwards.  29  Meanwhile, modern French histories have attempted less 
                                            
27.  Paul Thiébault, Relation de l'Expédition du Portugal, faite en 1807-8, par le 1er Corps d'Observation de 
la Gironde, devenu armée de Portugal. Par le Baron Thiébault, Lieutenant-Général. (Paris : Chez Magimel, 
Anselin et Pochard, 1817), Maximilien-Sébastien Foy, Histoire de la guerre de la Péninsule sous Napoléon 
par le général Foy, (Four volumes & atlas, Paris : Baudouin Frères, 1827) and Maurice Girod de l’Ain,  
Vie militaire du général Foy, (Paris : Plon. Nourrit, 1900). 
28.  Commandant Balagny, Campagne de l’Empereur Napoléon en Espagne, 1808-1809, (Five volumes, 
Paris : Berger Levrault, 1902-1907), Geoffroy de Grandmaison, L’Espagne et Napoléon, (Two volumes, 
Paris : Plon, 1908-1925) ; Alphonse Louis Grasset, La guerre d’Espagne, (Nancy : Berger-Levrault, 
1914).    
29.  Commandant Balagny, ‘La bataille de Bussaco’, Revue d’Histoire, rédigée à l’État-Major de l’armée, Xe 
année, no. 96, (1908) 515-36, XIe année, no. 97, (1909) 128-60, and XIe année, no. 98, (1909) 324-37 ; 
Aristide Martinien, Tableaux, par corps et par batailles, des officiers tués et blessés pendant les guerres de 
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successfully than those available in English to widen the scope of study and retain 
academic credibility; see for example Molières and Bernard.  30   Finally, Montrossier 
provides a very useful comparative study of French and British memoirs, although 
we still await a comprehensive history of the invasions of Portugal and Peninsular 
War from the French perspective.  31   
Despite the arrival, during the last decade or so, of a number of modern and 
fairly comprehensive surveys of the conflict, incorporating Spanish and French 
perspectives in English, there has been no concerted effort to provide a 
commensurately balanced account from the point of view of Portugal (either in 
terms of the incorporation of contemporary accounts or more recent 
historiography).  For these reasons, recourse to reliable Portuguese sources is 
indispensable.  32  For the Portuguese economist and statesman das Neves, a 
primary importance of the history he was writing was to encourage popular 
opposition to the French, which is clear within his vehemently, anti French 
                                                                                                                                
l'Empire (1805-1815), (Paris :  H. Charles-Lavauzelle, 1899) and Tableaux, par corps et par batailles, des 
officiers tués et blessés pendant les guerres de l'Empire (1805-1815) : supplement, (Paris : L  Fournier, 1909). 
30.  Michel Molières, Les expéditions françaises en Portugal de 1807 à 1811, (Paris : Publibook, 2007) and 
Léonce Bernard, Soldats d'Espagne : récits de guerre, 1808-1814, (Paris : Giovanangeli, 2008) : the former 
lacks a proper scholarly structure and the latter is a collection of edited samples from well known 
journals and memoirs – neither provide a definitive bibliography. 
31.  Laurence Montrossier, ‘Français et Britanniques dans la péninsule, 1808-1814’, Annales historiques 
de la révolution française, No. 348, No. 2, avril / juin, 2007, 131-45. 
32.  Although concise and accurate, the utility of Livermore’s review in ‘Portugal on the eve of the 
Peninsular War’, in this respect, is severely restricted due to the omission of a scholarly apparatus.  
The two most comprehensive single volume surveys by Esdaile and Gates, respectively, A new 
History and The Spanish ulcer, between them cite just three Portuguese secondary sources.  
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perspectives.  However, he provides us with some unique and extremely useful 
contemporary observations.  33   There is also a need to review the antecedents of the 
conflict, such as Portugal’s diplomatic manoeuvres and involvement in the 
Revolutionary Wars.  For this earlier period and the duration of the Peninsular War 
the detailed work of Chaby 34  and the history of Soriano  35 are obligatory, 
combining historical interpretation with primary documentation, and the more 
recent contributions by Amaral in this regard who, in addition to providing useful 
details of shifts in foreign policy also reviews politico- military development and 
social change in the final quarter of the nineteenth century.  36   However, as we 
have noted in the development of the historiography in English, French and 
Spanish there is an overriding need to ensure both historical accuracy and 
impartiality and apply modern historical research methods to ensure these accounts 
are comprehensive and brought up to date.   
                                            
33.  José Acúrcio das Neves, História geral da invasão dos Franceses em Portugal e da restauração deste reino, 
(Five volumes, Lisboa : Simão Thaddeo Ferreira,1810-1811). 
34.  Cláudio de Chaby, Excerptos históricos e collecção de documentos relativos á guerra denominada da 
Peninsula e ás anteriores de 1801, e do Roussillon e Cataluña, (Five volumes, Lisboa : Portugal 
Commissão de investigacões historicas, Imprensa Nacional, 1863-1882). 
35.  Simão José da Luz Soriano, Historia da Guerra Civil e do estabelecimento do governo parlamentar em 
Portugal: comprehendendo a historia diplomatica, militar e politica d'este reino desde 1777 até 1834, 
(Nineteen Volumes, Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional, 1866-1890). 
36. Manuel Amaral, ‘Portugal e as guerras da revolução, de 1793 a 1801: do Roussilhão ao Alemtejo’, 
in Guerra peninsular, novas interpretações: da Europa dividida à união Europeia, (Lisboa : Tribuna da 
História, 2005) and A luta política em Portugal nos finais do antigo regime: a proposta de reforma do exército 
português de 1803, (Lisboa : Tribuna de História, 2010). 
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For example, the concept of Portugal as a nation in arms would appear to have 
undergone a renaissance in the late nineteenth century by (serving) military 
historians, many of whom would appear to have also been (intrinsically) linked to 
the Republican Party in Portugal but also, paradoxically, opposed to (further) 
liberalisation of Portugal.  The loss of Brazil presaged a greater interest in its other 
colonies, for example along the west coast of Africa and Mozambique.  This would 
be a major factor influencing Portuguese politics, society and its economy well into 
the twentieth-century: indeed, unlike many other European states, Portugal 
retained her African colonies into the final quarter of that century.  Understanding 
the concept is further complicated given the interest in Portuguese nationalism and 
colonialism by conservatives and socialists alike.  An example of the former, 
Ramalho Ortigão commended Portugal to Britain in his satirical, some might argue 
vitriolic, address “To Mr. John Bull” on the occasion of a visit of the Prince of Wales 
to Lisbon, as “seu amigo, aliado e cliente, sempre explorado e sempre agradecido” 
(your friend, ally and client, always exploited and always grateful, my translation).  
Joaquim Pedro Oliveira Martins, as an example of the latter, reported in his História 
de Portugal that Portugal was “a ferramenta, o criado, a mula de carga de 
Inglaterra” (the tool, the servant, the pack mule of England, my translation), and 
asserted that Britain had inflicted more damage on Portugal than had the French 
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during the invasions of 1807-1811.  37  A common link between left and right 
therefore was a growing resentment of British involvement in Portugal and her role 
in precipitating the transfer of the court to Brazil, and therefore the loss of 
Portugal’s foremost colony, and the development of underdevelopment within 
Portugal, or worse still, as a British protectorate and dependent state.  38  
Both the early work of the progressive historian Oliveira Marques 39 and the 
more conservative Serrão 40 are helpful in this regard – but they too are now 
somewhat dated.  Future histories of the conflict will need to take into account two 
modern, comprehensive and broad-ranging histories directed and edited, 
respectively, by the historians Mattoso 41 and Serrão and Oliveira Marques.  42  
Although the volume in the Mattoso edition on the antigo regime is lacking in 
relation to Portugal’s Empire and the commensurate volume in the latter edition is 
                                            
37.  Ramalho Ortigão, John Bull, depoimento de uma testemunha ácerca de alguns aspectos da vida e da 
civilisação ingleza, (Porto : Lugan and Genelioux, 1887), pp. 95-97,  Joaquim Pedro Oliveira Martins, 
História de Portugal, (Two volumes, Lisboa : Parceria A.M. Pereira, 1908), vol. 2, pp. 268 and 269.   
38.  See the useful discussion in Mendo Castro Henriques, ‘1812 e a geopolítica da Guerra Peninsular’, 
in Guerra peninsular, novas interpretações, pp. 172-76.   
39.  A.H. de Oliveira Marques, História de Portugal: das origens às revoluções liberais., vol. 1 of 
História de Portugal, (Two volumes, Lisboa : Palas Editores, 1974). 
40.  Joaquim Veríssimo Serrão, História de Portugal, (Five volumes: Lisbon : Editorial Verbo, 1977-
1980): in particular O despotismo iluminado, 1750-1807, (1977) and  A instauração do liberalismo, 1807-
1832, (1977). 
41.  José Mattoso (ed.), História de Portugal (vol. 4): O Antigo Regime (1620-1807), (Lisboa : Editorial 
Estampa, 1993) and José Mattoso (ed.), História de Portugal (vol.5): O Liberalismo (1807-1890), (Lisboa : 
Editorial Estampa, 1993); 
42.  Joel Serrão and A.H. de Oliveira Marques (dirs. and eds.), Nova história de Portugal, (Ten volumes, 
(Lisboa : Editorial Presença).  The most relevant volume is: vol. 9: Portugal e a instauração do 
liberalismo, (Lisboa : Editorial Presença, 2002).  Thirteen volumes were planned but, unfortunately, 
the death of the two authors, the latter in 2010, has meant that the planned volume 8 of Nova história 
de Portugal: Portugal, a crise do Antigo Regime, has not been published. 
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missing entirely from the collection.   The interested historian therefore has to be 
both diligent and resourceful.   With the notable exception of Livermore, who 
provides a useful - albeit brief - summary of political, diplomatic and military issues 
in the late eighteenth century and fin de siècle Portugal, the literature in English is 
extremely sparse.  43  In addition to accessing Portuguese sources, a good 
understanding of the potential contribution of the literature in relation to Brazil is 
absolutely necessary in order to understand the interaction and interconnectedness 
of state and economy and the shifting, unpredictable and often unforeseen events in 
this crucial period.  Alexandre and Cardoso are essential for our understanding of 
political economy and the symbiotic relationship between metropole and colony.  44  
For data on the Portuguese population and economy I have relied upon Ferro and 
Serrão, Reis (and others) and Valério.  45  
                                            
43.  Harold Livermore, ‘Portugal on the Eve of the Peninsular War’ in Paddy Griffith (ed.), A History 
of the Peninsular War Volume IX: Modern Studies of the War in Spain and Portugal, 1808-1814, (London : 
Greenhill Books, 1999), 385-398. 
44.  Valentim Alexandre, Os sentidos do Imperio. Questao national e questao colonial na crise do Antigo 
Regime portugues, (Porto : Afrontamento, 1993);  José Luís Cardoso, ‘A guerra peninsular e a 
economia do império Luso-Brasileiro’, in Instituto da Defesa nacional, Guerra peninsular, novas 
interpretações: da europa dividida à união europeia, Actas do congresso realisado em 28 e 29 de Outubro de 
2002, (Lisboa : Tribuna de História, 2005), 
45.  João Pedro Ferro, A população portuguesa no final do antigo regime, 1750-1815, (Lisboa : Editorial 
Presença,1995); José V. Serrão, ‘Foi o século XVIII uma época de crise ou de progresso para a 
agricultura Portuguesa?’, Seminários de História do Instituto de Ciências Sociais, (Lisboa : 2004);  
Jaime Reis, Conceição Andrade Martins and Leonor Freire Costa, ‘New estimates of Portugal’s GDP 
per capita’, paper presented at the Portuguese Economic history Workshop, ICS, University of Lisbon, 12 
December 2011, 1-38; and Nuno Valério, ‘Portuguese Economic Performance’, in Juan Hernandez 
Andreu, José Luis Garcia Ruiz, José Morilla Critz and José Manuel Ortiz-Villajos (eds.), Las Claves del 
Desarrollo Economico. Ensayos en Homenaje al Professor Gabriel Tortella (Madrid : Universidad de Alcalá, 
2010), 431- 44. 
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A growing number of works in English focussing on the situation in Brazil 
help to shed some further light for the non-Portuguese speaker on economic, social 
and political developments in the late eighteenth century in Portugal.  For example, 
Lang, Maxwell, Schwartz and Schultz provide much needed details for Portuguese 
economics and society (albeit from the point of view of developments in Brazil). 46  
For an excellent overview of mercantilism and colonialism to the end of the 
eighteenth century, and the rise of the Atlantic economies see, respectively, Parry 
and Davis.  47  While a critical, if not compelling, review of the development of 
under-development in Portuguese political economy and the exploitative role of 
Britain during the eighteenth century, is provided by Braudel.  48  For a very useful 
review of global politics, empire and relations within and between the two Iberian 
metropolises and their roles in an ‘Atlantic system’, see Maxwell and Paquette.  49    
Finally, there is a fairly comprehensive review of the transfer of the court to Brazil 
                                                                                                                                
    
46.  James Lang, Portuguese Brazil: the king’s plantation, (New York – London, Academic Press, 1979); 
Kenneth R. Maxwell, Conflicts and Conspiracies, 1750-1808, (New York - London : Cambridge 
University Press, 1973), Pombal: paradox of the enlightenment, (Cambridge : Cambridge University 
Press, 1995); and Stuart B. Schwartz, ‘Magistracy and society in colonial Brazil’, Hispanic American 
Historical Review, vol. 50 no. 4, 1970, pp. 715-30 , Sovereignty and society in colonial Brazil: the high court 
of Bahia and its judges, 1609-1751, (University of California Press, Berkley, 1973).  
47.  Parry, Trade and dominion and Ralph Davis, The rise of the Atlantic economies, (London : Weidenfeld 
and Nicolson, 1973). 
48.  Fernand Braudel, Civilisation and capitalism, fifteenth to eighteenth century, (Three volumes, 
London : William Collins, 1982), volume II, ‘The wheels of commerce’. 
49.  Kenneth R. Maxwell, ‘The Atlantic in the eighteenth century: a southern perspective on the need 
to return to the ‘big picture’’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Sixth Series, vol. 3, 1993, 209-
236; Gabriel Paquette, ‘The dissolution of the Spanish Atlantic monarchy’, The Historical Journal, vol. 
52, no. 1 (2009), 175–212. 
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in the work of Macaulay, Schultz and Wilcken.  50  In relation to Spain, for 
comparative purposes, Esdaile provides a very useful review of social and political 
conditions, and the crisis of the antiguo régimen, Ringrose reminds us that not all 
aspects of eighteenth century economic development were negative, Lynch 
describes that country’s own dependence upon her Atlantic colonies, and Aulden 
raises the question of colonial conquest and conflict in the Americas.  51     
This brings us to Portugal’s involvement in the Revolutionary Wars, 
divergence from her preferred position of neutrality - the drivers of which were 
principally Franco-Iberian relations - and the Peninsular War.  Soriano is essential 
for issues of diplomacy and the build up to the declaration of war and, together 
with Chaby, for the campaign in Roussillon until the return of the Portuguese 
troops, whilst Amaral provides a useful modern summary.  52  Livermore 
emphasised the act of regicide, and Soriano the potential threats posed by the 
implementation of a constitutional monarchy to absolutism in Iberia, in 
                                            
50.  Neill Macaulay, Dom Pedro: The Struggle for Liberty in Brazil and Portugal, 1798-1834, (Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 1986); Kirsten Shultz, Tropical Versailles: empire, monarchy, and the Portuguese 
royal court in Rio de Janeiro, 1808-1821, (New York and London : Routledge, 2001),; Patrick Wilcken, 
Empire adrift: the Portuguese court in Rio de Janeiro, 1808-1821, (London : Bloomsbury, 2004). 
51.  Esdaile, A New History, pp. 17-20 and David R. Ringrose, Spain, Europe, and the "Spanish miracle", 
1700-1900, (Cambridge University Press, 1998), John Lynch, Spanish colonial administration, 1782-1810: 
the intendant system in the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata, (Greenwood Press, 1969), Dauril Alden, 
‘The Undeclared War of 1773-1777: Climax of Luso-Spanish Platine Rivalry’, The Hispanic American 
Historical Review, vol. 41, no. 1, (1961), 55-74.    
52.  Soriano, História da Guerra Civil, 1.ª época, vol. 1., pp 485-506 and 507-602, respectively, Chaby, 
Excerptos, vol. 1, passim, and Amaral, ‘Portugal e as guerras da revolução’, pp. 46-50. 
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precipitating this major policy shift.  53  Herr has also stressed the threat posed to 
enlightened absolutism in Spain and, by extension, Portugal.  54   For the period 1795 
to 1806, Livermore again supplies the basic information required, Soriano and 
Chaby a more detailed examination in Portuguese.  55  Vicente offers a revisionist 
viewpoint, attributing Portugal’s aversion to the tenets underpinning revolution 
and republicanism to her relationship with Britain as opposed to examining the 
pervasiveness of the absolutist state, and its apparatus, and in particular the 
extremely reactionary policies of Dona Maria I during the period of Portuguese 
history referred to as a viradeira.  56  For European politics in the second half of the 
long eighteenth century see Schroeder, who provides a comprehensive treatment of 
the period and subject, and Kraehe, Connelly and Broers who are also very useful 
for the period in question.  57   For British policy and, in particular, British policy in 
relation to Portugal, Spain and South America see, respectively, Newitt and Robson 
                                            
53.  Livermore, ‘Portugal on the Eve of the Peninsular War’, p. 385; Soriano, História da Guerra Civil, 1.ª 
época, vol. 1., chapter iv, pp. 419-506.   
54.  Richard Herr, The eighteenth-century revolution in Spain, (Princeton University Press, 1958): see 
especially pp. 435-44.    
55.  Livermore, ‘Portugal on the eve of the Peninsular War’, Soriano, História da Guerra Civil, 1.ª época, 
vol. 1 and vol 2, and Chaby, Excerptos , vol. 1. 
56.  António Pedro Vicente, Guerra Peninsular, 1801-1814, (Lisboa : Academia Portuguesa da História, 
2007) and ‘Portugal perante a política Napoléonica’, in Guerra peninsular, novas interpretações: da 
europa dividida à união europeia, Actas do congresso realisado em 28 e 29 de Outubro de 2002, (Lisboa : 
Tribuna de História, 2005). 
57.  Paul W. Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848, (Oxford University Press, 
1994); Enno E. Kraehe , Metternich's German Policy: volume I the contest with Napoleon 1799-1814, 
(Princeton University Press, 1963), Owen Connelly, Napoleon’s satellite kingdoms, (New York : The 
Free Press, 1965), and Michael Broers, Europe under Napoleon 1799-1815, (London and New York : 
Edward Arnold, 1996). 
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and Lynch and Paquette.  58   In relation to economic conflict, the development and 
implementation of the Continental System and the British response see Crafts, 
Crouzet, Heckscher and O’Brien.  59 
For a critical assessment of the campaign of 1808, and the ensuing Convention 
of Cintra, see Glover and for the understandable reaction of Portland’s 
administration to the Convention and the subsequent activities of Canning and 
Castlereagh, see Hinde.  60  Muir has argued, convincingly, that Wellesley owed his 
re-appointment in 1809 as commander in chief to the British forces in Portugal to 
Canning, as opposed to the patronage of his friend Castlereagh, while Hinde argues 
that Wellesley’s reputation after Cintra was saved by the steadfast defence put up 
by Castlereagh and Severn, meanwhile, stresses the influence of the Marquis 
                                            
58.  Malyn Newitt and Martin Robson (eds.), Lord Beresford and British Intervention in Portugal, 1807-
1820, (Lisboa : Imprensa das Ciências Sociais, 2004); Martin Robson, Britain, Portugal and South 
America in the Napoleonic Wars: alliances and diplomacy in economic maritime conflict, (London – New 
York : IB Tauris, 2011); John Lynch, ‘British Policy and South America’, Journal of Latin American 
Studies, vol. 1, no. 1, 1969, 1-30 and Paquette, ‘The dissolution of the Spanish Atlantic monarchy’, 
59.   See N.C.R. Crafts, ‘The eighteenth century: a survey’, R.C. Floud and D.N. McCloskey (eds.), The 
economic history of Britain since 1700, (Two volumes, London - New York : Cambridge University 
Press, 1981), vol. I,  and for the dislocation of trade, the effects of the Orders in Council on and other 
factors impeding growth in continental European economies,  from a French perspective, see 
François Crouzet, ‘Wars, blockade, and economic change in Europe, 1792-1815, The Journal of 
Economic History, vol. 24, no. 4, 1964, 567-588; Patrick O’Brien, ‘European economic development: the 
contribution of the periphery’, The Economic History Review, Second Series, vol. 35, no. 1, 1-18 and Eli 
F. Heckscher, The continental system: an economic interpretation, (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1922). 
60.  Michael Glover, Michael Glover, Britannia sickens: Sir Arthur Wellesley and the convention of Cintra, 
(London : Leo Cooper, 1970) and Wendy Hinde, George Canning, (London : Purnell Book Services, 
1973), in particular pp. 201-205. 
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Richard Wellesley.  61  In addition to Muir, Hall is essential for British strategy and 
the combination of military and naval resources committed to the Iberian theatre.  62  
Longford offers a liberal interpretation of Wellesley’s campaigns in 1808 and 1809, 
while Bryant provides a more critical appraisal of the relevant issues relating to 
Wellesley’s campaign in Spain and victory at Talavera, and conflicting perceptions 
of his qualities as a general and the title bestowed upon him.  63  Most recently, 
Moon has reviewed in detail a concept that has been raised repeatedly, by several of 
the historians interested in British policy referred to above, namely that of 
Wellington’s two-front war.  64     
Nowhere in the above is there a detailed study of the conflict from the 
perspective of Portugal, and most especially in relation to popular insurrections and 
resistance.  The need and appetite for such a study is clear and, moreover, there is 
also a model and precedent for its development.  As indicated above, Esdaile has 
produced a rich and broad ranging revisionist review of the Peninsular War, 
                                            
61.  Muir, ‘Britain and the Peninsular War’, Hinde, George Canning,  John K. Severn, ‘The Wellesleys 
and Iberian Diplomacy, 1808-12’, in Norman Gash (ed.), Wellington: studies in the military and political 
career of the first Duke of Wellington, (Manchester University Press, 1990). 
62 Christopher D. Hall, British strategy in the Napoleonic War, 1803-15, (Manchester : Manchester 
University Press, 1992) and Wellington’s Navy: Sea Power and the Peninsular War 1807-1814, (London : 
Chatham Publishing, 2004) 
63.  Elizabeth Longford, Wellington: the years of the sword, (London : Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969), 
see especially pp. 172-182, 184-190 and 198-199  and Arthur Bryant, Years of victory, 1802 – 1812, 
(London : Collins, 1944), especially pp. 310-24, and p. 358. 
64.  Joshua L. Moon, Wellington's Two-Front War: The Peninsular Campaigns, at Home and Abroad, 1808–
1814, (University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 2011)  
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incorporating a focused investigation of the origins of the conflict and a significant 
number of fresh insights into the war - especially those of a political and diplomatic 
nature.  65  This work builds upon significant advances within the English literature, 
over the last few decades, in terms of our understanding of Spanish involvement in 
the war and its various components, for example, the complex relationships 
between King Carlos, Godoy and Prince Ferdinand, the Junta Suprema and Spain’s 
armed forces.  66  More recently, the seminal work of Lovett, Tone and Alexandre 67  
on la guerrilla, regional insurrections and counter insurgency operations have been 
supplemented by further works covering provincial governments, the 
guerrilleros(as), bandits, adventurers and land pirates.  68  More recently, this work 
has extended to cover the concepts of popular insurgency, resistance, coercion and 
control and logistics and attrition.  69  The most recent contribution to this debate, 
                                            
 
66.  Charles J Esdaile, ‘War and Politics in Spain, 1808-1814’, The Historical Journal, 31, 2, (1988), 295-
317, ‘Wellington and the Military Eclipse of Spain’, 1808-1814, The International History Review, vol. 
11, no. 1, (Feb., 1989), 55-67 and ‘The duke of Wellington and command of the Spanish army’, in 
Norman Gash, (ed.), Wellington: studies in the military and political career of the first duke of Wellington, 
(Manchester : Manchester University Press, 1990) and David Gates, The Spanish ulcer: a history of the 
Peninsular War, (London : Pimlico, 2002). 
67.  Gabriel Lovett, Napoleon and the Birth of Modern Spain, (Two volumes, New York : New York 
University, 1965); John L. Tone, The fatal knot: the guerrilla war in Navarre and the defeat of Napoleon in 
Spain, (Chapel Hill : University of North Carolina Press, 1994); and  Don. W. Alexander, Rod of iron: 
French counterinsurgency policy in Aragon during the Peninsular War, (Wilmington : Scholarly 
Resources, 1985).  
68.  Charles J. Esdaile, Fighting Napoleon, guerrillas, bandits and adventurers in Spain, 1808-1814, (New 
Haven - London : Yale University Press, 2004), Charles J. Esdaile (ed.), Popular resistance in the French 
wars: patriots, partisans and land pirates, (New York : Palgrave, Macmillan, 2005). 
69.  Esdaile (ed.), Popular resistance in the French Wars, Ronald Fraser, Napoleon’s Cursed War: Popular 
Resistance in the Spanish Peninsular War, (London – New York : Verso, 2008) and John Morgan, ‘War 
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and in particular the chapters dealing with the concepts of popular revolt and local 
resistance; territory and collective struggle in Galicia and Catalonia; and the (social) 
origins of the guerrilla, is no less revisionist than Esdaile’s contribution, albeit for 
different reasons.  70 
In comparison, with one or two exceptions such as the very informative 
research of Dores Costa, there has not been a commensurate focus on the origins of 
the war from a Portuguese perspective, the very great contribution made by 
Portugal and the Portuguese people or the effects of the conflict on that country and 
its people.  71  Rather, the focus has been on the accomplishments of Beresford in 
equipping, mobilising, training and disciplining Portugal’s front-line troops and 
their contribution to the victories enjoyed by the Anglo-Portuguese army under 
Wellington.  For the former, see Livermore, Grehan, Cetre and Ward 72 and, for the 
                                                                                                                                
feeding war? The impact of logistics on the Napoleonic occupation of Catalonia’, The Journal of 
Military History, 73, (January 2009), 83-116.   
70.  Ronald Fraser, Napoleon’s cursed war: popular resistance in the Spanish Peninsular War, (London 
and New York : Verso, 2008) 
71.  Fernando Dores Costa, ‘Army size, military recruitment and financing in Portugal during the 
period of the Peninsula War: 1808–1811’, e-JPH, vol. 6, number 2, (Winter 2008) and ‘Conflictos entre 
Wellington y los gobernadores de Portugal durante la campaña de 1810-1811 contra Masséna’, 
Cuadernos de Historia Moderna, Anejo IX (2010), 123-145. 
72.  Harold Livermore, ‘Beresford and reform of the Portuguese army’, in Paddy Griffith (ed.), A 
History of the Peninsular War volume IX: modern studies of the war in Spain and Portugal, 1808-1814, 
(London : Greenhill Books, 1999) , John Grehan, ‘Wellington’s fighting cocks: the Portuguese army in 
the Peninsula’, in Ian Fletcher, (ed.), The Peninsular War: aspects of the struggle for the Iberian Peninsula, 
(Staplehurst : Spellmount, 1998), F. O. Cetre, ‘Beresford and the Portuguese army’, in Alice Berkeley 
(ed.), New Lights on the Peninsular War: International Congress on the Iberian Peninsula -Selected Papers 
1780-1840, Calouste Gulbenkian Centre, Lisbon, Portugal 24th-26th July, (Lisboa : British Historical 
Society of Portugal, 1991) and S. G. P. Ward, ‘The Portuguese infantry brigades, 1809-1814’, Journal of 
the Society for Army Historical Research, vol. 53, no. 214, 1975, 103-12.   
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latter, the work of historians such as Glover and Robertson who, albeit 
unashamedly Anglo-centric, stand out amongst a plethora of recent, mainly 
derivative and reiterative, contributions.  73   That being said, the very recent work 
of Buttery provides some useful insights relating to the First French invasion and 
the British expeditionary force under Wellesley.  74  The bicentenary of the conflict 
has witnessed a resurgent interest, and some very insightful studies, over the last 
few years from Portuguese historians and publishers such as Mendo Castro 
Henriques, Rui Moura, Nuno Lemos Pires, Pires Nunes and the Tribuna da 
História.  75  It has only been possible to include the briefest summary of issues 
relating to the third French invasion, for example Wellington’s protracted battle 
with the Principal Sousa (and the Bishop of Oporto) in relation to their opposition to 
his strategy for the defence of Portugal and the crucial involvement of Forjaz and 
Stuart in ensuring its successful implementation.  Horward has written prolifically 
                                            
73.  Michael Glover, The Peninsular War: a concise military history, 1807-1814, (London : David and 
Charles, 1974) and Ian Robertson, Wellington at war in the peninsula: 1808-1814 an overview and guide, 
(Barnsley : Leo Cooper, Pen and Sword, 2000). 
74.  David Buttery, Wellington against Junot: the first invasion of Portugal, 1807-1808, (Barnsley : Pen and 
Sword, 2011) provides some useful additional material but his work on the third invasion, Wellington 
against Massena: the third invasion of Portugal, 1810-1811, (Barnsley : Pen and Sword, 2008), less so. 
75.  See, for example, Instituto da Defesa Nacional, Guerra peninsular, novas interpretações: da 
Europa dividida à união Europeia, Actas do congresso realisado em 28 e 29 de Outubro de 2002, 
(Lisboa : Tribuna de História, 2005). 
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on this subject and, although dated and decidedly pro-French, this author’s work 
remains the best source of information on this important period.  76    
Finally, there is a considerable corpus of work developing our understanding 
of the personal and public spheres in relation to the six years of conflict known as 
the Peninsular War and even on the Iberian insurrections – although the focus of 
the latter is squarely on events in Spain with no commensurate study in English on 
Portugal.  Firstly, in relation to specific features of the conflict and the memoirs of 
protagonists the work of Fletcher, Richards and - especially Esdaile – provide us 
with glimpses of the human aspects of war from the perspective of the main 
protagonists.  77   My reasons for omitting the wide range of primary sources from 
participants within the Anglo-Portuguese army are quite straightforward.  The 
extent of British memoirs is extensive and their use plentiful and well known within 
the existing literature.   Generally speaking, with one or two notable exceptions, 
                                            
76.  Donald D. Horward: The French Campaign in Portugal 1810-1811: An Account by Jean Jaques 
Pelet, (Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press, 1973); Napoleon and Iberia: The Twin Sieges of 
Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, 1810, (University Press Florida, 1984); ‘Wellington and the Defence 
of Portugal’, The International History Review, vol. 11, no. 1 (Feb., 1989), 39-54, and ‘Wellington as 
a strategist, 1808-14’, in Norman Gash, (ed.), Wellington: studies in the military and political career of 
the first duke of Wellington, (Manchester : Manchester University Press, 1990). 
77.  Ian Fletcher, (ed.), The Peninsular War: aspects of the struggle for the Iberian Peninsula, (Staplehurst : 
Spellmount, 1998) and Voices from the peninsula: eyewitness accounts by soldiers of Wellington’s 
army, (Stackpole, Pennsylvania : Greenhill, 2001),  D.S. Richards, The peninsula veterans, (London : 
Macdonald and Jane’s, 1975) and The peninsula years: Britain's redcoats in Spain and Portugal, (Barnsley 
: Leo Cooper, 2002) and Charles J. Esdaile, Peninsular Eyewitnesses: the experience of war in Spain and 
Portugal, 1808-1813, (Barnsley : Pen and Sword, 2008).  Despite the wider scope of the latter, none of 
these surveys provide insights into the human aspects of the war for the Portuguese unless refracted 
through the prism of the British soldier or officer.    
19 
 
their views of indigenous Iberians are negative and - often - exceptionally 
xenophobic.    
With the objective of providing a fresh viewpoint, I have preferred to revisit 
and critically re-examine French memoires.  The perspective of French participants 
in the conflict is almost as well-served as that of the British, and no less partisan or 
chauvinistic in terms of their views of indigenous Iberians, if at times more elusive, 
but has received comparatively little attention within the English literature in 
relation to these research questions.  Moreover, French protagonists were eye 
witness of the conflict with the Portuguese in the years 1808 and 1809; the British 
intervening decisively after the insurrections in the former and subsequent to the 
occupation of Oporto in the latter.  The quality and consistency of French 
eyewitness accounts, as with that of the British can vary, and they are no less 
contradictory, subject to bias or polemical content - all of which, together with the 
date of publication, editor and sponsor have to be borne in mind.  The interested 
reader is referred to the primary and secondary sources in the bibliography for 
further details of French works consulted.   
In addition to das Neves, reference to Basto, Matos and Pulido Valente is 
crucial for a correct understanding of the popular insurrections in Portugal in 1808 
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and 1809.  78  Vicente and Caillaux de Almeida provide some additional and useful 
insights from a Portuguese perspective and an interesting, if not compelling, 
revisionist review of French intervention in Portugal.  79   Finally, two modern 
studies have proved useful in bringing a Portuguese perspective to assist with our 
understanding of the human and public sphere.   80    
Hopefully the following dissertation will prove to be a useful start, in terms of 
addressing the above mentioned imbalances, but there is very considerable work to 
be done to bring our understanding of the Portuguese (and French) experiences of 
this war to the level enjoyed by those interested in the British and Spanish 
perspectives. 
                                 
                                            
78.  Artur de Magalhães Basto, ‘O Pôrto contra Junot’, in Damião Peres (ed.), Revista de Estudos 
Históricos, 1.º Ano – N.º 4, Outubro-Dezembro, 1924, pp. 51-61; 88-120; and 121-147, Henrique José 
Martins Matos, ‘As juntas minhotas de 1808 na reacção à occupação francesa’, Revista de faculdade de 
letras: História, Porto, III serie, vol. 10, 2009, 43-55   
 and Vasco Pulido Valente, ‘O povo em armas: a revolta nacional de 1808-1809’, Analise Social, vol. 
XV, no. 57, 1979, 7-48. 
79.  António Pedro Vicente, ‘Raisons de la défaite de Napoléon au Portugal’, Rives méditerranéennes, 
‘Napoléon and le Portugal’, 2010, n° 36, 2, 13-26 and Tereza Caillaux de Almeida~, ‘L'échec des 
campagnes napoléoniennes au Portugal dans les Mémoires des Officiers Françaises’, Rives 
méditerranéennes, ‘Napoléon and le Portugal’, 2010, n° 36, 2, pp. 59-69.  In an interesting twist of fate, 
two of the most celebrated of Portuguese generals to emerge in the period 1809 to 1814 were both of 
French origin: Champalimaud and Lecor. 
80. Tereza Caillaux de Almeida, Memória das ‘invasões Francesas’ em Portugal (1807-1811), (Lisboa : 
Ésquilo, 2010) and Luís Maria Pedrosa Dos Santos Graça, ‘Resistência e conspiração no tempo da 
guerra peninsular: um “francesismo” regional – acção e perseguição’, in Guerra peninsular, novas 
interpretações , pp. 361-441. 
21 
 
Chapter two: the origins of the French invasions of Portugal 
 
Economic and political relations between Britain, France, Portugal and Spain 
at the turn of the nineteenth century were multifaceted.  And the circumstances 
leading up to the French invasions of Portugal, between 1807 and 1811, and British 
intervention in the Iberian Peninsula from 1808, were also highly complex.  
Immediately prior to the third invasion of 1810-1811, Portugal had been invaded 
twice by French armies in 1807 and 1809 and once by a Spanish army, supported by 
France, in 1801.  While there had clearly been attempts to draw Portugal within the 
arc of Consular influence, and ultimately to integrate the country into the 
Napoleonic Empire, the origins of French designs on Portugal do not begin with 
Napoleon’s reign.  Rather, they are to be found in the longer term, throughout the 
long eighteenth century and, most especially, in the thirty years leading up to 1807. 
While Portuguese foreign policy was often in line with that of Britain, it was 
not solely directed by Britain or British interests.  In the final quarter of the 
eighteenth century, at least four shifts in Portuguese foreign policy are visible: the 
first two of these were developed jointly with Spain while the third was a 
consequence of Spanish aggression and the fourth resulted from the development 
of the Coalition of European powers against the French Republic.  Portugal could 
clearly try to steer her own course, but would continue to be subject to errant winds 
and wayward tides.  Portugal and Spain negotiated a series of agreements and 
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treaties guaranteeing (mutual) security and neutrality.  During the American War 
of Independence, the two countries signed a maritime and neutrality convention 
jointly and with Russia.  Between 1789 and 1790 Spain requested the assistance of 
France (under an existing treaty between the two countries) in addressing a dispute 
over access to navigation rights and trade on the Pacific coast of North America.  
The refusal of France to assist Spain on this matter is not of immediate concern here, 
but two outcomes of direct relevance were: the repudiation of the existing treaty 
between Spain and France and resurgent hostilities between Spain and Portugal.  
Most importantly, perhaps, throughout this period, and especially during the 
development of the First Coalition and the early revolutionary wars, Portugal 
consistently articulated a well-thought-through policy of neutrality in all matters of 
European foreign policy.  81 
A major difficulty faced in addition to disputes within and between the four 
main protagonists involved, Britain, France, Portugal and Spain, were the complex 
interconnections with colonies in the southern hemisphere.  The peripheral location 
of such a small state of fewer than 3 million people on the south west tip of Europe 
belied Portugal’s importance in a Euro-Atlantic system spanning northern and 
southern hemispheres of the globe.  In this respect also, it is not merely coincidental 
                                            
81.  For these shifts in foreign policy see Manuel Amaral, ‘Portugal e as guerras da revolução, de 1793 
a 1801: do Roussilhão ao Alemtejo’, in Guerra peninsular, novas interpretações: da Europa dividida à união 
Europeia, (Lisboa : Tribuna da História, 2005) and for the Iberian Atlantic Empire see Kenneth R. 
Maxwell, ‘The Atlantic in the eighteenth century: a southern perspective on the need to return to the 
‘big picture’’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Sixth Series, vol. 3, 1993, 209-236. 
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that British and French policy, in the second half of the eighteenth century, became 
increasingly predicated upon the struggle for maritime supremacy and mercantile 
competitiveness.  82   Moreover, the growth within European economies was 
progressively dependent upon “commercial intercourse” with the Americas.  
According to O’Brien: 
“[By] the 1790s, the geographical destination of commodity exports that crossed the 
boundaries of European states was: to other European states 76 per cent, to North 
America 10 per cent, to Latin America and the Caribbean 8 per cent, to Asia 5 per cent 
and to Africa 1 per cent.  The “periphery” [the four last named destinations] 
purchased about 14 per cent of Europe’s exports  … [but if the “periphery” were to be] 
“redefined to include the Southern colonies of North America, where African slaves 
worked the tropical plantations … by the end of the eighteenth century the flows of 
commodities transshipped between Western Europe and regions of the “periphery” of 
the “modern world system” might amount to 20 percent of exports and 25 per cent of 
imports.”    83 
Britain and France had been at war since 1793: and Portugal was one of the 
last countries to sign a formal agreement of alliance against the French Republic, as 
she desperately tried to sustain her neutrality.  But first Spain, and eventually, 
                                            
82.  See P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, The political economy of British expansion overseas, 1750-1914, 
The Economic History Review, Second Series, vol. 33, no. 4, 1980, 463-490, especially pp. 471-474, 
Daniel A. Baugh, ‘Withdrawing from Europe: Anglo French maritime geopolitics, 1750-1800’, The 
International History Review, vol. 20, no. 1, 1998, 1-32 and Martin Robson, Britain, Portugal and South 
America in the Napoleonic Wars: alliances and diplomacy in economic maritime conflict, (London – New 
York : IB Tauris, 2011.   
83.  Patrick O’Brien, ‘European economic development: the contribution of the periphery’, The 
Economic History Review, Second Series, vol. 35, no. 1, 1-18. 
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Portugal joined the anti-French coalition of European powers as Livermore reported 
quite succinctly: 
“In 1793 France declared war on her [Spain] and sent a delegate to Lisbon to seek 
Portuguese neutrality.  Britain negotiated an alliance with Spain, and in June Grenville 
sought a treaty with Portugal. In July, Portugal made an offensive and defensive 
alliance with Spain.”.  84  
The brief alliance of these two Iberian powers culminated in a joint military 
campaign and invasion of French territory in the south, while other allies 
threatened France from the north.  The provision of a military force was Portugal’s 
first act of open aggression against France on mainland Europe.  Ultimately, with 
French victory in this conflict - the War of Roussillon - the Spanish abandoned their 
erstwhile allies and negotiated peace leaving the Portuguese contingent to make its 
own way home and Portugal to seek whatever terms it could from the victors.  
Crucially, the decision to join the coalition had breached Portugal’s long term 
strategy of remaining neutral in any pan-European conflict, a policy aim which it 
had maintained throughout the vast majority of the last quarter of the eighteenth 
century.  The deciding factors that explain Portugal’s resolve to send a military 
contingent to aid Spain, and directly intervene in the Revolutionary Wars, were the 
acts of revolution and regicide.  The overthrow of the French monarchy and 
execution of Louis XVI represented a direct a threat to the security of the Bragança 
                                            
84 .  Livermore, ‘Beresford and reform of the Portuguese army’, p. 385 
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dynasty in Portugal, and to Bourbon rule in Spain: this common threat effectively 
underpinning the alliance of these two - previously antagonistic and highly 
competitive - Iberian powers.  85 
 The outcome of the War of Roussillon was neither total peace nor all out war.  
Spain managed to build upon the peace negotiations to develop a more fully-
fledged alliance with France by 1795.  Britain and Portugal, meanwhile, continued 
to develop diplomatic and trading relationships.  Despite, perhaps, some major 
disagreements in the two decades spanning the fin de siècle, the alliance between the 
two powers - one of the longest-standing in European history - prevailed.  While 
the Anglo-Portuguese accord was primarily driven by a number of shared 
economic and political aims and reciprocal developments in trade and industry, it 
had developed by the end of the eighteenth century to the extent that Britain 
maintained a small military force in Portugal for short periods – notably in 1796 and 
also 1800.  However, only a small number of these troops were British being 
comprised, in the main, of French émigré regiments and Dillon’s Irish.  As will be 
detailed later, Portugal would have preferred a more substantial British military 
                                            
85.  Harold Livermore, ‘Portugal on the Eve of the Peninsular War’ in Paddy Griffith (ed.), A History of 
the Peninsular War Volume IX: Modern Studies of the War in Spain and Portugal, 1808-1814, (London : 
Greenhill Books, 1999), pp. 385-398, Simão José da Luz Soriano, História da Guerra Civil e do 
estabelecimento do governo parlamentar em Portugal comprehendendo a história diplomática militar e política 
d'este reino desde 1777 até 1834 (Nineteen volumes, Lisboa : Imprensa Nacional, 1866-1890), 1.ª época, 
vol. 1., chapter iv, pp. 419-506 and Richard Herr, The eighteenth-century revolution in Spain, (Princeton 
University Press, 1958), pp. 435-44. 
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presence: instead Britain’s response was to dispatch troops to the Mediterranean 
and Egypt and to occupy Madeira (much to Portugal’s consternation).    86   
Militarily, Portugal remained preoccupied with territorial integrity and, 
therefore, the border with Spain and threats presented by a Franco-Spanish alliance.  
Comprehensive plans were developed and implemented for a possible defensive 
campaign against land-based aggression.  For example, in 1796, a military camp 
was created to mobilise a substantial part of the Portuguese Army, perfecting 
defensive manoeuvres to face a potential Franco-Spanish invasion.  Inspections 
carried out by Baron Waldeck, in 1798, revealed a relatively well prepared 
defensive force of ten regiments, competent in undertaking military manoeuvres - 
but in various guises due to inconsistent implementation of new military 
regulations and the necessity of drilling with arms of various provenance and bore.  
In addition, a British expeditionary force was sent out to strengthen the Portuguese 
Army.  87   Spain, meantime, given its alliance with France, was soon forced to 
declare war on Britain, a move that had significant implications for both Spain and 
Portugal.  For Spain, the enmity of Britain meant that Spanish ports were 
                                            
86.  See Livermore, ‘Portugal on the eve of the Peninsula War’, pp. 386-388, for a useful review of the 
salient points.  See also pp. 91-95 in Edgar Prestage, ‘The Anglo-Portuguese alliance’, Transactions of 
the Royal Historical Society, Fourth Series, vol. 17, 1934, 69-100. 
87.  Manuel Amaral, ‘Portugal e as Guerras Da Revolução’,pp. 54-55, citing documento n.º 98 “Plano 
de defesa, ou das posições que devem ocupar os exércitos de observação, feito em 4 de Setembro de 
1796”, in Soriano, História da Guerra Civil, 1.ª época, vol. 3, pp. 450-59; and “Documentos publicados 
sobre as revistas passadas a regimentos de infantaria, cavalaria, artilharia e milícias assim como a 
ordenanças na Beira, Estremadura, Alentejo e Algarve pelo príncipe de Waldeck”, in the Boletim do 
Arquivo Histórico Militar, 62.º volume, pp. 153-373.   
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blockaded, with considerable repercussions for both the domestic economy and, of 
course, international trade.  At the same time, Portugal’s frontier could only be truly 
secure if friendly relations with Spain were maintained.  As a result, Dom João, the 
second son of Dom Pedro III, and Portuguese Regent since 1797, was coming under 
increasing pressure from France and Spain to join with them and declare war on 
Britain.   88 
Although joining the alliance would guarantee Portugal’s mainland territorial 
sovereignty, it would also serve to undermine if not totally destroy, her maritime 
security and ultimately the Portuguese economy.  Portugal was ultimately 
sustained by the enormous revenue derived from international trade and Lisbon’s 
singular position as entrepôt for goods and raw materials from Portuguese colonies 
and particularly, at this time, those from Brazil.  89  As Russell-Wood observed, 
Whatever Portugal imported, be it spices, perfumed woods, and roots with medicinal 
purposes from Asia, ivory or slaves from Africa, wines from Madeira, or sugar, 
                                            
88.  In relation to Spain see Charles Esdaile, The Peninsular War: A New History, (London : Allen 
Lane, 2002), pp. 17-20 and David. R. Ringrose, Spain, Europe, and the "Spanish miracle", 1700-1900, 
(Cambridge University Press, 1998).  For mercantilism and colonialism to the end of the eighteenth 
century, see Parry, Trade and dominion.  For the inter-dependence of Portugal and Brazil see Valentim 
Alexandre, Os sentidos do Império: questão nacional e questão colonial na crise do Antigo Regime português, 
Volume 5 of Colecção Biblioteca das ciências do homen: História, (Porto : Edições Afrontamento, 
1993).  Dom João, as the second son of Dom Pedro III, had ruled as prince regent of Portugal since 
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89.  For details of the wide range of imports and re-exports into and from Lisbon see A.J.R. Russell-
Wood, A world on the move: the Portuguese in Africa, Asia and America, 1415-1808, (Manchester :  
Cancarnet - Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, 1992), especially ‘chapter iv: ebb and flow of 
commodities’, pp. 123-47.   
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cottons and dyewoods from Brazil, there was an eager and insatiable market in 
Europe for these goods from overseas.”  90 
Portugal did have a growing, albeit relatively weak, domestic market.  91  But, 
in essence, Portuguese economic and, more particularly, commercial, prosperity 
was principally founded upon colonial aggrandisement and exploitation, 
underpinned by relatively favourable trading agreements.  Moreover, the 
Portuguese economy was, increasingly, sustained by the “old alliance” with Britain 
and especially after 1805, by the Royal Navy’s unchallengeable maritime 
supremacy.  Throughout the eighteenth century the British economy benefited from 
sustained and increasing demand for manufactured goods and therefore, given 
necessary limitations on growth of domestic demand, the growth of overseas 
markets.  The intermittent discontinuities in the development of foreign markets, 
resulting from wars throughout the long eighteenth century, meant that exporting 
manufacturers and merchants increasingly sought new markets.  The substantial 
rates of growth in the population of the Americas, of migrant Europeans, enslaved 
African and indigenous populations, fuelled demand for British exported 
manufactures such as cottons and worsteds, non-ferrous metal, glass and 
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earthenware products and also the export of fine goods from the Portuguese 
metropolis such as silks, cottons and woollens.  92 
Despite growth and specific improvements in the domestic sphere, and 
particularly in the agricultural sector  93, the Portuguese economy in the final 
quarter of the eighteenth century, was increasingly threatened, as Alexandre notes, 
by an inherent ‘structural vulnerability’.  
“The central interpretive concept [was Portugal’s] vulnerability in geo-political terms.  
However, in underlining the permanent and structural nature of this vulnerability, 
throughout the eighteenth century, we would also equally stress an enhanced 
manoeuvrability within Portuguese foreign policy, from 1777, based upon 
increasingly close relations between the courts of Lisbon, Madrid and Paris whilst [at 
the same time] preserving the principal (and preferential) relationship with England.  
Portuguese foreign policy evolved into a multi-polar system of alliances, which 
(better) permitted resistance to British pressures.” 94 
Mercantilism, imperialism and, more specifically, the interdependence of the 
Portugal-Brazil-Africa trade triangle underpinned Portugal’s absolutist monarchy 
                                            
92.  For the dislocation of trade, the effects of the Orders in Council on and other factors impeding 
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93.  Serrão, ‘Foi o século XVIII uma época de crise’ 
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Regime português, Volume 5 of Colecção Biblioteca das ciências do homem: História, (Porto : Edições 
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and her economy.  Ironically, albeit for different reasons, this ‘structural 
vulnerability’ was a common concern of members of the partido francês and partido 
ingles.  But here a note is required on the concept of political allegiance.   There 
were, of course, no formal political parties in Portugal at this time.  The terms 
partido francês and partido inglês reflected ideological commonalities of adherents to 
the two main groups that wielded political power.  The partido francês, in general 
terms, looked inwards towards Europe and France (and also Spain) in particular, 
and was more acquiescent to French ideas and influence.  The partido inglês, 
however, looked outwards towards the Atlantic and Portugal’s maritime Empire 
and, as a consequence, was amenable to British influence.  95  As such, their 
competing ideologies were predicated upon substantial differences in perspectives 
combining national and international economics and politics.  They were further 
complicated by a complex and entangled web of political and familial connections 
and, of course, the pervasiveness of political patronage and vested interests as 
represented, for example, by the Portuguese and Brazilian mercantilist and proto-
industrialist oligarchies.  96  
                                            
95.  A useful stipulative definition for party at this time would probably include three essential 
components: an organised group of individuals with common interests; these individuals seek to 
control the state (even where representatives of more than one party are present within the 
“executive”); they will be competitive for the favour of the king, queen or prince regent (given the 
absence of elections) and thereby seek to control polity and political economy.   
96.  For which see Maxwell, Conflicts and conspiracies, particularly the final chapter ‘compromise’. 
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French aggression and, from 1795, the Franco-Spanish alliance, represented a 
major threat to Portuguese sovereignty on mainland Europe.  Additionally, France 
and Spain had designs on Brazil: the former from its territories bordering the north 
of that country, the latter from those bordering its southernmost reaches.  
Appeasement was the preferred response of the partido francês to the threats posed 
in mainland Europe and Portugal’s overseas dominions by this alliance.  Britain, 
meantime, was perceived as a threat to Portugal’s colonies in general, but 
principally to Brazil, Africa and some strategic island territories.  However, Britain’s 
aggressive pursuit of raw materials and markets, for example in the Americas, was 
not a principal concern for the partido inglês given its desire to placate, rather than 
antagonise, Britain and prevailing, and mutually beneficial, economic conditions 
and considerations, not least of which was Lisbon’s exclusive position as entrepôt.     
The drivers of European political economy were increasingly global in 
character throughout the long eighteenth century; resulting intermittently in 
continuity and change, conflict and compromise.  Portugal’s options were 
constrained as much by the tremendous distances separating metropolis and 
colony, and the relatively precarious nature of the Portuguese navy, as by territorial 
insecurity and the limited resources available to sustain her sovereignty in 
continental Europe.  Maintaining the policy of appeasement, and the preferred 
position of neutrality in the face of European conflict, would appear to have offered 
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the only realistic and feasible diplomatic options to ensure economic stability and 
growth.  97  But this position would become increasingly difficult to sustain in the 
face of increasing hostility on the European continent.   
In 1801, Napoleon effectively coerced Godoy, first minister of Spain, into a 
joint invasion of Portugal.  Godoy though had his own designs.  Military success 
against Portugal would help undermine his detractors, secure his power base and 
help divert attention from domestic issues.  For Napoleon, the war afforded an 
opportunity, indirectly at least, to strike at Britain, make economic gains and, 
potentially, attain much-needed additional ships of the line to challenge Britain’s 
overwhelming maritime superiority.  While Portugal was not the maritime power 
of old, the overall size and importance of the Portuguese fleet had been 
substantially augmented under the ministry of D. Rodrigo de Sousa Coutinho.  The 
Portuguese navy and merchant fleet had benefited directly from a significant 
programme of ship building and related maritime improvements, and indirectly 
from continued investment in Brazil and overall growth of that country’s economy 
and the scale and range of exported produce.  98  Moreover, the strategic location 
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and capacity of Lisbon’s harbour were an unquestionably important factor in 
defining competitive economic advantage and a successful maritime strategy.  99    
Despite some initially successful Portuguese diplomatic tactics delaying any 
offensive, France and Spain ultimately declared war on Portugal and the Spanish 
invasion force crossing the Portuguese frontiers in 1801.  For Portugal, in addition 
to matters of international politics and diplomacy, there were a number of military 
considerations and issues to take into account.  Firstly, Portugal had no appetite for 
European aggrandisement; although an aggressive policy of territorial acquisition 
in Brazil and surrounding territories was actively pursued throughout this period 
and beyond.  Strictly in relation to continental Europe, though, neither Dom João 
nor Portuguese foreign policy was naturally belligerent.  As a result, no significant 
reforms of Portugal’s land based military forces had been implemented since 
Pombal’s premiership.  The current commander in chief, the very elderly Duc de 
Lafões, was not only a senior member of the Portuguese royal family, and a leading 
light in the partido aristocrático, the nearest Portuguese equivalent of the Whig party, 
but had also retained the appointment of Marshal-General of Portugal since 1791.  
100 Lafões had both managed to retain Portugal’s highest military office and 
stubbornly resist any military reform, for over a decade, despite the army suffering 
                                                                                                                                
XXVII, Otoño 2009, no. 2, 183-204 and Parry, Trade and Dominion, in particular chapter 2, ‘The South 
Atlantic and the West Indies’, pp. 29-41.  
99.   Robson Britain, Portugal and South America in the Napoleonic War, pp. 35-36. 
100.  Manuel Amaral, A luta política em Portugal , pp. 28-29  
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a number of military setbacks under his overall command.  The Portuguese army 
was therefore inadequately prepared for the war in 1801: its devastating outcomes, 
and the loss of Portuguese territories in Extremadura, presaged Lafões’ final 
undoing and were the catalyst for subsequent military reforms. 
Godoy meantime, in support of domestic political ambitions, had the triple 
aims of: defeating Portugal without the assistance of French forces (thus ensuring 
Spanish sovereignty); winning a quick war (thereby minimising the costs of war); 
and imposing terms on the Portuguese most favourable to Spain.  The short-lived 
War of the Oranges, military operations and subsequent negotiations between the 
Spanish and Portuguese which ended in the Treaty of Badajoz are of no immediate 
concern here.  However, two outcomes are.  Firstly, as a consequence of the peace, 
French troops had no excuse to enter the Iberian Peninsula and become involved in 
the war against - and ultimately occupy - Portugal.  Napoleon viewed the terms of 
treaty with some disdain, blaming his brother Lucien Bonaparte and Godoy for not 
imposing more strenuous terms on Portugal and, thereby, securing Portuguese 
submission to French foreign policy - especially on matters relating to the war 
against Britain.  Secondly, Portuguese feelings were embittered by defeat and the 
loss of territories – Olivença and Jerumenha in Portugal to Spain and northernmost 
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Brazil (bordering French Guyana) to France.  101  While ceding seemingly 
insignificant strips of territory may have appeared to have been a small price to 
pay, when so much could have been at stake, this issue also continued to be a bone 
of contention between Portugal, Spain and Britain throughout the Peninsular War, 
up to and beyond the Congress of Vienna.  Thirdly, a small but important 
reinforcement to the existing British military force, mentioned above, had as 
recently as 1800 been promised to Portugal.  However, just at the point when it was 
most required, all direct military aid subsequently had to be withdrawn.  The 
removal of British troops from Portugal did nothing to either help smooth 
diplomacy between the two countries or convince Portugal of Britain’s support at a 
time when relations with France and Spain were decidedly hostile.  These troop 
movements were a necessary response to Napoleon’s Egyptian campaign in 
pursuance of a long standing British strategy to support its continental allies by 
mounting small, diversionary, amphibious operations against relatively vulnerable 
French targets.  However, Britain’s argument was not entirely persuasive and, in 
addition, the mistrust was not one-sided.  Finally, Anglo-Portuguese diplomacy at 
the time came to revolve around British concerns for what they saw as Portuguese 
acquiescence to, and subsequent collusion with, Spain on matters of trade.  This 
                                            
101.  For a useful summary of military developments at a strategic and tactical level see Pedro de 
Avillez, ‘Portugal nas guerras napoléonicas: uma visão global’, in Guerra peninsular, novas 
interpretações: da Europa dividida à união Europeia, (Lisboa : Tribuna da História, 2005), particularly pp. 
465-66 and for the wider politico-military perspectives, see Shirley Black, ‘Olivenza: An Iberian 
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latter issue being inconsistent, from Britain’s viewpoint, with Portugal’s preferred 
status of neutrality.  Ultimately, the effects of these developments at the turn of the 
century were substantial and, in addition, Anglo-Portuguese diplomatic relations 
soured somewhat in the period 1800 to 1802.   
The Portuguese meantime, mindful of Moreau’s and Napoleon’s successes, 
respectively, at Hohenlinden and Marengo, were at pains to placate rather than risk 
enraging the Spanish (and, more particularly, their French allies) over trade related 
issues.  A further factor underpinning the intricate nature of, and complex 
developments in, Portuguese foreign policy was that Dom João’s wife Carlota 
Joaquina was of Spanish Bourbon stock.  She maintained a significant influence on 
aspects of Portuguese policy and, particularly, regarding relations with Spain; that 
is, until the estrangement of the royal couple in the period immediately prior to the 
first French invasion in 1807.  With the exception of the short-lived War of the 
Oranges, and the ongoing dispute over the ensuing cessation of the occupied 
territories to Spain, and taking into account Portugal’s relatively aggressive policy 
for colonial aggrandisement and the prominence of its maritime capability, 
relationships were relatively amicable between these two neighbouring Iberian 
powers.  102  However, arguments over trade and shipping were becoming an 
                                            
102.  Both Spain and Portugal managed to placate France (and also Britain) simultaneously by paying 
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História da Guerra Civil, 1.ª época, vol. 2, pp. 555 et seq. 
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increasingly important feature of diplomatic relations between these four countries 
– even in this early period.  While there is more than a hint of inconsistency and 
improvisation in British policy towards Portugal at this time, the greater and 
impending threat to British interests can be seen to be the driving force behind the 
shift in emphasis in British foreign policy – i.e. as opposed to a reluctance to 
support one of the British government’s few long-term allies when threatened by 
one, or more, (common) enemy.  103  Although the issues above were eventually 
resolved, for a time at least, firstly by the treaty of Badajoz between Spain and 
Portugal and secondly by the peace of Amiens between Britain and France (and 
their respective allies), they were to emerge and intensify again in the period 1804-
1807.  But for the time being, with French security on her natural borders, and the 
acceptance of further buffer or satellite states in the Netherlands and Italy, as 
ratified in the Treaty of Lunéville, the ensuing peace of Amiens proved to be the 
most substantial break in the war on continental Europe between 1793 and 1815.  
Napoleon’s designs on Portugal, for the time being, were put on hold. 
Portugal steadfastly refused to take sides in face of increasing pressures, from 
both Britain and France at the turn of the century and, especially, after the 
                                            
103.  See Frederick Black Jr. ‘Diplomatic Struggles: British Support in Spain and Portugal, 1800–1810’, 
(Unpublished PhD thesis :  Florida State University, 2005), pp. 15-16, citing Grenville to Frere, 
October 1800 PRO FO 63/35.  Britain had three underlying concerns with Portugal in relation to 
trade: the continued access to Portuguese ports enjoyed by Spanish vessels; Portuguese vessels 
carrying Spanish trade; and the activities of Spanish privateers against British shipping off the 
Portuguese coast – Grenville to Frere, 20 Jan., 1801, PRO FO 63/35 cited in Black, ‘Diplomatic 
Struggles’, pp. 22-23.   
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resumption of hostilities due to the collapse of the Peace of Amiens.  Portugal’s 
situation was perhaps made easier by her relatively peripheral location in Europe 
and Napoleon’s more pressing concerns in central Europe.  However, her attempts 
to remain neutral became increasingly more difficult to sustain.  The revival of 
hostilities ratcheted up commercial conflict.  Britain increasingly enforced its 
blockade on trade - particularly that from the Americas - with continental Europe, 
in response to Napoleon’s extension of the exclusion policies against British 
shipping from France, and French controlled territories, along the North Sea coast 
to Hamburg and Bremen.  Commercial war, and, in particular, these early 
‘skirmishes’ in the continental blockade presaged further measures to restrict access 
to European markets by the closure of all ports in continental Europe to British 
shipping; measures that would have a more devastating impact should Portugal 
succumb to French diplomatic pressures.  104  Crucially, in this period, Portuguese 
foreign policy was driven by a leading figure in the partido francês at the centre of 
the Portuguese court and government, Dom António de Araújo de Azevedo.   
 The drivers of Napoleonic policy towards Portugal were complex.  Napoleon 
was attempting to secure closure of one of the few remaining breaches of the 
economic stranglehold he was trying to impose on Britain.  He also had designs on 
                                            
104.  Eli F Heckscher, The continental system: an economic interpretation, (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 
1922), part II, chapter 1, and especially pp. 81-83, for the origins and development of commercial war 
prior to the Berlin decree, and Crouzet, ‘Wars, blockade, and economic change in Europe’, passim.  
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the Portuguese fleet and, given Lisbon’s strategic location, potential opportunities 
for aggrandisement presented by Portuguese colonies (especially in relation to 
Brazil) and access to potentially lucrative South American markets.  In this last 
regard though, Portuguese policy would ultimately be shaped by her long standing 
maritime and commercial agreements with Britain.  Indeed, while Britain may not 
have been in a position to provide direct, land based, military support to Portugal, 
to face the French invasion, France could be denied access to South America.  And a 
small British naval and military contingent duly set out for and landed in Madeira 
to secure this strategically important naval base; albeit for the duration of the 
present crisis, and amidst not a little Portuguese resentment and humility.  105   
 Britain’s response to this crisis would appear to add weight to the argument 
that, from the signing of the Methuen Treaty a century earlier, Portugal was no 
more than a dependent economy of Britain.  This assertion is not only a 
considerable distortion of the complex economic relationships between the two 
countries but also seriously undervalues the autonomy of Portuguese political 
economy and foreign policy.  Four main influences shaped the development of 
Portuguese foreign policy from the seventeenth century onwards.  The defence of 
Portugal against Spanish aggression - a particularly important consideration in 
                                            
105. Livermore, ‘Portugal on the eve of the Peninsular War’, Soriano, História da Guerra Civil 1.ª época, 
vol. 2, pp. 438-39, and Desmond Gregory ‘British Occupations of Madeira during the Wars against 
Napoleon’, Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, vol. 66, no. 266 (Summer 1988), 80-96. 
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those periods when Spain is allied with France (the “norm” during the “family 
pact” underpinning the Bourbon dynasty); the protection of colonial commerce - the 
single most important component of Portuguese international trade; the territorial 
integrity of Portuguese colonies (for example in relation to threats to Brazil from 
French Guyana to the north and Spanish Rio de la Plata to the south); and the 
preservation of the single most important mainstay of the Portuguese empire, 
namely the supply of slaves from African coastal states to its colonies and, in 
particular, Brazil.  Security in neutrality was a possibility, but could only be 
achieved with the successful development and implementation of some very 
complex policy options in reaction to, or in attempts to mitigate, external drivers 
and internal pressures.   106  
Portugal’s best possible course was to try to sustain an increasingly precarious 
peace, particularly regarding relations with France and Britain, by reverting back to 
and maintaining the preferred position of neutrality.  For this strategy to succeed, it 
would, at times, mean playing one country off against the other (a policy that once 
more came under pressure when Britain declared war on France in 1803, insisting 
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that Portugal do the same).  The period immediately following the War of the 
Oranges, and the re-commencement of hostilities between Britain and France 
following the Peace of Amiens, was interesting to say the least.  Similarly, the 
period immediately preceding 1807 was marked by a series of political and military 
events, the dynamics of which were to continue to have repercussions for at least 
two decades.  In addition to Portuguese domestic issues, a number of international 
developments featured prominently such as the resumption of hostilities between 
Britain and France, the crowning of Napoleon as Emperor in 1804, the development 
of the third coalition in 1805 and the resumption and intensification of European 
conflict. 
 Within Portugal, two main developments arose from the unsuccessful 
campaign of the War of the Oranges.  Although officially exonerated of blame for 
the disastrous performance of the Portuguese army, the Duke de Lafões was 
replaced by Count von der Goltz as commander in chief of the Portuguese army 
(supported by Dom José Maria de Sousa Botelho).  107 Additionally, the 
responsibilities of the Secretary of State for War were reunited with the briefly 
independent portfolio of foreign affairs: the two portfolios were previously 
combined under the tutelage of Dom João de Almeida a leading light in the partido-
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inglês.  One result of these changes, and, more specifically, of interventions resulting 
directly from the work of the military commissions, was the development of a 
modern structure for the recruitment and mobilisation of the Portuguese army and, 
for the first time, a professional general staff.  These innovations, though, were not 
without their detractors (both political and military) and this period was marked by 
divisions amongst the higher echelons of the Portuguese military and a more 
discernible prominence in Portuguese politics and in government (if not outright 
power) of the partido francês.  108  Lannes’ onslaught, during his first term at the 
Portuguese court against D. João de Almeida and D. Rodrigo de Sousa Coutinho, 
considered to be two of Portugal’s more enlightened and pro-British politicians of 
the time, was a considerable and ultimately defining factor in Portuguese politics 
up to the declaration of war between Britain and France in 1803.  109   Lannes’ return 
to that office, and the intensification of French pressures, resulted in the dismissal of 
these two ministers from government and the consolidation of power in the partido 
francês and, specifically, António de Araújo.  110   
The illness at the beginning of 1804, and ultimate death in April of that year, of 
Luís Pinto de Sousa Coutinho effectively resulted in the reduction of the 
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functioning Portuguese government to two ministries and the concentration of 
power in the hands of two men, namely the Visconde de Anadia as secretary of 
state for war, and Luis de Vasconcellos e Sousa as president of the treasury (real 
erário).  111  Two further replacements had to be made to portfolios previously held 
by Luís Pinto de Sousa: the Conde de Villa Verde, D. Diogo de Noronha, was 
appointed to head foreign affairs and, most importantly, António de Araújo de 
Azevedo (recalled from the Portuguese legation at St. Petersburg) had replaced 
Anadia as secretary of state for war.  112  While these four ministers were decidedly 
more amenable to French influence their most vocal member, António de Araújo, 
had no desire for Portugal to become a de facto satellite of France, let alone be 
occupied by French troops, and his influence would be crucial in winning over 
those who might be beginning to be disillusioned with Britain (but who had not yet 
been convinced of the necessity of alliance with France).  Araújo de Azevedo’s 
influence at court grew as the council of ministers, although comprised of less 
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senior figures, now met on a much more regular basis than hitherto.  113  A further 
result of French pressure was a significant reduction in finance allocated to the 
Portuguese armed forces, 114 and yet another the replacement of Pina Manique and 
the adoption of a less repressive attitude towards French republican sympathies 
and expressions whilst, at the same time, stifling pro-British sentiments: such as the 
“lighting” of Lisbon houses in celebration of the victory at Trafalgar.  Meantime, 
John-Hookham Frere had been replaced as Britain’s envoy extraordinary and 
minister plenipotentiary in Lisbon in 1802 by Lord Robert-Stephen Fitzgerald until 
1806.  115  British influence in Portuguese politics commensurately and noticeably 
diminished in this period.  116   
After becoming first consul, and increasingly on becoming emperor in 1804, 
Napoleon, intent on depriving Britain of her continental markets, and exploiting his 
continuing alliance with Spain, sought closure of the remaining ports of the Iberian 
coastline.  Portugal’s resistance to Napoleon’s demands was met with an 
increasingly aggressive diplomacy with the aim of depriving Britain of her 
continental markets.  The alliance with Spain closed her ports to British shipping 
and exports and, with the support of Portugal, the remainder would follow.  
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Portugal’s resistance to Napoleon’s demands was met with the dispatch of two 
military ambassadors – first Lannes, and then Junot, to the Portuguese court.  The 
aim of this increasingly bellicose foreign policy was to force Portugal’s hand.  
Indeed, one of the effects of diplomatic pressures exerted on Portuguese 
ambassadors in France and the activities of these two French sabreurs was to isolate 
and eventually eliminate leading lights within the partido inglês, and therefore 
British influence on policy at the Portuguese court, and install ministers more 
amenable to French influence.  117  
Napoleon was by now pre-occupied with defeating the third coalition; first 
Austria and Russia (1805), and then Prussia in (1806).  Thereafter, from November 
1806, he concentrated on implementing the continental system, as set out in the 
Berlin decree, in central Europe and was therefore less immediately interested in 
the affairs of Spain and Portugal.  It was not until Napoleon was secure in northern 
and central Europe that he was able to turn his attention to imposing his demands 
to the remaining ports Europe through which Britain could still freely trade and, 
therefore, the implications of Napoleon’s victories in 1806 became clear.  Crucially, 
Portugal still had a significant fleet, the last independent European navy after 
Britain seized the Danish fleet from its harbour in Copenhagen, and offered access 
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to lucrative South American markets.  An over-independent Holland “hindered the 
effective operation of the Continental System.  But Napoleon decided to maintain 
the status quo [in that country] while he implemented his plans for Spain and 
Portugal which he considered more urgent.”.  118  Although the decree was 
announced towards the end of 1806, Napoleon would have to wait until his victory 
at Friedland, and the Treaty of Tilsit, in 1807 before he could fully implement it 
across the European continent in general, and in Portugal in particular, prohibiting 
the importation of British goods into all European states that were allied with (or 
dependent upon) France.  119  By the end of 1807, with the effective closure of 
Portuguese ports, only those of Sweden remained freely available to British 
shipping.  Given that British goods continued to find new markets and, apart from 
a brief period, had unconstrained access to the United States, “the effect of the 
continental blockade was not to cripple British export trade, but to inconvenience it, 
to diversify it, and the drive it into a greater variety of overseas channels.”  120 
The Portuguese government had taken comfort in Napoleon’s preoccupation 
with matters in central Europe and his lack of interference in Iberian politics.  
Portuguese relations with France had been at their friendliest in 1806 and, in these 
matters, the influence of Araújo de Azevedo had been and continued to be crucial.  
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Throughout 1807, Portuguese policy sought to placate France at all costs to forestall 
any potential invasion.  There is no doubt that diplomacy between the two 
countries was eased by the lacklustre performance of the Conde de Villa Verde and, 
most importantly, the involvement of Araújo and the amenability of his fellow 
ministers to French influence and the increasing isolation of former ministers within 
the partido inglês.  There is a clear consensus within the literature that the 
Portuguese government was increasingly amenable to French influence and 
estranged from that of Britain in a decisive period immediately prior to 1807. 
Although Araújo remained in power until the flight of the court to Brazil, 
there were a number of developments that helped to limit his overall power, one of 
which was the estrangement of Dom João and Carlota Joaquina, which had the 
effect of limiting pro-Spanish influences at court.   While domestic considerations 
were important, the major issue for Dom João (and his ministry) was the increasing 
pressure from Napoleon to close Portuguese ports to British shipping, arrest British 
citizens resident in Portugal and seize all British goods.  The policy proved more or 
less impossible to implement: Portugal’s increasing inability to pay the reparations 
agreed culminated first in impasse then crisis when Portugal defaulted on 
payments and Napoleon threatened to impose his will by force if his demands were 
not met.  
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 Outstanding war reparations were one factor, not eased by the despatch of 
the Marquêz de Marialva with diamonds to smooth the diplomatic process, in 
Napoleon’s commitment to implement the Continental System fully.  In due course, 
pressure was increasingly applied to ensure compliance with the terms of the 
decree given Portuguese insistence on neutrality and continued trade with Britain 
throughout the previous period.  Despite the continuation of trade, the influence of 
Britain and of the partido inglês in Lisbon was at a very low point if not its absolute 
nadir, and Dom João appeared indecisive on these matters.  The initiative had 
transferred to the partido francês and, in particular, to António de Araújo who 
consulted strategically placed Portuguese ambassadors across Europe on whether 
to continue to ally with Britain or, finally and completely, to turn to France.  D. 
Rodrigo de Sousa Coutinho’s preferred policy of physically opposing the French, 
put forward during his period in office at the turn of the century, was not 
considered a serious option.  However, a “Brazil plan” - the transfer of the court to 
Rio de Janeiro - was being afforded increasingly serious consideration, as Sousa 
Coutinho advised the prince regent most presciently: 
“‘Portugal is not the best and most essential part of the monarchy’.  In South America 
a mighty empire could be created …[and, moreover] the [Prince] had very little choice 
49 
 
in the event of a showdown.  If the French took Portugal, then the British would take 
Brazil.  It was better to anticipate both by seizing the initiative.”  121 
A number of factors compounded these problems.  Rumours concerning Dom 
João’s illness, the identification of a cabal in support of his wife Carlota Joaquina, 
and the deaths of the Conde de Villa Verde and Lafões, further concentrated power 
in the hands of António de Araújo who now had combined responsibility for 
foreign affairs, war and (literally) the defence of the realm.  If any hopes for a 
favourable conclusion of affairs in northern and central Europe remained in 
Portugal, they were quickly dispelled with the crippling defeat of the Russian forces 
at Friedland.  The ensuing treaty of Tilsit signalled Napoleon’s reinvigorated and 
unbridled aggression towards Britain via the wholesale implementation of the 
Continental System across Europe and its extension to Portugal.  122  When all 
diplomatic pressures to ally Portugal to France had failed, Napoleon ordered Junot 
to invade at the head of le Premier Corps d'Observation de la Gironde, devenu armée de 
Portugal.  123   
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But it was not until the army’s imminent arrival at the gates of Lisbon that 
Dom João was eventually persuaded by his advisors of the hopelessness of the 
situation and the need to escape to Brazil.  What is not well documented within 
British historiography is that he not only appointed a regency council to govern in 
his absence but also directed the Portuguese army and people to receive the French 
amicably rather than oppose them.  Equally, the role played by the family Sousa 
Coutinho, in the negotiations and the convention agreed between Portugal and 
Britain, is also inadequately understood.  As a result, the momentous decision to 
transfer court, government and its supporting impedimenta en masse to Brazil to 
escape falling into French control and its repercussions remain under-examined.  
Similarly, the important role of political economy underpinning the transfer 
remains substantially underplayed and misunderstood.  Essentially, without this 
shift in the location of political power and authority, Portugal and the Portuguese 
economy would - to all intents and purposes - have ceased to exist.   King Carlos 
and Prince Ferdinand retained a decidedly insecure independence for a while to 
come but, given the Royal Navy’s victory in 1805, the Spanish “metropolis was 
…[already] virtually eliminated from the Atlantic “.  124  Moreover, although a 
policy option that was to be reversed in 1808, the Spanish Americas were 
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vulnerable to land based assault.  The ultimately disastrous Whitelocke expedition 
to Buenos Aires was a major factor in the shift in policy - the potential for 
provoking widespread rebellion or territorial conquest in the Americas being put 
on hold if not fully disproved.  125   
Ultimately, saving the Portuguese royal family by taking the court to Brazil 
was not an impulsive reaction to the events of 1807, but was an integral component 
of the plan for the maintenance of the Portuguese monarchy and Luso-Brazilian 
empire, conceived by D. Rodrigo Sousa Coutinho as early as 1802 and afforded 
serious consideration in the crisis of 1806.  126  The plan now attracted support from 
adherents of the two main political factions alike.  The principal dividing lines 
between Sousa Coutinho and Araújo de Azevedo were drawn on the subject of 
military opposition to French invasion.  Sousa Coutinho believed, probably with no  
little justification, that Portugal would be unable to oppose invasion: but, at 
the same time, favoured delaying tactics, the development of a robust plan for the 
defence of the realm, the mobilisation of Portugal’s armed forces and direct British 
military intervention.   Araújo refused to support either indigenous military 
resistance or direct military intervention from Britain; on the one hand he lacked 
confidence in the Portuguese military and, on the other, he completely distrusted 
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British intentions.  The court’s transfer removed the immediate threat posed to the 
Portuguese monarchy by Napoleon.  However, it subsequently served to 
undermine absolutism and the Bragança dynasty, led to a brief period of regional 
governance, prompted demands for constitutional reform and, eventually, civil war 
and revolution.  127   Clearly, Britain’s refusal to support Portugal militarily in 1801 
was uppermost in current considerations.  128  The prince regent received news of 
the imminent arrival of the French army of invasion, and a council of state was 
called at which a unanimous vote was taken for the royal family to embark for 
Brazil.  129 
 Both of these influential politicians agreed that the removal of the 
Portuguese court to Brazil, in the face of a Franco-Spanish invasion, was the only 
feasible way of preventing the Portuguese royal family and its court from coming 
under the direct control of an increasingly belligerent Napoleon and retain the 
intrinsic nature of polity underpinning the Bragança dynasty given the deep 
divisions at court.  Retrospectively,  Napoleon’s treatment of King Carlos and 
Prince Ferdinand of Spain would serve in future, if needed, as a very practical 
reminder of the diplomatic manoeuvres that could be resorted to when faced by 
                                            
127.  Kirsten Schultz, ‘Royal authority, empire and the critique of colonialism: political discourse in 
Rio de Janeiro (1808-1821, Luso-Brazilian Review, vol. 37, no. 2, Special Issue: State, Society and Political 
Culture in Nineteenth-Century Brazil, (Winter 2000), pp. 7-31. 
128.  Robson, Britain, Portugal and South America, pp.  114-119. 
129.  Soriano, História da Guerra Civil, 1.ª época, vol. 2, pp. 671-72 
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non-compliant royalty and, therefore, the justification for such a momentous 
decision for the Bragança dynasty.  130   
Though Araújo remained consistently and totally loyal to Dom João and 
Portuguese sovereign interests, his hand would appear to have been behind the 
royal decree establishing the regency council and the decision not to oppose the 
French invasion.  131  In accepting British naval, as opposed to direct, land based, 
military intervention, to secure the successful transfer of the court to Brazil, 
Araújo’s intention was to prevent a complete rupture of diplomatic relations with 
France in order to retain the option of negotiations in future, on the one hand, and 
to counteract the anticipated ascendancy of British influence over the Portuguese 
government in Brazil, on the other.  For D. Rodrigo de Sousa Coutinho, and the 
partido inglês, the shift in the location of political authority to Brazil represented a 
substantial opportunity to wrest political power and economic influence from their 
erstwhile opponents at court.  132   
                                            
130.  For the deleterious economic effects of the French Revolutionary Wars and alliance with 
Napoleon on Spain’s maritime commerce see Paquette, ‘The dissolution of the Spanish monarchy’, 
esp. pp. 178-80.     
131.  The nominated governadores were as follows: Marquêz de Abrantes (Dom João’s cousin); 
Francisco da Cunha e Menezes (lieutenant general); Principal Castro (Bishop of Oporto, and Regedor 
das Justiças); Pedro de Mello Breyner, Presidente do Real Erário (Treasury); Luiz de Vasconcellos e 
Souza; Dom Francisco Xavier de Noronha (lieutenant general); to be presided over by the Conde de 
Castro Marim (then the Monteiro Mór and subsequently Marquêz de Olhão) and with a secretariat 
of two: the Conde de Sampaio (and in his absence he could be substituted by) Dom Miguel Pereira 
Forjaz or João António Salter de Mendonça.  Soriano, História da Guerra Civil, 1.ª época, vol. 2, p. 672. 
132.  Soriano, História da Guerra Civil, 1.ª época, vol. 2, p. 679.  For the declaration to the people of 26th 
November 1807, and the resultant consternation in the capital see Soriano, História da Guerra Civil, 1.ª 
época, vol. 3, pp. 619-22, documents no. 127 and no. 127-A, respectively, for the proclamation to the 
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For Napoleon, the objective of denying the ports of Europe to Britain was 
temporarily fulfilled, although he was never able to fully implement the continental 
system given the continuance of British maritime supremacy.  For Britain, the 
ensuing months would be spent in identifying the potential for further 
opportunistic intervention in the Americas, if not yet in the development of a 
coherent strategy, but the thought of countering Napoleon’s designs by developing 
and sustaining a military presence on mainland Europe was not, at that moment at 
least, a realistic option.  133  For the time being, a total blockade was maintained on 
the port of Lisbon by the Royal Navy.  134   For Portugal,  
“At a stroke, age old colonial sea routes were reversed, with edicts traveling eastward 
across the Atlantic, and with provisions, personnel and troops journeying out to the 
New World to supply the court.  Lisbon, a venerable metropolis, was transformed into 
an outpost of its former colony; the court’s new seat, the slave-market town of Rio de 
Janeiro, assumed the role of an imperial capital.  There the court faced the 
contradictions found in all empires in a single city: Rio was both the seat of empire 
and the biggest slaving port in the Americas … the mother country had become … “a 
colony of a colony””.  135 
                                                                                                                                
Portuguese people relating to the transfer of the court to Brazil and Dom João’s directive not to 
oppose the French in order to keep the peace.  For a near contemporaneous publication of Dom 
João’s proclamation and directive see, respectively: Correio Braziliense ou Armazém Literário, Volume 1 
1808 pp. 5-6 and pp. 7-8. 
133.  Muir, Britain and the defeat of Napoleon, pp. 29-31. 
134.  Robson, Britain, Portugal and South America, pp. 179-195 
135.  Isabel Nobre Vargues, ‘O processo de formação do primeiro movimento liberal: a revolução de 
1820’, in José Mattoso (ed.), História de Portugal, vol. 5, O Liberalismo, (Lisboa : Editorial Estampa, 
1993), p. 57 cited by Patrick Wilcken, ‘”A colony of a colony”: The Portuguese royal court in Brazil,  
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Chapter three: The invasion and occupation of Portugal 1807 to 1808 
I 
On concluding the terms of the Treaty of Tilsit, and returning to Paris, a 
triumphant Napoleon summoned the Portuguese minister D. Lourenço de Lima to 
hear demands that were then re-iterated by de Rayneval, minister in the French 
legation in Lisbon, to António de Araújo de Azevedo.  Unless Dom João acquiesced 
to Napoleon’s demands in full, declared war on Britain, recalled her ambassadorial 
presence from London and dismissed that of Britain in Lisbon, detained all British 
residents, sequestrated their goods and property, and closed all ports to British 
shipping by September 1st, France would invade Portugal.  136 A further request, that 
the Portuguese navy be placed at Napoleon’s disposal, was already known to Dom 
João’s ministers - who had forewarned Britain of Napoleon’s designs on the 
Portuguese fleet as early as May 1807.  137                    
As in 1801, with one eye on trade with the Americas and the other on 
preventing Napoleonic aggrandisement, Madeira was uppermost in the thoughts of 
                                                                                                                                
Common Knowledge, vol. 11, no. 2, 2005, 249-263, p. 250. 
136.  See Harold Livermore, ‘Portugal on the eve of the Peninsular War’, in Paddy Griffith (ed.), A 
History of the Peninsular War, Vol IX, Modern Studies of the War in Spain and Portugal, 1808-1814, 
(London : Greenhill, 1999, 385-98, especially pp. 394-95, Soriano, História da Guerra Civil, 1.ª época, 
vol. 2, pp. 644-48 and, for details of the demands, ibid. vol. 3, pp. 587-594.   
137.  For the suggestion that Britain knew of Napoleon’s designs on the Portuguese fleet, see Richard 
Glover ‘The French Fleet, 1807-1814: Britain’s Problem; and Madison’s Opportunity’, in The Journal of 
Modern History, vol. 39. no. 3, 233-252, in particular see p. 3, and n3, where the author cites The 
Diaries and correspondence of James Harris, first earl of Malmesbury, vol. 4, p. 391 and Harold Temperley, 
Life of Canning, (London, 1905) in which the author offers verification of the general accuracy of 
Malmesbury’s information regarding the Portuguese fleet.   
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both the foreign and war office in Britain.  In 1802, upon formal agreement of the 
Treaty of Amiens, “the evacuation [of Madeira] had taken place.  In the present 
emergency [of 1807], however, Madeira was too valuable a pledge to be risked.”.  
Britain’s response in 1807 mirrored that in the previous crisis, and a suitably 
equipped fleet carrying an expeditionary force was despatched to Madeira.  138  The 
Portuguese perspective and their response (at least at the time of the crisis) was, 
thankfully, somewhat different to that during the earlier occupation of the island, 
which was viewed to be unsupportive and, by some, to be outwardly aggressive.  
Moreover, Britain’s reluctance to offer financial and military aid to Portugal during 
the crisis of 1801, particularly given she was being threatened by a Franco-Spanish 
alliance and therefore a common enemy, amidst suggestions that Portugal should 
try to negotiate with Spain (and France) to avert war, was deeply resented.  
However, times had changed and both policy and military options open to Britain 
were much broader.  The occupation of Madeira in 1807 was agreed in a secret 
treaty, negotiated between D. Domingos António de Sousa Coutinho and Canning 
                                            
138.  Livermore, ‘Portugal on the eve of the Peninsular War’, p. 395; Soriano, as might be expected, is 
much less charitable, asserting that the seizure of Madeira, albeit for the duration of hostilities 
between Britain and France, was for ulterior motives and (probably) seen as a form of indemnity for 
British support during the present crisis, Soriano, História da Guerra Civil, 1.ª época, vol. 2, pp. 693-95, 
and see Gregory, ‘British Occupations of Madeira’, pp. 80-96.  
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in London: a major provision of the treaty relating to safe transportation of Dom 
João and the Portuguese court to Brazil.  139     
The failure of diplomacy, and finally the imminent arrival of Junot, was the 
catalyst for the Brazil plan to be implemented: a decision that was to have major 
political and economic repercussions for both metropolis and colony.  Despite 
Strangford’s insistence of the importance of his role in this decision 140 , there were a 
number of much weightier external drivers and internal pressures than localised 
British diplomatic pressure.  As we saw earlier, the potential to transfer the court to 
Brazil had a well-established history as a strategic option.  141   But Britain’s dispatch 
of a powerful fleet and a significant expeditionary force, with orders to escort the 
Portuguese royal family to Brazil and, if not, seize the Portuguese fleet, destroy or 
otherwise put it beyond use, were perhaps the decisive factors in the 
implementation of the “Brazil plan”.  142  If further evidence of the determination of 
the British government in this period is required, the Portland administration were 
resolved to bombard and occupy the forts of Lisbon, if necessary, in a plan that 
                                            
139.  Neill Macaulay, Dom Pedro: The Struggle for Liberty in Brazil and Portugal, 1798-1834, (Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 1986), pp. 12-13 and fn 309-10. 
140.  Frederick H. Black Jr. ‘Diplomatic Struggles: British Support in Spain and Portugal’.   
141.  See Kirsten Schultz, ‘The crisis of empire and the problem of slavery: Portugal and Brazil, c. 1700- 
c. 1820’, Common Knowledge, vol. 11, Issue 2, Spring 2005, 264-282.  Maxwell stresses the primacy of 
political economy and commercial strategy in the decision making process, the ‘Brazil plan’ 
comprised an important component of  Sousa Coutinho strategy, see the final chapter of Conflicts and 
conspiracies, ‘Compromise’, pp. 204-39. 
142.  Martin Robson, ‘The Royal Navy in Lisbon, 1807-1808’, in Malyn Newitt and Martin Robson 
(eds.), Lord Beresford and British Intervention in Portugal, 1807-1820, (Lisboa : Imprensa das Ciências 
Sociais, 2004). 
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matched the reaction of the Ministry of the Talents to the perceived crisis a year 
earlier in 1806. 143 Britain clearly intended to respond quickly and determinedly to 
French threats towards Portugal and her fleet.        
The apparent indecision of the regency council that had been left to govern in 
the prince regent’s absence (any matters of import had to be referred to the relevant 
ministerial portfolio in Brazil) and the decision not to oppose the French invasion, 
also had both immediate and long term implications for Portugal, her economy, 
people and the military.  A further factor was that more people than had been 
anticipated sought to escape the occupation of Portugal by the French, and joined 
the mass migration of the Portuguese court and nobility.  Not all who wanted to 
leave could do so.  A small number of ships were not able to set sail either because 
they were not seaworthy or were prevented by the last minute arrival of Junot.  144  
Even upon departing for Brazil, and hearing of the early reports of military 
intelligence concerning the French invasion route via the Beira Baixa and Abrantes, 
Dom João ordered his subjects to welcome the French and set out his justification 
                                            
143.  Robson, Britain, Portugal and South America, pp. 41-59, esp. p. 54 et seqs.   
144.  The consensus is that the prince regent set sail, with the royal court, a variety of dignitaries, 
ministers, army and navy officers, together with tonnes of documentation to support the continued 
governance of the realm from Brazil.  In addition, somewhere between 10,000 and 15,000 people also 
set sail for Brazil – many never to return.  See the initial chapter ‘Exodus’ in Neill MacCaulay, Dom 
Pedro: the struggle for liberty in Brazil and Portugal, 1798-1834, (Duke University Press, Durham, 1986) 
and Patrick Wilcken, Empire adrift: the Portuguese court in Rio de Janeiro, 1808-1821, (London : 
Bloomsbury, 2004).  
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for doing so.  This policy at one and the same time sought to appease Napoleon and 
placate the British government.  145   
Negotiations were, therefore, certainly being undertaken until the very last 
possible day (if not hour).  While these actions have led Dom João to be labelled 
indecisive in many accounts, we argue here that any apparent vacillation was due 
to the range of possible options being presented by his ministers and competing 
political and diplomatic pressures and, not least, the very great importance such a 
momentous decision would have for Portugal.  Ultimately, the Portuguese council 
of ministers ordered the embarkation of the court on hearing of Junot’s arrival at 
Abrantes on the 23rd November 1807.  Interestingly, this would appear to be a policy 
option agreed upon and openly supported by the main political factions at court on 
this occasion.  The transfer of the court and the whole apparatus of government 
were complex issues that could not possibly be managed in a matter of days; 
therefore a great deal of planning must have been undertaken behind the scenes to 
ensure its success.  But the circumstances of, and manner in which, the transfer was 
implemented suggest that Dom João was ultimately still persuaded by the 
                                            
145.  The treaty and its ratification are presented in José Ferreira Borges de Castro, Collecção dos 
Tratados, Convenções, Contratos e Outros Actos Publicos, (Four vols., Lisbon 1856-57), vol. 4, pp. 236-62, 
A further indication that diplomacy and discussions were being undertaken until the very last hour 
is that, under the provisions of the (secret) Treaty, the Royal Navy was to escort the prince regent, 
his family and court to safety in Brazil and was negotiated directly between the Chevalier de Sousa 
and Canning in London, on the 22nd October 1807.  It was subsequently ratified in Portugal on the 9th 
November and returned to Britain on the 19th December 1807 – a very tight timeline given the 
exigencies of the situation and the nature of seaborne communications. 
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(domestic or continental) policy preferred by Araújo de Azevedo while the Sousa 
Coutinho faction held sway in relation to diplomacy with Britain (international 
policy and economic strategy).    146   
Therefore, due in no small part to Portugal’s lack of a coherently argued and 
consistently implemented foreign and military policy, Junot was able to invade 
Portugal with something less than 25,000 troops of all arms.  147  The enormous 
distance covered, difficulties posed by the terrain and inclement weather, meant 
that Junot arrived at the gates of Lisbon with a very much reduced, dishevelled and 
totally exhausted advance guard, having dropped the majority of the army, its 
artillery and baggage on the way.  148   Junot’s urgency was dictated by Napoleon’s 
designs on Portugal, its place in his strategy for the domination of Europe and the 
Mediterranean and economic war against Britain.  In December 1807, Napoleon 
directed Clarke, his minister for war, as follows: “my intention is that as from 1st 
November the pay, all the regular financial needs and incidental expenses of the 1er 
corps de la Gironde are [to be] paid by [extraordinary] contributions levied on the 
                                            
146.  Livermore, ‘Portugal on the eve of the Peninsular War’, pp. 396-97; Soriano, História da Guerra 
Civil, 2.ª época, vol. 1, pp. 1-15.  .  
147.  Oman, provides a succinct but not altogether credible account of the French invasion and 
subsequent arrival in Lisbon at the end of November 1807.  In particular, he avoids all consideration 
of the difficult decisions taken, and dangerous situation faced by, the Portuguese ministry, Oman 
History of the Peninsular War, vol. 1: 1807-1809, pp. 26-31. 
148.  Paul Thiébault, Relation de l'Expédition du Portugal, faite en 1807-8, par le 1er Corps d'Observation de 
la Gironde, devenu armée de Portugal. Par le Baron Thiébault, Lieutenant-Général, (Paris : Chez Magimel, 
Anselin et Pochard, 1817), especially chapter 5 and, in particular, pp. 56-70, Jackson L. Sigler, 
‘General Paul Thiébault: his life and his legacy’, (Unpublished PhD thesis : Florida State University, 
2006), pp. 169 et seqs., and Livermore, ‘Portugal on the eve of the Peninsular War’, passim. 
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kingdom of Portugal, and that as from the 1st December [so too, all of] the financial 
needs of the 2e corps de la Gironde.”.  149  There was no doubt in Napoleon’s mind that 
Portugal would (or must) foot the bill for the war to subjugate the Iberian 
Peninsula.  Therefore, while it could be argued there was a disproportionate focus 
on the minutiae to ensure the strategy was implemented, and an under-estimation 
of the complex, and often conflicting, tasks these various invasion forces were set, in 
terms of financing operations, the strategy and its implementation were totally 
unambiguous.      
   An additional, and not unimportant factor, was that the higher echelons of 
the Portuguese military were divided on the options available to Portugal and the 
correct course of action to take.  There were some very similar lines of allegiance 
drawn to those relating to the concept of military reform at the turn of the century.  
A major difference though was the absence of the militarily ineffective, but 
politically important, Duc de Lafões.   150  Ultimately, a number of relatively senior 
and experienced army officers, including senior generals, members of the general 
                                            
149.  Napoléon Correspondance, vol. xvii  13412. —AU GENERAL CLARKE, Ministre De La Guerre.  
Milan, 23 décembre 1807.  Monsieur le Général Clarke, envoyez en Portugal quatre bons 
commissaires des guerres et deux bons inspecteurs aux revues. Envoyez-y également quatre 
auditeurs. Vous vous entendrez pour cela avec M. l'archichancelier.  Faites partir sans délai tous ces 
individus ; cela est nécessaire à l'administration du pays. Mon intention est qu'à dater du 1er  
novembre la solde, les masses et toutes dépenses quelconques du 1er corps de la Gironde soient 
payées par les contributions du royaume de Portugal, et qu'à dater du 1er décembre la solde, les 
masses et autres dépenses du 2e corps de la Gironde soient également payées sur les contributions 
du Portugal.  … [signed] Napoléon. 
150.   Manuel Amaral, A luta política em Portugal , pp. 28-29 
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staff and regimental personnel, helped to form a division of Portuguese troops in 
French service called La Légion Portugaise, some of whom accompanied Masséna’s 
army in the 1810 invasion.  151  A small but significant group of officers though 
evaded involvement in the process of demobilisation and subsequent service in 
French pay.  Some fled to Brazil, embarking temporarily to Britain, others opting to 
return to Portugal once news of the insurrections arrived, to fight against the French 
in the Leal Legião Lusitana or the regular Portuguese army under Beresford.  A 
number of those Portuguese officers who left for France, but did not serve against 
Portugal in the subsequent invasion of 1810-1811, were not only pardoned but also 
served their country in various capacities post 1820.  152  
II 
 
As a result of these complex events Portugal was devoid of direct governance 
and political leadership.  But if there had been any uncertainty in the period 
immediately preceding the arrival of Junot as to the underlying reasons for invasion 
                                            
151.  Livermore, ‘Portugal on the eve of the Peninsular War’, p. 397 and Soriano, História da Guerra 
Civil, 2.ª época, vol. 1, pp. 50-88 and João Torres Centeno, O exército português na guerra peninsular, 
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Levrault, 1897), Arthur Ribeiro, A legião portugueza ao serviço de Napoleão (1808-1813), (Lisboa : 
Livraria Ferin, 1901).  For a popular history see Pinheiro Chagas. ‘Historia da legiáo portugueza’ 
from A Illustraçao portugueza, vol. 2 (1885) and a more critical review, see Manuel de Castro, Historia 
da legião portugueza em França, (Londres : Hansard, 1814). 
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these were quickly dispelled.  Junot dismissed the regency council and installed, in 
its place, a military government as reported by das Neves:   
“A few days later, Hermann was introduced into the government with the title of 
administrator general of finance in the (royal) treasury * ... but this was not the most 
extraordinary [event] Berthelot was similarly introduced (into government) with the 
title of inspector general of contributions and revenues of Portugal, nominated by the 
Emperor of the French himself, dated Fontainebleau 17th November 1807”   153 
But he retained a few members of the former regency council charged with joint 
responsibility for portfolios alongside French counterparts in an effort to provide 
the government with some semblance of legitimacy.  Some of the Portuguese 
members, for example the Conde de Sampaio and Pedro Mello de Breyner, were 
seen to be actively cooperating with the French and, as such, the regency council as 
a whole was tainted with collaboration in the eyes of their fellow countrymen.  
Suffice to say, for the moment, that those members more compliant with the 
military government were removed from the Council’s membership when it was re-
instated by Dalrymple in the autumn of 1808.  But the acute emotional response to 
perceptions of collaboration and betrayal would become key factors underlying 
popular resentment and anger.  154    
                                            
153.  * Por decreto de Junot de 3 de dezembro de 1807 (by Junot’s decree, 3rd December).  José Acúrcio 
das Neves, História Geral da Invasão dos Franceses em Portugal e restauração deste reino, (Five volumes, 
Lisboa : Simão Thaddeo Ferreira,1810-1811), vol. 1, pp. 225-26, (my translation).    
154.  Thiébault paints the picture of a coalition government, with French and Portuguese appointees to 
each portfolio, excepting those of justice and religion: M. Hermann and Petro [Pedro] de Mello 
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 For the time being, despite the imposition of the exactions demanded by 
Napoleon, the seizure of plate and other valuables in lieu of payment, the 
repression of public meetings and any overt expression against the regime, the 
replacement of the Portuguese national flag with the tricolour of France on the 
Castelo de São Jorge, the British blockade, rising unemployment and prices, and, 
finally, the proclamation on 1st February 1808 that the house of Bragança had ceased 
to reign in Portugal, the result was not opposition but rather a depressive 
helplessness amongst the Lisbon population.  155   The relatively quiescent state of 
the population in Lisbon, and especially across the country more generally, has 
been questioned by some historians arguing that the jurisdiction of the military 
government, its Portuguese adherents or afrancesados, and the newly appointed 
corregedores mores, was limited to those areas under direct French control.  Clearly 
the military only had overwhelming control over the wider metropolitan area of 
Lisbon plus a limited number of cities and fortified places held by small French 
garrisons and their Spanish allies.  156   However, the almost total compliance of 
                                                                                                                                
[Breynier], (ministres des finances et de l’intérieur); M. Luuyt and le comte Saint-Payo [Conde de 
Sampaio], (ministres de la guerre et de la marine); M le principal de Castro (ministre de justice et des 
cultes); M. de la Garde, (intendant général de la police); and M. Viennot Vaublanc (inspecteur aux 
revues, … nommé secrétaire d’état), Thiébault, Relation de l'Expédition du Portugal, pp. 99-100. 
155.  Acúrsio das Neves, História Geral da Invasão, vol. 2, pp. 148-49 and pp.157-58 and Soriano, Historia 
da Guerra Civil, 2.ª época, vol. 1, pp. 188-199.  
156.  During April the following officials were appointed as corregedores-mores with responsibility for 
five provinces: Estremadura, Mr. Pepin de Bellisle; Beira, Sr. José Pedro Quintela; Entre-Douro-e-
Minho, Mr. Tabureau; Alentejo, Mr. Lafond; and the Algarve, Mr. Goguet.  In addition, a number of 
juízes de fora and juízes de crime were appointed with responsibility for the subjugation of strategic 
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civil, judicial and military authorities with French demands ensured Junot’s reach 
was much wider than those areas under direct military control: a cause of further 
infuriation for the Portuguese population.  157  Once Junot had begun to impose 
military law and collect the extraordinary contributions demanded by Napoleon, 
the legitimacy of this imposed government was increasingly being questioned but, 
as yet, aggravation had not led to open insurrection.   However, there is 
considerable evidence that increasingly, between April and May, the violent nature 
and extent of exactions, together with perceived collaboration, was leading to much 
more widespread discontent than the existing historiography would have us 
believe.  158  
Detailed investigation of the evidence highlights a number of significant 
issues.  Popular insurrections were prevalent throughout rural provinces of 
Portugal, particularly so in the most northerly regions and particularly that of Trás-
os-Montes, spreading to Beira (Alta, Baixa and Litoral), Estremadura and the 
Algarve and also, albeit assuming a quite different form, in the Alentejo.  The only 
region that remained quiescent was Lisbon - Junot’s military base.  Even with some 
                                                                                                                                
cities.  António Ventura, ‘A propaganda francesa durante a guerra peninsular’, Catedrático de 
História,  Faculdade de letras, Lisboa, undated essay.  
157.  The compliance of the Portuguese apparatus of state does not appear to have been taken into 
account as a factor in enabling Junot’s control over Portugal by Esdaile, Popular resistance in the 
French wars, pp. 4-5. 
158.  See, for example Oman, History of the Peninsular War, vol, 1, pp. 210-18 and Esdaile, A new history, 
pp. 90-91 who reports “Whether this movement amounted to anything more than a glorified 
jacquerie is unclear.” 
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welcome reinforcements, Junot had just 30,000 troops at his disposal and therefore 
relied heavily on the Spanish for the military subjugation of Portuguese territory 
that lay outside his immediate jurisdiction.  However, paradoxically, he could count 
upon the compliance of the provincial and local representatives of the absolutist 
state.  The extent of compliance with Dom João’s request not to oppose the French 
ensured monetary exactions were gathered and the demobilisation of the military 
implemented.  Therefore, although the vast majority of French troops were 
concentrated in Lisbon, and fortified cities such as Abrantes, Almeida and Elvas, 
there were other factors underpinning the general compliance and quiescence of the 
Portuguese population.  159  Apart from some limited opposition to the military 
occupation of strategic points, the demobilisation of the army and the character and 
scale of exactions, there had still been no significant outbreaks of insurrectionary 
violence: the form and nature of nascent of opposition, if not more established 
insurrectionary activities, was starting to take shape.  160  One indirect consequence 
of these brutal actions was the strengthening of the partido inglês.  If not yet totally 
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160.  Correspondance, vol. xvii, 13416. au général Junot, Commandant L'armée De Portugal. Milan, 23 
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and reports that Junot, therefore, requested the amount be reduced to 50 million francs, Thiébault, 
Relation de l'Expédition du Portugal, pp. 90-91.   
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in control in government, the faction was certainly much more able to exert 
influence on Dom João and the court in Rio de Janeiro, the court of St. James and, 
from 1809 onwards, the regency council in Portugal – such that by May 1808 a state 
of war had been declared with France.  161   
Following the revolt of the Spanish people, insurrections erupted across 
almost all provinces of Portugal.  The scale and nature of the insurrections, and 
participants involved, varied from locality to locality.  But, from contemporary 
records, it would appear that participants in the insurrections, with one or two 
specific exceptions were ordinary people and, moreover, people from within the 
lower classes of society with little or no property: small farmers, jornaleiros (day-
wage labourers), artisans and “mechanics” (for example locksmiths), and non-
commissioned officers of the milícia or ordenanças.  162  There would appear to be 
only a limited number of occasions where people of higher status joined in the 
insurrections and very limited evidence that the initiative was taken by civil and 
judicial authorities or military governors.  163  In the vast majority of cases, the 
involvement of the state’s representatives, and subsequently the clergy, was as a 
                                            
161.  Dom João declared war on France, from Brazil, on 1st May 1808, João Torres Centeno, O exército 
português na guerra peninsular, Volume 1, do Rossilhão ao fim da segunda invasão francesa 1807-1810, 
(Lisboa : Prefácio, 2008), p. 107. 
162.  Valente, ‘O povo em armas’, pp 16-17. 
163.   Valente, ‘O povo em armas’, passim.  Matos, though, affords a much more pro-active role to the 
representatives of the state in the insurrectionary activities.  See Henrique José Martins Matos, ‘As 
juntas minhotas de 1808 na reacção à occupação francesa’, Revista de faculdade de letras: História, Porto, 
III serie, vol. 10, 2009, 43-55.   
68 
 
direct result of the insurrections rather than precipitating them – although 
individual members of the clergy were actively involved in these preliminary 
insurrections at a local level.  164     
Additionally, there were quite distinct variations in the nature of the élite’s 
response to these insurrections which, in order to understand correctly, need to be 
seen within the context of territorial organisation and the various forms of 
governance combining civil and judicial powers at regional and local level.  Some 
officials attempted to maintain the rule of law: that is they continued to support 
French decrees.  Other officials did just enough to placate the mob and keep their 
heads, or pro-actively sought to harness and control the excesses of the mob and 
direct it towards the French.  Another, more sinister, side to the insurrections was 
the settling of old scores against local officials, nobles, the church and the state: a 
phenomenon that is well documented in literature dealing with Spanish responses 
to French occupation.  To a certain extent though, it could be argued, that these 
antagonisms resulted as much from the people’s anger at the compliance of the 
state’s representatives with French demands as the exactions themselves.   It was 
not the French invasion itself, therefore, but the implementation of military rule that 
was the catalyst for these specific forms of rural revolt, the people’s anger clearly 
focused on anyone perceived to have collaborated or to have profited from 
                                            
164.  Valente, ‘O povo em armas’, pp. 24-25. 
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collaboration.  A further issue was that, in many cases, the authorities imposing 
exactions, either in the absolutist regime or French military regime, were one and 
the same.  Therefore, once the crises had subsided and the civil, judicial and 
military authorities had regained control, in some areas there was a crusade to 
identify, root out and bring the full weight of the law to bear upon the perpetrators 
of these “crimes” against the state’s local representatives - as in the cases of Vila 
Nova de Foz Côa and Arcos de Valdevez.  165  The criminalisation of specific 
insurrectionary activities was therefore one of the components of élite counter 
measures to gain control of the situation.  
Even after taking into account the evidence presented above, it is still not clear 
how such a small force of occupation was able to exert such powerful control over 
an entire country with a population in excess of three million.  Contrary to the 
assertion that Portugal continued to benefit from a period of enlightened despotism 
throughout the second half of the eighteenth century  166, she had been subjected to 
an intense programme of measures in the thirty years to 1807 that could best be 
described as counter-reformationary.  167  Upon the demise of Dom José I, and the 
fall from grace of the Marquêz de Pombal, Dona Maria I implemented a programme 
of reactionary policies that were as ruthlessly implemented as those of Pombal had 
                                            
165.  Valente, ‘o povo em armas’, pp. 15-16 and Esdaile A new history, pp. 90-91. 
166.  Esdaile, A new history, pp. 5-6. 
167.  Joaquim Veríssimo Serrão, História de Portugal: O despotismo iluminado (1750-1807),  (Lisbon : 
Editorial Verbo, 1977), pp. 295-96 underplays the significance of the counter-reforms. 
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been.  The role and power of the monarchy, aristocratic élites and the church 
(including the Jesuits and the inquisition) were firmly re-established.  Conversely, 
leading academics in Coimbra, liberals, deists, encyclopaedists, were imprisoned, 
purged from office or exiled.  A substantial number of Pombaline reforms were 
reversed, the exceptions generally being those that served to strengthen, rather than 
undermine, absolutist authority: for example economic and political reforms 
reinforcing the dominance of the metropolis and the subservience of Portugal’s 
colonies irrespective of the potentially negative longer term implications for the 
preservation of the Luso-Brazilian Empire.  168     
These considerations are important for two reasons.  Firstly, they help us to 
understand the pervasiveness of the absolutist state and its apparatus in Portugal 
and, in particular, the reinforcement of the role and importance of the first two 
estates - the nobility and clergy in government, at national and provincial level.   
Secondly, they helps us to understand the opposition to military reform upon 
Portugal’s defeat in the War of the Oranges - given the continued power of the 
partido aristocrático within the military and, most especially, in terms of the role of 
the military élites in the provinces of Portugal.  Suffice to say, the third estate had 
no real involvement in government, there was neither a partido popular nor a 
numerous and powerful stratum of society that could be identified as comprising a 
                                            
168.  See, for example, Maxwell, Conflicts and conspiracies, pp. 82-83.     
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burguesia (apart from in Lisbon and its environs) and, moreover, their activities 
were restricted to the economic and social sphere as opposed to the political.    
As we saw earlier, starting with the Spanish insurrection in Madrid referred to 
from the date of its occurrence as the dos de mayo, the Iberian Peninsula began to rise 
up against French occupation.  169  Uprisings in Madrid led to further insurrections 
across Spain which, in turn, was the catalyst for the revolt to spread to Portugal in 
the following month.    It was only at this stage that the growing, albeit passive, 
animosity towards French rule was eventually transformed into positive and active 
opposition and open insurrection.  But the insurrection had still not, during these 
early days, erupted in Lisbon itself.  170  For Junot this was crucial, given the 
importance of his base in Lisbon was due entirely to the inordinate concentration, 
historically, of the country’s population, economic base, social élites and political 
power in the capital and its immediate environs.  Moreover, Junot was, even at this 
stage, still able to rely upon Spanish troops to control the north and south of 
Portugal.  However, upon receiving news of the rebellion in Spain, Junot was forced 
to first deceive and then disarm the Spanish contingent helping to secure Lisbon.  
At the same time, General Belestá the commander of the Spanish contingent in 
Oporto, became aware of the revolt of his compatriots and incarcerated Quesnel the 
senior French officer in the city, together with the small number of French officers 
                                            
169.  Esdaile, A new history, pp.  37-40,  
170.  Esdaile, A new history, pp.  90-92 
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and troops stationed there, called a meeting with the Portuguese authorities in 
Oporto to advise them of his actions and to take control of the situation and 
marched off to Galicia with his captives.   171 
These actions by the Spanish garrison in Oporto meant that the insurrection 
could quickly spread throughout the north of Portugal and into the Beiras.  Similar 
insurrections took place in Estremadura; quickly spreading into the provinces of the 
Alentejo and the Algarve, given they too had previously been controlled by troops 
who had now departed for Spain.  However, these insurrections were successively 
and brutally repressed, starting with the first of these three regions; as Loison and 
other French generals were despatched at the head of flying columns to 
systematically and rigorously put down the Portuguese rebellion.  In a small but 
significant number of cities, French reprisals attained a level of brutality that 
forewarned of the scale, nature and intensity of the forthcoming struggle: the most 
notable of which took place in Leíria, Caldas da Rainha and Évora.      
A brief review of events in Oporto, hopefully, will serve as an example of the 
confusion and disorder in the north of Portugal at this time and the extent to which 
popular opposition to the French also came up against determined resistance 
amongst some of the Portuguese élites.  Despite the departure of the Spanish 
troops, a small number of Portuguese notables retained control in the city in the 
                                            
171.  Livermore, ‘Portugal on the eve of the Peninsular War’, pp. 397-98, and Oman, A History of the 
Peninsular War, vol. 1, pp. 215-17.   
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name of Junot: the Brigadeiro Luís de Oliveira da Costa, who had been appointed 
governador das armas, had managed to retain control of the city’s military forces and 
its arsenal, had taken down the national flag previously hoisted by the patriots, 
replaced the tricolor in its stead and arrested one of the major instigators of the 
revolt, Raimundo José Pinheiro (although he subsequently escaped).  Meantime, the 
desembargador Joaquim Rodrigues Botelho tried to formally organize popular 
insurrections.  Between the 6th and 9th June various attempts were made to organise 
public support for an insurrection, eventually calling a meeting which was attended 
by a number of the city’s civil and judicial authorities including: the Presidente da 
Câmara and Juiz de Fora, Luís Barbosa e Mendonça; the vereadores, Bernardo de Meio 
Vieira da Silva e Menezes and Tomás da Silva Ferraz; and six desembargadores, 
Estanislão José Brandão, João de Carvalho Matheus da Silva Ferrão, Vitoriano José 
de Cerveira Botelho do Amaral, João Bernardo Cardoso, Francisco Sabino da Costa 
Pinto and António Pedro de Alcântara Sá Lopes.   
During this same period the people of the Minho and Trás-os-Montes had 
risen in revolt and had appointed the two generals Sepulveda and Silveira as 
governadores das armas for the two regions acclaiming their allegiance to Dom João 
and the Casa de Bragança.  The insurrection in Oporto was ultimately successful 
during the night of the 18th to 19th of June prompted in part by the strength of 
popular insurrection in the surrounding provinces, a patriotic proclamation by the 
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desembargador José Feliciano da Rocha Gameiro and a successful uprising amongst 
the city’s population led by a captain of artillery, João Manuel de Mariz – the 
catalyst for which was quite possibly the broadcast of false news of the imminent 
arrival of a French expeditionary force. 172  On the 19th the Junta Provisional do 
Supremo Governo was declared in the name of the prince regent.  However, not only 
Mariz and a fellow officer of artillery who assisted in the uprising, but also general 
Luís Cândido Pinheiro Furtado - who had been nominated military governor for 
the city’s defences, were subsequently prevented from participating further in the 
establishment of the junta by a highly influential conservative faction led by the 
Bishop of Oporto that, thereby, managed to wrest control from those of a more 
radical persuasion.   173      
That these uprisings remained uncoordinated, provincial insurrections rather 
than a national uprising was due, in no small part, to the power vacuum left when 
the Portuguese court departed for Brazil, the limited powers entrusted to the 
regency council and its subsequent dismissal by Junot substantial divisions 
amongst the civil, judicial, military and, most importantly, clerical authorities.  
There was no credible centre for opposition in the capital Lisbon.  Popular 
                                            
172.  Artur de Magalhães Basto, ‘O Pôrto contra Junot’, in Damião Peres (ed.), Revista de Estudos 
Históricos, 1.º Ano – N.º 4, Outubro-Dezembro, 1924, pp. 51-61; 88-120; and 121-147.  A further work 
that looks to be of interest but unfortunately was not available at the time of writing is José Augusto 
dos Santos Alves, ‘A opinião pública em Portugal (1780-1820)’, Teses // Universidade Autónoma de 
Lisboa, Departamento de Ciências Humanas, (Lisboa : Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa, 2000). 
173.  Valente, ‘O povo em armas’, pp. 29-30 
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perceptions of specific, prominent members of the former regency council, and the 
apparatus of the state at local levels, were extremely negative; based upon quite 
visible evidence of collaboration with French rule. 174   Nevertheless, these 
insurrections were important occurrences.  They provided substantial indications of 
the extent of determined popular, indigenous opposition to the French occupation 
of Portugal or the compliance of Portuguese élites with French rule.  Crucially, they 
also help to define the centres for that opposition and the forms the opposition took, 
albeit not providing a definitive and comprehensive record of the social basis of 
popular resistance.  175  
Some local, temporary successes were achieved and, given the limited number 
of French troops, much of Portugal was reclaimed.  However, despite widespread 
support for the juntas and the insurrection, the Portuguese were not able to totally 
overthrow the forces of occupation – given the inherent deficiencies of the 
Portuguese military following Junot’s programme of demobilisation.  But the 
insurrection did succeed in disturbing French rule and substantially dissipating the 
forces of occupation.  Ultimately, British intervention in Portugal was greatly 
                                            
174.  Pedro Mello de Breyner, for example, was despatched by Junot to moderate, if not totally 
suppress, insurrectionary activities in Oporto until French forces could be dispatched to intervene; 
but he was stopped at Leíria by the groundswell of popular opposition to the military government 
and its repressive activities.       
175.  It has not been possible to obtain a comprehensive idea of the social basis leading and supporting 
this opposition in all of these areas to support the current study, but analysis of the signatories of the 
many proclamations issued by the juntas would be a useful start in investigating these types of 
issues in future: for example, Manoel Jorge Gomes de Sepulveda, Collecção de papeis officiaes da Junta 
Provisional do Governo Supremo, (Porto : Typographia de Antonio Alvarez Ribeiro, 1808). 
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assisted by the insurrection given the majority of French troops were dispersed and 
hard pressed, as an increasingly substantial proportion had to be dispatched to 
subdue uprisings in the Algarve, Alentejo, Estremadura, Ribatejo and the Beiras.  In 
the main, the timeliness of responses and the number of troops deployed meant 
Junot was able to quickly and efficiently deal with the hastily and ill-organised, 
military opposition.  But the limits of Junot’s military jurisdiction, and the 
precarious nature of his tenure of Portugal, were demonstrated by Loison’s 
ultimately unsuccessful expedition to quell insurrections in the north of Portugal.  
Moreover, given that many of these points had been formerly held by Spanish 
troops, Junot was forced to detach a number of troops to garrison the main 
settlements and to suppress disturbances as they occurred in a desperate attempt to 
control the rapidly increasing scale of the insurrection.  Despite having received 
some limited reinforcements in the meantime, increasing his total available force to 
around 30,000, these detachments seriously undermined the security of his central 
base in Lisbon and Estremadura where approximately 15,000 troops held down a 
population perhaps twenty times that number.   
There was a great deal of popular support for the widespread insurrections 
across the length and breadth of Portugal.  Civilians and volunteers helped to 
defend major settlements which had risen against the French: often fighting 
alongside first line troops (infanteria) second line troops (milícia) and the locally 
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organised levies in the companies of ordenanças.  Moreover, in Évora, both Spanish 
and Portuguese insurgents and armed forces disputed the French reprisals.  As a 
result of the ill-coordinated but passionate resistance they encountered, both from 
the impromptu gatherings of armed troops and volunteers defending major towns 
and cities, but also the passionate and stubborn resistance of the general population 
in dispersed settlements they passed through, the French inflicted dreadful 
reprisals in retaliation against the civilian population (in Beira, Estremadura, and 
Alentejo).  These reprisals against Portuguese patriots, as against those in Spain, 
served only to stiffen resolve and incite, rather than stifle, further opposition.  176   
As indicated above, a provincial government was hastily formed in Oporto 
called the Junta Provisional do Governo Supremo.  Declarations were published to 
assure the citizens of Oporto, and the nearby provinces, of the steps being taken, in 
the name of the prince regent, for the defence of Portugal.  One of the Junta 
Suprema’s first initiatives was to put troops within its jurisdiction on a war footing, 
with specific proclamations calling officers and soldiers of the two regiments of the 
city - that had been disbanded by Junot earlier in the year - to the colours and 
setting out terms of service and payment.  177  These public proclamations served a 
number of purposes.  They helped to assure people of all classes that the junta had 
been established, that its members were being pro-active in the defence of the 
                                            
176.  Soriano, História da Guerra Civil, 2.ª época, vol. 1., passim. 
177.  See Gomes de Sepulveda, Collecção de papeis officiaes da Junta Provisional, passim.          
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realm, and that these activities were in the name of the legitimate ruler of Portugal, 
our lord the prince regent “em nome do principe regente: nosso senhor, a junta 
provisional do governo supremo”.  This gave the junta at one and the same time power, 
legitimacy and, crucially, control over the masses.  
Meantime, the Junta Suprema had already not only started to organise 
volunteer corps but had also called out the troops of the line (infanteria), second line 
(milícias) and ordenanças within the Partido do Porto, in which it could claim 
legitimate jurisdiction, but also across the other military regions of northern 
Portugal.  To raise funds, the Junta Suprema had also implemented taxation on some 
of the principal exports from the region’s ports, for example on wine, aguadente, oil 
and vinegar, and had requested the loan of a substantial sum in coin from the 
British government in the sum of 1.2 million Cruzados (in the event, somewhere 
between 200,000 and 300,000 patacas or dollars was furnished).  Importantly, the 
Junta Suprema had also requested the assistance of military forces (troops), arms, 
and equipment from Britain.  As such the Junta Suprema was essentially requesting, 
retrospectively, official authorisation for the assumption of power and - in a quite 
unprecedented step - assuming responsibility for, and power over, not only the 
Partido do Porto but also vast majority of northern Portugal encompassing the 
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Minho, Trás-os-Montes and Beira Alta regions.  178  An obvious concern, appearing 
frequently in the various proclamations of the Junta Suprema, was the need to 
maintain public safety and public order: clearly these would appear to be responses 
to significant and, at times, uncontrollable, acts of public disorder and related in 
various British memoirs and accounts.  Some of the scenes of public disorder will, 
no doubt, have been due to popular discontent not only with the invasion itself but 
also the perceived lack of an appropriate, official national response to the invasion.  
In many cases they would appear to have resulted directly from perceptions of 
collaboration by the apparatus of state with the French regime and the coercion of 
the Portuguese population. 
We can now address the concept of ideology in some further detail and 
specifically the assertion that it had no, or a very limited, role in the insurrections 
and opposition to the French.  179  At first sight, the evidence would appear to bear 
out this assertion in that the focus of the violence would appear to have been 
directed against perceived collaborators and afrancesados.  Moreover, the nature of 
the insurrections and activities of insurrectionists appeared more retributory than 
revolutionary.  However, these concepts are difficult to disentangle given the 
association of the established élites with the French impositions and the extent of 
                                            
178.  See Soriano, História da Guerra Civil, 2.ª época, vol. 1, pp. 309-313.  Soriano asserts that while the 
written request for support was made on the 2nd July a deputation (comprising the Visconde de 
Balsemão and the desembargador João de Carvalho Mártens da Silva Ferrão) arrived in London on 
the 27th July.   
179.  Esdaile, Popular resistance in the French wars, p. 22. 
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coercion and social conditioning underpinning the absolutist regime in Portugal.  In 
relation to the former, to counter some of the more excessive examples of violence 
the juntas acted quickly to criminalise certain aspects of insurrectionary behaviour.  
In terms of the latter, the energies of civil and clerical authorities were combined in 
articulating the divine right of Dom João to rule and provide justification and 
encouragement for popular resistance.   
At first sight, then, the evidence suggests the motivation was, in the main, 
economic and social and, in some cases, criminal, rather than political.  There is 
some evidence that the violence was justifiably directed against persons who were 
suspected of collaboration, and in many cases of course this was correct.  But there 
were other, less rational, examples of victimisation - for example the number of 
recorded attacks on members of the Jewish population, perceived heretics, and 
some which would appear to be no more than the settling of old scores.   
The ideological nature of the insurrections does not become apparent until 
later, that is after the assumption of power by the ruling élites.  There is a clearly 
defined chronology and pattern for the establishment of the juntas, across the north 
of Portugal, and some useful indicators for the social basis of their membership.  
Moreover, the centres for these juntas were the centres of military governorship, 
Oporto (Partido de Porto), Viana, Braga, etc – many of which were conterminous 
with (or approximately followed) the boundaries of clerical diocese.  The 
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establishment of civil, judicial and military authority restored absolutism, and 
curbed the excess of the masses.  Rather than supporting and empowering the 
people to oppose the French, their enthusiasm was harnessed: in some cases by 
relatively limited forms of coercion, but in others enforced by means of rigorous 
application of the rule of law.  In these matters it is clear that inadequate recognition 
has been afforded to the extent to which Portuguese society was marked by 
ascription and deference, an acceptance of the existing hierarchical structures and 
the subaltern status of commoners and – especially - the non propertied majority of 
both the rural and urban population.  How else are we able to explain the ability of 
the élites to harness and suppress popular enthusiasm?   
The ideological underpinning, for this phase of the insurrection, was 
unquestionably that of the (absent) Bragança absolutist monarchy and, as such, we 
have to allow for social conditioning and élite manipulation in establishing control 
given the precarious hold the civil and judicial authorities had over the masses.  180  
One further factor in establishing authority and directing public anger against the 
French was the role of the church, from the ultra-conservative high clergy such as 
the Bishops of diocese to parochial priests and friars.  Given the important role 
played by the Catholic Church in Portuguese society, and the extent of illiteracy 
                                            
180.  There is some agreement on this aspect of the role of the state and church in relation to 
insurrectionary activities, see for example Esdaile, Popular resistance and the French wars, and Fraser, 
Napoleon’s cursed war.  For the role of the magistracy in Portuguese society in the eighteenth century 
see Stuart B. Schwartz, ‘Magistracy and Society in colonial Brazil’, The Hispanic American Historical 
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amongst the general population, the general perception and conflation of Napoleon 
and the French invaders as regicidists and atheists is, perhaps, to be expected.  But 
the role of the church does not become apparent until after the insurrections had 
occurred and civil, judicial and military authority had been re-imposed on “patriot” 
forces.  However, from that point on members of the clergy not only actively 
participated in insurrectionary activities they clearly gave them an ideological basis 
– whether in terms of the fight against the French enemy, personified as Jacobin, 
anti-Christ or both, or in terms of further defining the insurrections as conservative 
and reformatory, rather than a revolutionary force for change.  181 
Power was assumed by the juntas and, in the north, the Junta Suprema 
assumed a pan-regional role, issuing proclamations requesting public subscriptions 
to support the development and implementation of provincial civil and judicial 
administration in the absence of more formal governance and finance at a national 
level.  Despite a lack of consensus on all matters, the membership of the Junta 
Suprema was united in relation to the pressing need for arms, munitions and finance 
to sustain popular opposition to the French.  All soldiers of the first and second line, 
who were either still under “licence” to serve, or who had served at some point 
since 1801, were recalled to their respective regiments. The Junta Suprema defined 
the territorial limits for recruitment to each regiment and announced an increase in 
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pay for both first and second line troops.  In these ways, the Junta Suprema was 
successful in mobilising the eight infantry regiments pertaining to the northern 
provinces, three regiments of cavalry and, in addition, four battalions of caçadores 
were raised, respectively, in the Entre Minho e Douro, Partido do Porto, Trás-os-
Montes and Beira Alta.  The lack of finance and more particularly the deficiency in 
officers and staff, and therefore military discipline, organisation and logistics, 
would continue to present problems.  The civil and judicial authorities were armed 
in an effort to maintain the rule of law and ensure public safety.  To provide an 
infrastructure and raise funds, the Junta Suprema implored the population to make 
patriotic donations of arms, equipment, horses, and money to sustain military 
mobilisation.  In addition to imposing new taxation, in coin, on staple exports such 
as wine, oil, vinegar and aguadente, the Junta Suprema requested a loan from the 
Portuguese treasury of two million Cruzados and sought a similar amount of 
finance from the British government.  D. Domingos António de Sousa Coutinho 
wrote to the Junta Suprema from London on the 18th July to report that all almost all 
requests for aid had been agreed to, or were to be met, in full.  182 Not only money, 
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arms and equipment were to be sent but also a British expeditionary force under 
Wellesley.  183     Finally, a treaty was drawn up and agreed between the Junta 
Provisional do Governo Supremo in Oporto and the Junta Revolucionaria da Galicia 
declaring mutual support for all military efforts in relation to resisting and 
expelling the French from their respective countries.  184   
In Portugal, there was clearly a groundswell of public support for the 
establishment of the juntas, and formal opposition to the French, as evidenced by 
the donations given, the extent of military mobilisation (in such a short period of 
time) and the numbers voluntarily enlisting in the numerous volunteer battalions; 
some of which were of much more military significance than others.  For example, 
many of the volunteer light infantry battalions formed the cadres of the first six 
battalions of caçadores to be officially incorporated into the Portuguese regular army 
in late 1808 whilst other volunteers enlisted into the Leal Legião Lusitana: a unit that 
had a chequered history and which, ultimately, was disbanded; its officers and 
troops providing the nucleus for six additional battalions of caçadores in 1811.   185 
Undoubtedly, the activities of D. Miguel Pereira Forjaz was a major factor 
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underlying the successful re-organisation of Portuguese armed forces in the north, 
the Junta Suprema had responsibility for recruitment and mobilisation of almost 
one half of the Portuguese regular armed forces.  186 
Meanwhile, the British expeditionary force under Wellesley had already been 
given to orders to embark: although, as is well understood within British 
historiography the eventual destination for this force had not yet been decided.  Up 
until the very last hour before embarkation, this force had been destined for South 
America, the defining moment in the decision making process being the Spanish 
uprising against Napoleon.  187  British preferences were probably still, even at this 
point, for intervention in Spain or even on two fronts – Cadiz and Lisbon.  The 
decision to intervene in Portugal was determined by the unfolding of events in the 
Iberian Peninsula including the critical mass of Spanish troops located in the 
northern regions of Spain and a combination of Spanish pride and unease at a 
further British military presence in mainland Spain.  188  The initial British 
expeditionary force which sailed from Cork had previously been committed to an 
expedition to Venezuela.  It was joined by an ad hoc combination of other troops 
that had previously been intended to serve in a variety of other operations, for 
                                            
186.  ibid. pp. 116-17. 
187.  John Lynch, British policy and South America, Journal of Latin American Studies, vol. 1, no. 1, 1969, 
1-30, pp. 22-24 and Martin Robson, Britain, Portugal and South America in the Napoleonic Wars, 
(London : IB Tauris, 2011), pp. 214-22. 
188.  For details of which see Esdaile, A new history, pp. 95-97, Muir, Britain and the defeat of Napoleon, 
pp. 46-49; Muir, ‘Britain and the Peninsular War’, p. 342; and Michael Glover, Britannia sickens: Sir 
Arthur Wellesley and the convention of Cintra, (London : Leo Cooper, 1970), pp. 56, and 59-60.   
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example in the Mediterranean and the Baltic: a relatively small expeditionary force 
under Sir Brent Spencer already off the coast of Spain and a much larger force that 
had been prepared for an expedition to the Baltic under Sir John Moore was also 
dispatched to Iberia, but did not reach Portugal in time to take part in the campaign 
of 1808.  The decision to divert all of these troops from their various operations and 
for them to concentrate on the Iberian Peninsula came after requests for support 
from Asturian delegates despatched to London, and no doubt similar requests from 
the Portuguese, and resulted in a wide ranging brief being given to Wellesley by 
Castlereagh.  However, the Spanish delegation sent to London and (subsequently) 
the authorities in La Coruña refused the offer of direct military intervention but not 
the provision of finance, arms and equipment.  This shift in emphasis, coupled with 
the direct requests for military aid by, and more recent intelligence from, Portugal 
(as represented by the Junta Suprema in Oporto and the minister plenipotentiary in 
London convinced the British government of the wisdom of intervening in 
Portugal.  The government’s views (expressed in a fairly wide ranging brief to 
Wellesley) were immediately confirmed when Wellesley arrived off the coast of 
Spain.  Wellesley quickly determined to sail on to Portugal, agreed the most 
appropriate point for the army’s disembarkation, and sent on reports to London 
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confirming their increasing interest in concentrating the efforts of the combined 
expeditionary forces in the liberation of Portugal from the French.  189   
Wellesley wrote to Castlereagh from La Coruña to apprise him of the 
intelligence he had gained from the Junta Revolucionaria de Galicia and from Charles 
Stuart who had been dispatched on a particular mission to northern Spain.  He 
informed him of the extent of the Spanish insurrection, the most likely basis for 
British military intervention and his intention to sail on to Oporto.  Writing again 
from Oporto, he detailed the extent of insurrection in Portugal, in all provinces to 
the north of the Tagus, the very limited indigenous military forces and the general 
lack of arms and equipment for the same.  Wellesley estimated there were 
approximately 5,000 formal troops of which only 1,000 were properly armed and 
accoutred; and, taking into account local intelligence relating to French deployment, 
determined to disembark the British expeditionary force at the mouth of the 
Mondego.  190  The details of the disembarkation and subsequent campaign are well 
documented, and need to not detain us here, except in relation to Portuguese 
                                            
189.  For a succinct yet comprehensive review of the campaign, see Rory J Muir, ‘Wellington and the 
ingredients of victory’, in Rory Muir, and others, Inside Wellington’s Peninsular Army, (Barnsley : Pen 
and Sword, 2006), in particular pp. 1-2, and for coverage of the strategic, political and other 
considerations (such as military hierarchy),  and details of the military briefing given to Wellesley 
and subsequent commanders, see Rory Muir, Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon 1807-1815, (London : 
Yale University Press, 1996), pp. 42-43, and 65-69 and Charles Esdaile, The Peninsular War: A New 
History, (London : Allen Lane, 2002), pp. 94-97. 
190.  Wellesley to Castlereagh, HMS Crocodile, Coruña, 21st July, 1808, pp. 23-24, same to same, pp. 
24-29; same to same, HMS Crocodile off Oporto, 25th July, 1808, pp. 30-31 et seq., same to same, 
HMS Donegal off the Mondego River, 1st August, 1808 pp. 39-43. For details of the expeditionary 
force, its remit and composition, see the correspondence in WD iv, pp. 15-18, in particular ibid., 
Castlereagh to Wellesley, Downing Street, 15th July, 1808, pp. 15-17. 
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perceptions and expectations of the British expeditionary force and developing 
Anglo-Portuguese relations.  191  Crucially, in relation to these isssues, we will need 
to take into account the developing civil, judicial and military power base in the 
north of Portugal.  
III 
Bernadim Freire de Andrade played a substantial role in the mobilisation and 
deployment of Portuguese armed forces in 1808 and 1809.  His relationships with 
the Junta Provisional do Governo Supremo in Oporto, and the British general Sir 
Arthur Wellesley, were both difficult and complex.  An investigation of the 
activities of this general, his links with the Junta Suprema in Oporto, and his 
relationship with Wellesley and the Portuguese army, provides an excellent 
opportunity to explore in more detail some of the issues identified and outlined in 
the previous section.  The focus will be on Freire’s capacities, activities and 
responses as a general, the circumstances and experiences of the troops under his 
command, and the intervention in military matters of Portuguese civil and judicial 
authorities in the form of the Junta Suprema and the governor of Coimbra.  192  Freire 
had both his defenders and detractors: amongst the latter, the editor of the Correio 
Braziliense, Hipólito José da Costa; amongst the former, Frei Joaquim de Santo 
                                            
191.  The interested reader is referred to the relevant passages in Oman, History of the Peninsular War, 
vol. 1. and Glover, Britannia sickens, for further details.  170. See also pp. 103 et seq. below. 
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António de Brito França Galvão to whom the anonymous Reflexões sobre o Correio 
Brasiliense, was attributed: a refutation of various accusations against Freire and the 
Regency (and Portuguese politics and policy in general) made in the Correio 
Braziliense.  The journal was a Portuguese/Brazilian periodical published in 
England; da Costa the author of the journal lived in exile in London, being banned 
from publishing in Portugal, after asserting greater Brazilian autonomy and 
advocating changes to the Portuguese political “constitution”.  Da Costa was 
viewed as a dangerous Jacobin by the church and the political establishment in 
Portugal.  193   
Immediately following its establishment, the Junta Provisional do Governo 
Supremo appointed Bernadim Freire de Andrade, a veteran of the Roussillon War as 
governador das armas.  His immediate tasks were to mobilise and lead the military 
forces under its jurisdiction.  Formal military forces in the north of Portugal were 
furthest from Junot’s immediate authority in Lisbon, and were therefore spared 
some of the more excessive reductions in manpower experienced by regiments in 
Lisbon and the surrounding province when the army was ordered to disband.  
While the Spanish occupying forces had been tasked with ensuring compliance 
with that decree, in those areas over which they had jurisdiction, it is likely that 
some if not all of the sequestered arms would subsequently become available upon 
                                            
193.  I am grateful for the assistance of Moisés Gaudêncio for help with these insights into Freire. 
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the departure of the Spanish.  But the departure of such a substantial number of 
Portuguese troops for France and the deleterious effects of the process of 
demobilisation meant that it was only with great difficulty that Bernadim Freire de 
Andrade was able to mobilise and march 7,600 Portuguese troops, from the 
provinces of Partido do Porto, Trás-os-Montes, Minho and Beira (Alta), to assist 
with the eviction of the French from Portugal in the summer of 1808.  The small 
Portuguese army Freire managed to assemble was not only recruited from four 
different provinces, it was composed of a wide variety of troop types, was poorly 
officered, inadequately trained, and almost entirely deficient in proper arms and 
equipment.  194 
Bernadim Freire de Andrade and Manuel Pinto Bacelar, two senior Portuguese 
generals, met Sir Arthur Wellesley at Montemór-o-Velho whilst the British troops 
were still disembarking at the mouth of the Mondego River.  Initially, it was agreed 
that all the Portuguese troops under their command would act jointly with the 
British force under Wellesley.  Wellesley and Freire de Andrade would manoeuvre 
on Lisbon, via Leíria and the coastal road, while the troops of Manuel Pinto Bacelar 
would move from Castelo Branco towards the fortress city of Abrantes to observe, 
                                            
194.  Fortunately, the civil, judicial and military authorities there had not totally lost the confidence of 
an enthusiastic population and the insurrections were backed by military commanders, for example 
general Manuel José de Sepúlveda, the governador das armas of Trás-os-Montes who ordered the 
mobilisation of all military forces in that province, and lieutenant colonel Francisco Pinto da Fonseca 
ordered the formation of the Caçadores Volúntarios de Vila Real, an impromptu enlistment of loyal 
volunteers that would become the nucleus for the future Batalhão de Caçadores No. 5.  See Centeno, O 
exército português na guerra peninsular, p. 108. 
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and contain, the activities of the French in that region.  The British troops moved off 
on the 10th August via Pombal, towards Leíria; the intended rendezvous point for 
the Anglo-Portuguese forces.  The Portuguese moved down from their 
cantonments, meeting the British expeditionary force for the first time on the 12th 
August in Leíria as had been initially agreed.  195        
There is still no clear consensus amongst Portuguese and British historians as 
to the actual reasons for Freire’s subsequent inactivity, and reluctance to cooperate 
further, when the two generals met again in Leíria.  One possibility was the 
perceived difficulties with procuring supplies the Portuguese troops ordered 
towards the Beira Baixa province would encounter.  Indeed, Wellesley had already 
recognised the extent of the problem for the British expeditionary force, profiting 
from a number of sources of military intelligence, not least of which from Lt. Col. 
Brown and Lt. Col. Trant who were engaged on “particular service” in Portugal.  
Despite the eagerness with which the British were received, and the willingness of 
                                            
195.  WD, iv, Wellesley to the Juiz de Fora at Figueira, 1st August, 1808 pp. 44-45; Wellesley to Brown, 
Lavaos (sic), 4th August, 1808 and Wellesley to Trant, Lavaos, 6th August, 1808 pp. 49-50.  In the latter 
dispatch Wellesley informed Trant of his intention to “meet General Freire at Monte Mor at twelve 
to-morrow”.  For a useful, if somewhat one-sided summary of the campaign, see Glover, Britannia 
sickens: the nature of the meeting and the character of the Portuguese general is described on pp. 75-
76.  Soriano provides a useful account of the meeting, confirming both Freire and Bacelar attended, 
and by inference D. Miguel Pereira de Forjaz – given he was aide to Freire and also a near relation, 
Soriano, História da Guerra Civil, 2.ª época, vol. 1, p. 371.    
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the Portuguese to support the British in any way they could, Wellesley complained 
of the lack of provisions and of draught animals. 196   
A more plausible possibility was that the French deployed in and around 
Santarém (the more usual route to Lisbon tracked alongside the right bank of the 
Tejo) posed a significant threat to Coimbra and, thereafter, Oporto.  In addition, a 
further argument put forward was that better resources would be available in the 
interior (Ribatejo) and, perhaps also, this manoeuvre would provide an opportunity 
to strike against Loison, as opposed to merely containing the threat his command 
posed towards Coimbra (if the allies concerted their operations along the coastal 
road).  Loison, it will be recalled, had been despatched to overpower the 
insurrection in the Alentejo region, and had defeated a joint Portuguese – Spanish 
force defending Elvas, its major city.  But he had subsequently been called in by 
Junot towards the province of the Ribatejo to assist in the campaign against the 
forces that were now expected to combine against the French; both those that were 
already being mobilised by the Portuguese and, upon their arrival, the British 
expeditionary force.   
                                            
196.  The declaration of the merchants of Coimbra, in Soriano, História da Guerra Civil, 2.ª época, vol. 5, 
part 1, pp 94-95, provides evidence of popular support for the "common cause": but logistics posed a 
serious problem for armies in the Iberian Peninsula.  Wellesley had written to his superiors, whose 
arrival he expected, that the Portuguese would give everything they could provide in the way of 
sustenance, but that it would be little given their desperate situation.  Additionally, it would be very 
difficult to arrange transport (ox carts) for logistical support (except in stages).  He had taken steps to 
order 150 mules from Oporto, which they could use on arrival.  But he had procured all the mules 
available in the vicinity to support the logistical needs of the army, Glover, Britannia sickens, p. 78.   
  
93 
 
Freire’s dilemma was not confined to the inadequately armed and provisioned 
troops at his disposal; he had become embroiled in an increasingly difficult political 
situation.  Contrary to the agreement reached at Montemór-o-Velho, Freire now 
asserted that he could only continue to operate jointly with Wellesley if the British 
general undertook to provide food for the entire Portuguese force.  Wellesley could 
not comply with this request in its entirety but was able to provide 5,000 muskets, 
and commensurate ammunition, to arm and equip a good number of the troops that 
had marched south without weapons and agreed to the necessary logistical support 
and food for a small contingent of Portuguese troops: essentially the Oporto and 
Chaves regiments of line infantry – and for the Portuguese cavalry and artillery in 
which the British were decidedly deficient.        
 In justification of Freire, it has been argued that the governor of Coimbra 
wrote to the Junta Suprema in Oporto, to outline the potential threat to Coimbra and 
Portugal’s second city (Oporto), posed by the French force in the Ribatejo.  The 
inference was that, as the allied forces moved towards Lisbon, this French force 
could strike against the undefended city of Coimbra and subsequently move 
against Oporto.  The Junta intervened, and ordered Freire to defend against the 
threat to Coimbra and Oporto rather than act jointly with Wellesley.  This was an 
important intervention at two levels.  The Junta Provisional do Supremo Governo in 
Oporto was the recognised authority in the north and was presided over by the 
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Bishop of Oporto, a former member of the regency council and one of the most 
senior clergymen in Portugal.  Freire had been appointed to command by the Junta 
Suprema, but his warrant was from the prince regent.  The juntas had declared 
themselves the recognised authority within their respective jurisdiction, but there 
was no royal charter approving them officially.  However, they assumed full 
authority in the name of the prince regent to make these types of demands.  Freire 
was put in an uncomfortable position.  He could proceed on the basis of sound 
military judgement and assist Wellesley in securing the capital, which would mean 
disobeying the directives of his political superiors.  He was also mindful of the 
relative lack of experience of a substantial proportion of the troops in the 
Portuguese force; many of whom were recent volunteers and had little or no 
previous army service.  However, in this he would seem to be unduly concerned – 
they would appear to have been both prepared for the rigours of the campaign and 
willing to fight.   Alternatively, he could comply with his political superiors.  197 
 Wellesley, not without some justification, had considered Freire’s proposed 
plan impractical.  He could not undertake to provide for all the Portuguese troops, 
his argument being that if the Portuguese could not provide for their own 
subsistence along Freire’s proposed route of manoeuvre; how could the British be 
expected to sustain the manoeuvres of the combined force, especially taking into 
                                            
197.  Soriano, História da Guerra Civil, 2.ª época, vol. 1, pp 371-74,  and ibid, vol. 5, part 1, pp. 100-05. 
95 
 
account the limitations of the logistical support available?   Moreover, Wellesley 
could not undertake manoeuvres at any great distance from the coast and the all-
important littoral road given his reliance for logistical support and supplies from 
the transport ships that accompanied his expeditionary force.  198   Leaving aside 
local considerations, Wellesley’s strategy was dictated by the limitations of his 
remit, the knowledge that he was to be superseded by two senior generals and no 
little pressure from the British government.  He needed to retain clear lines of 
communication with the transports in the event of a significant setback or defeat 
and to cover the disembarkation of the expected reinforcements.  Ultimately, Freire 
and the majority of the troops under his command took no part in the battles of 
Roliça and Vimeiro.  Both British and Portuguese generals, it would seem, had one 
eye on military matters and the other on political considerations.  199 
These issues are important if only in that the main focus of secondary sources, 
particularly - but not only - those in English, has been on the intervention of the 
British expeditionary force under Sir Arthur Wellesley and the relatively small 
Portuguese contingent serving with it.  Rather than the broader issues pertaining to 
the situation in Portugal, these accounts focus on Wellesley’s victories over 
                                            
198.  Michael Glover, Britannia sickens: Sir Arthur Wellesley and the convention of Cintra, (London : Leo 
Cooper, 1970).     
199.  For the complex and often difficult relations between “soldiers and statesmen”, see Rory J. Muir 
and Charles J. Esdaile, ‘Strategic Planning in a Time of Small Government’, pp. 13-21.   
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Delaborde and Junot, respectively, at Roliça and Vimeiro in August 1808.  200  There 
has been no concerted focus on the political, economic or military difficulties faced 
by the Portuguese.  Suffice to say here that although Wellesley had been allowed to 
continue in command at the battle of Vimeiro, he had already been superseded by 
Sir Harry Burrard who in turn was out ranked and replaced as Commander in 
Chief by Sir Hew Dalrymple shortly afterwards.  201  Dalrymple was a very senior 
officer and well regarded.  He was also, immediately prior to being appointed to 
command the expeditionary force, governor of Gibraltar and acquainted with 
British foreign policy in respect of the Iberian Peninsula.  However, his 
appointment reveals more about the conservative nature of, and protocol for, 
military appointments – and therefore also highlights the rather extraordinary 
nature of Wellesley’s appointment to command in 1808 and, especially, 1809.  202  
Although limited in scale, the participation of a small but significant 
Portuguese contingent greatly helped the “common cause”, and gave a much 
needed legitimacy to British intervention in Portugal.   Despite the appalling 
circumstances and embarrassing outcome of the Convention of Cintra, the 
campaign had demonstrated the determination of the Portuguese to oppose the 
                                            
200.  For further details see: Oman, History of the Peninsular War, vol. 1, Glover, Britannia sickens, and   
David Buttery, Wellington against Junot: the first invasion of Portugal, 1807-1808, (Barnsley : Pen 
and Sword, 2011).  
201.  See Muir, Britain and the defeat of Napoleon, pp. 44-47, and Esdaile, A new history, pp. 95-96. 
202.  Ron McGuigan, ‘The origin of Wellington’s peninsular army’, in Rory J. Muir and others, Inside 
Wellington’s Peninsular Army, (Barnsley : Pen and Sword, 2006). 
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French invaders and resist the occupation of their country, while Britain had 
resolved to continue to make a substantial intervention in the Iberian Peninsula.   
The regency council had been re-instated following the eviction of the French, 
albeit by one of the discredited British commanders, Dalrymple.  But its very 
legitimacy had been questioned by the perceived acquiescence, and outright 
collaboration, of some of its members in the French military government.  
Additionally, there were some overtly political outcomes to take into account.  The 
Junta Suprema had set itself up as an authority, had authorised the mobilisation of 
Portuguese armed forces.  Crucially, the junta had intervened in military decision 
making in order to provide for the defence of Coimbra and Oporto – and 
undermined its appointed Commander in Chief.     
 The disorganised nature of the troops under his command and Freire’s own 
timidity and inactivity called into question the capabilities and capacities of senior 
Portuguese officers and the army, as it was presently constituted, to oppose the 
French independently.  In some ways the experiences of the campaign of 1808 
matched many of those witnessed in the War of Roussillon; in others, they presaged 
the disastrous events that were to unfold in early 1809.  Nevertheless, the present 
campaign had not only demonstrated that the Portuguese were prepared to offer 
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vigorous resistance to future invasions; it had also provided a positive, albeit 
limited, example of their ability to combat the French.  203 
There were a number of fairly complex outcomes of British intervention in 
1808 that had important repercussions for Portugal.  The Convention of Cintra, and 
more specifically the manner in which the French were permitted to return to 
France, transported in British ships, together with the enormous controversy 
surrounding the contents of their baggage, led to national uproar in Britain and a 
commission of enquiry.  204  Wellesley was eventually exonerated and his 
undoubted military abilities were in no way diminished at the Portuguese court as 
a result.  He would return again to Portugal in 1809 as commander in chief, while 
the two senior generals never again saw active service.  When Wellesley was called 
back to England, to face the inquiry, Beresford began to develop what was to 
become a long and, in the main, very positive relationship with Portugal.  He was 
unrelenting in his efforts to limit the worst and unrestrained behaviour of French 
officers in relation to property and valuables they had acquired during the 
occupation of Portugal.   Meantime, Sir John Moore, who was en route from the 
                                            
203.  See Soriano, História da Guerra Civil, 2.ª época, vol. 1, p. 372; Soriano rejects the possible political 
justifications for Freire’s inactivity in their entirety, suggesting the timidity of Freire de Andrade lay 
behind the Portuguese commander’s reasoning and stresses the willingness of the Portuguese army 
to fight outside their own provinces, and - prior to receiving them from the British - without proper 
military arms and equipment. 
204.  For the understandable reaction of Portland’s administration to the Convention and the 
subsequent activities of Canning and Castlereagh, see Wendy Hinde, George Canning, (London : 
Purnell Book Services, 1973), pp. 201-205.   
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Baltic to join the expeditionary force, assumed overall command of British forces in 
the Iberian Peninsula: subsequently undertaking a diversionary expedition in 
support of the Spanish forces in the north of Spain in the last months of 1808.  205  
His eventual retreat and the return of the expeditionary force to Britain in January 
1809 are important in relation to understanding the complexities of the overall 
struggle for the Iberian Peninsula and in relation to developing British strategy.  
Moreover, this initial British intervention in Portugal (and Spain) would have a 
considerable impact on the struggle for Portugal: both for the nation and the 
Portuguese people.   
 Portugal still lacked a functioning army and the necessary resources to 
support its recruitment, continued mobilisation, logistics and supplies.  Success in 
Portugal in 1808, tempered by the substantial losses incurred in Moore’s campaign 
would also have significant implications for the development of an extremely 
cautious British foreign policy and subsequent military strategy in the Iberian 
Peninsula between 1809 and 1811.  Suffice to say that Dalrymple, who superseded 
Wellesley, left as a legacy a small British force in the environs of Lisbon (soon to be 
commanded by Sir John Cradock) and re-installed the regency council.  Additional 
problems faced by the Portuguese government were numerous.  They included the 
                                            
205.  Wellesley showed remarkable prescience in writing to Castlereagh on 1st August, as the British 
troops disembarked, advising the financial support of 30,000 Portuguese troops within a combined 
Anglo-Portuguese force of over 50,000, in order to ensure successful intervention in the Iberian 
Peninsula, see Muir, citing Wellington’s private correspondence, in ‘Wellington and the ingredients 
of victory’,  p. 2.      
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continuing power vacuum, created by the transfer of the court and the apparatus of 
Government to Brazil, the somewhat tainted profile of specific members of the 
regency council - given the inclusion of some of its former members in the military 
government imposed by Junot, the lack of funds, troops, capable officers, 
armaments and equipment, and - most importantly in February of 1809 - the 
renewed threats to Portugal’s territorial sovereignty posed by French forces in 
Spain.  206  Finally, one important and very positive feature of the expulsion of the 
French in 1808, was the emergence to a position of much higher authority of Dom 
Miguel Pereira Forjaz; a man who was to become very important in promoting and 
sustaining the “common cause”.  207     The “common cause” was a term used to 
describe the alliance in defence of Portugal and opposition to the French in the 
Iberian Peninsula.  Particularly after the trials and tribulations of joint campaigning 
with the Spanish in the summer of 1809, and with Stuart’s replacement of Villiers 
and the steadfast support of Forjaz in the regency council, the “common cause” 
became a particular focus of British and Portuguese policy.  Underpinning the 
“common cause” were common goals, close cooperation in military operations and 
financial planning to support the war effort.  According to Fryman, the financial 
                                            
206.  The legitimacy of the regency council was even called into question by the Portuguese minister 
plenipotentiary in London, D. Domingos de Sousa Coutinho (the Chevalier de Sousa), see Muir, 
Britain and the defeat of Napoleon, p. 83.  
207.  See, Francisco de la Fuente, ‘Dom Miguel Pereira Forjaz: his early career and role in the 
mobilisation and defence of Portugal, 1807-1814’, (Unpublished PhD thesis : Florida State University, 
1980) and Mildred L. Fryman, ‘Charles Stuart and the Common Cause’.          
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stability and administrative efficiency of Portugal was crucial to the successful 
conclusion of the campaign against France in the Iberian Peninsula.  Stuart was 
instrumental in applying pressure on the regency council to support and bring to 
fruition the majority “of Wellington’s plans for alterations and improvements in the 
realm of Portugal’s domestic affairs” in the regency council. 
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Chapter four: the invasion of 1809 – the onset of total war? 
 
I 
 
In the winter of 1808-1809, Napoleon left Spain, directing Soult to pursue and 
defeat the British army of Sir John Moore and, thereafter, to invade Portugal.  He 
had made no fresh provision, by way of significant reinforcements, for the 
subjugation of Spain and Portugal, on the supposition that the forces already 
committed to the war beyond the Pyrenees were adequate for the tasks they had 
been set.  This may have been a reasonable assumption, given the relative ease with 
which the disparate Spanish armies in the north of Spain had been overcome in the 
campaign of late 1808.  He did order Victor to support Soult from his base in Castile 
and Estremadura.  What Napoleon could not have foreseen was that increasingly, 
from 1809 onwards, the nature of the conflict in the Iberian theatre has led to it 
being described as guerre à outrance. 208  Moreover, the potential scale and nature of 
popular opposition to this second French invasion do not appear to have been taken 
into consideration.  209    
Portugal faced two immediate military threats: namely a direct strike against 
Lisbon along the Tagus (Victor) and indirectly via Oporto (Soult).  There remained 
                                            
208.  Guerre à outrance (war to the utmost; to the bitter end; or to the death): see David Gates, The 
Spanish ulcer: a history of the Peninsular War, (London : Pimlico, 2002), ‘Part three: guerre à outrance’. 
209.  Napoleon pursued Moore only as far as Astorga and, on departing, ordered Soult to pursue and 
defeat Moore and invade Portugal, via Oporto in the north, and Victor to support from his bases in 
central Spain, as he wished to subdue Portugal completely in 1809: CN XIX, pp. 116-17, cited in 
Donald D. Horward, The French Campaign in Portugal 1810-1811: An Account by Jean Jaques Pelet, 
(Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press, 1973), p. 7.      
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also the possibility of further threats via the Beiras, should French forces in northern 
Spain be successful in subjugating Spanish opposition and move against Portugal 
via New Castile and Leon (for example, the troops commanded by Lapisse).  In the 
event, Soult would invade northern Portugal in March, with the aim of taking 
Lisbon, from his base in Galicia.  This decision was to have a significant impact on 
both the invasion of Portugal and French efforts to subjugate the north west of 
Spain.  However, in order to understand correctly the issues and implications of 
military invasion and occupation, we also need to consider the social origins of 
popular opposition to the French alongside consideration of political and military 
strategy.   
These social origins were clearly linked to land tenure, property relations and 
the social relations of production as much as to political and ideological factors.  A 
number of recent studies have pointed to the importance of, the specific forms of 
land tenure and social relations of production underlying popular opposition to the 
French invasion and occupation.  The potential for Spanish opposition to the French 
already existed in the form of irregular militia, in Galicia the Alarma, in which all 
men were liable to serve (unless exempt from service due to age or prescribed 
occupations).  The Alarma was organised and officered within each parish, and 
operated with not a little encouragement from the local clergy.  But the catalyst for 
its mobilisation and deployment was not the French occupation of Spain per se, but 
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French exactions, reprisals and retributions against any opposition.  210  Further 
major factors defining the numbers involved, and the form, nature and pattern of 
irregular warfare in Galicia, were the prevailing social, economic and geographical 
conditions specific to borderland regions in Spain.  211   In addition, there were 
specific linguistic and dynastic commonalities, combined with similar forms of land 
tenure, property relations and social relations of production, between Spanish 
Galicia and the Portuguese regions of the Minho and Trás-os-Montes that would be 
a key factor in defining the sustained and fierce popular opposition to the French in 
these regions. 
But in addition to commonalities, we also need to consider variations within 
and between regions: more specifically insights afforded by a new history of Spain 
that has been developing throughout the second half of the twentieth century and, 
by extension, Portugal – for example in terms of our understanding of the situation 
in specific regions such as Navarre.  This new history has revealed that the 
labradores of Navarre were both land owners and tenant farmers, and their 
landholdings had developed and benefited from capital investment and the 
application of specific agricultural methods.  To economic drivers such as land 
tenure and soil utilisation must be added factors such as the investment of capital, 
creation of surplus, profit taking, taxation, dues and also rights (for example to 
                                            
210.  Esdaile, Popular resistance in the French wars, p. 6, p. 11, Esdaile, A new history, pp 168-70. 
211.  Fraser, Napoleon’s cursed war, pp 337-38. 
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common land) that were particular to certain provinces of Spain.  The importance of 
this revisionist view is that it challenges both popular perceptions of the social 
origins of the guerrilla, as a form of warfare, and the guerrilla fighter as patriot, 
replacing the uni-dimensional figure represented in both Spanish and English 
secondary sources with the much more complex and multi-faceted concept of the 
guerrillas as partisans, but also bandits, smugglers and deserters. 212  A further point 
to be borne in mind is that the economic system, and supporting infrastructure, that 
had been developed in this (sub) region was atypical – in particular when compared 
the Montaña (the northern province of Navarre) to the Ribera (its southernmost 
province) and other regions and provinces of Spain.  The complex economic, social 
and political relationships in Spain at the turn of the century meant that it is not 
possible to make logical generalisations about the social origins of popular 
opposition from one region to another, or indeed, in this case, from one province to 
another in the same region.  213   
According to the revisionist history of la guerrilla in many, if not the majority, 
of cases, the guerrilleros(as) were mainly self serving, driven by greed and as 
exploitative of the local population as the French.  In the most extreme cases they 
detracted from, rather than complemented, patriot Spain’s struggle against the 
                                            
212.   See John L. Tone, The fatal knot: the guerrilla war in Navarre and the defeat of Napoleon in Spain, 
(Chapel Hill and London : University of North Carolina Press, 1994), chapter one: ‘Guerrilla country’ 
and chapter two: ‘Economy and politics in Navarre’.  
213.  Charles Esdaile, Fighting Napoleon, guerrillas, bandits and adventurers in Spain, 1808-1814, (New 
Haven - London : Yale University Press, 2004), pp. 90-93. 
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invader.  Moreover, it has recently been claimed that a significant number of 
guerrilleros were themselves former officers, soldiers, deserters or escaped prisoners 
from the French (either prisoners of war or incarcerated civilians), and that much of 
the overall guerrilla activity was undertaken by dispersed military units engaged in 
a partisan-type war of attrition against the French – as opposed to popular, armed 
insurrection.  Recent work has provided a specific and detailed analysis of the 
insurrection in Galicia and the Asturias, investigating the concepts of popular revolt 
and local resistance, territory and collective struggle.  But, despite a detailed 
examination of the social origins of the popular opposition, there is still no clear 
model that can be extrapolated to other regions – a key factor underpinning the 
development of opposition being the specific material and ideological conditions 
encountered at a regional and even local level.  214  The terms la guerrilla, and los 
guerrilleros are constructs that are specific in both a temporal and spatial context.  In 
the early nineteenth century the term la guerrilla meant literally petite guerre or little 
war.  It signified the activities of small groups of armed troops, engaging in a war of 
                                            
214.   See Esdaile, Fighting Napoleon, in particular, specific chapters devoted respectively to the 
guerrilla in history; the guerrillas in context; and their (social) origins.  Esdaile asserted in this work 
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phenomenon but probably contributed much less to the defeat of Napoleon than the canons of 
Spanish and English secondary sources have asserted – and their motivation cannot be reduced 
simply to faith in dios, rey y patria or the inducements of a fanatical clergy.  In the main, not only 
were the guerrillas in reality malhechores, contrabandistas y bandoleros as opposed to partisans and 
patriots, they detracted from, rather than contributed to, formal military opposition to the French. 
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outposts or guerre des postes in a formal military context.  However, given the 
particular focus in Spanish secondary sources on popular opposition to the French, 
and the concepts of spontaneous and armed civilian insurrection, la guerrilla has 
come to symbolise not only the overall concept of armed civilian insurrection but 
also the groups from within the general population who engaged in these activities 
and took up arms against the French occupational forces.  The concept of guerrilla 
warfare, then, has undertaken a transformation of meaning and been absorbed into 
modern English usage as a war of the people, as partisans, in a struggle against 
formal military opposition and - in its widest sense - a nation in arms.  Similarly, the 
guerrilleros(as) have become the guerrillas – the fighters who engage in a guerrilla 
war or guerra de guerrillas.  215   
The north of Portugal, though, has not been the subject of such a detailed and 
protracted study in English: although there is a developing strand within 
Portuguese historiography and a number of detailed studies of the war from the 
perspectives of specific regions.  The northern regions of Portugal, the Partido do 
Porto, Entre Minho e Douro, Trás-os-Montes and Beira (Alta), were not 
homogenous in their economic geography but did share some common features, 
both within and between themselves and with some northern Spanish regions.  The 
contemporary economy, agricultural production, trade and commerce, and in some 
                                            
215.  See, for example, Ronald Fraser, Napoleon’s cursed war: popular resistance in the Spanish Peninsular 
War, (London and New York : Verso, 2008). 
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cases language, customs and currency, were not strictly encompassed or 
constrained by national or international boundaries in northern Iberia.  While there 
were some large landowners, Portuguese lavradores could work land that was 
wholly or partly owned, rented or leased from the nobility and clergy; as did their 
counterparts in Spain.  The principal forms of agricultural activity, and the social 
relations of production, were based upon the parcelisation of land and at least a 
limited sense of ownership and control of the land worked.  It has also been argued 
that population growth in these provinces was sustained by the introduction of new 
crops, crop rotation and more intensive farming methods, but also by bringing 
marginal lands into cultivation.   The rural population of the Montaña, Galicia and 
Asturias in Spain, and the Trás-os-Montes, the Minho and Beira in northern 
Portugal, were used to fighting, physically and metaphorically, for their land, its 
productive capacities and its outputs.  As a result, they had developed specific 
relations with the local state representatives, civil, juridical and military, the 
nobility and clergy.  Whilst, in the main, economic progress was most likely to take 
place at the level of the individual farmer, there are some identifiable “collective” 
gains.  One example of this can be found in the particularly beneficial relationships 
with the clergy in relation to land use and the expropriation of seigneural and 
clerical dues, and the introduction of new and high yield crops.   
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These material conditions are further compounded by structural change 
within the economy in the eighteenth century and resulting demographic features 
such as population density.  Overall, some 41% of the Portuguese population 
resided in comarcas lining the Atlantic seaboard from Setúbal, just to the south of 
Lisbon, to the north above Oporto; indeed, the development of these 
agglomerations was largely driven by improvements in agriculture, proto-
industrialisation, rising demand in domestic markets and the expansion of external 
trade.  216  Population change was very unevenly distributed in Portugal in the late 
eighteenth century.  In 1801 there were 32.8 inhabitants per km2 across Portugal in 
total.  In the north of Portugal population density was highest in the Minho region 
(96.0) but much lower in the region of Beira (52.4).  In Trás-os-Montes, the most 
northerly province, one of the least well developed areas of Portugal, encompassing 
an extremely mountainous terrain and, as such, with a very limited proportion of 
the land under cultivation, population density was much lower (24.7).  The Minho 
was a very fertile province and therefore was able to support a much higher 
population density and witnessed an annual percentage increase in population of 
around 1.8% in the last decade of the eighteenth century to the census of 1801.  
While the Partido do Porto was similarly well endowed with naturally fertile 
                                            
216.  João Pedro Ferro, A população portuguesa no final do antigo regime, 1750-1815, (Lisboa : Editorial 
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110 
 
terrain, the population did not increase much above the average annual rate of 0.4% 
p.a. in many areas that were not immediately bordering the Douro River. In 
contrast to the above, the Alentejo had been witnessing depopulation and had a 
population density of just 11.1 per km2.  Although the description relates to the 
early nineteenth century, the Alentejo was typified by a significant disequilibrium 
between property owners and those without land, absentee landlords from the 
lesser nobility, an extremely rural and sparsely populated countryside, and a great 
number of beggars and idlers (mendigos and ociosos), the population suffered from 
cachexia, were malnourished, exhibited lower levels of fertility and / or retarded 
puberty.  217  As an aside, these considerations are fundamental to disentangling 
consensus and dissension in relation to observed variations in the extent of 
Portuguese military recruitment and mobilisation by region.      
   We have a number of studies based upon primary sources, then, that 
confirm the need to take into account interconnections within and between material 
conditions and the operation of state apparatus, regional economic and social 
development, in order to understand correctly the forms and nature of popular 
opposition to the French in the north of Spain and Portugal in 1809.  In addition, not 
only was there cross border collaboration between the respective juntas, and joint 
military operations, but there were clearly also spontaneous forms of cooperation 
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111 
 
and assistance between irregular forces disputing the occupation and pacification of 
Spanish and Portuguese territories by the French.  Much of this fierce opposition no 
doubt directly resulted from the French approach to war, the occupation of Spanish 
and Portuguese settlements, enforced seizure of property and foodstuffs, and their 
treatment of the local population.  218  A French diarist reported that whilst the 
inhabitants in one specific canton of Galicia ran away on the approach of the 
French, they pitilessly massacred small detachments in isolation.  The French 
retaliated against those insurgents they were able to catch, shooting anyone out of 
uniform, one diarist declaring the roads were strewn with French and Spanish 
corpses.  219   Another French source casually mentions the razing of two Spanish 
villages to the ground and the murder of hundreds of their inhabitants.  220  No 
doubt the inability to cross the river, given it was disputed by masses of poorly 
armed and organised insurgents, was one factor driving the frustration of the 
French, while another would be the hit and run tactics of both the Spanish and 
Portuguese insurgents.  A French secondary source, published mid century, 
acknowledges that the French had previously fought in Portugal, in campaigns 
marked by insurrection, retaliations and cruelties on both sides, with specific 
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negative effects on the morale of the French forces.  221  There is therefore a 
considerable historiography and evidence base to support the development of some 
tentative conclusions about the social basis of popular resistance to the French 
invasions. 
II 
To return to the immediate crisis facing Portugal, Dom João and his advisors 
in Brazil had already taken steps to help resolve some of their immediate military 
problems by requesting a British general to help organise, train and command the 
Portuguese military forces.  Beresford had been appointed to overall command of 
the Portuguese forces and Wellesley would soon take over responsibility for British 
forces in Portugal from Cradock. 222  Moreover, Britain had resolved to provide 
unqualified support for a substantial proportion of Portuguese troops (providing 
sufficient funds to recruit, mobilise, equip and arm, ultimately, 30,000 troops).  223  
But all of these changes would take time to be implemented in full.  But while the 
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regency council was soon to receive official notification from the Portuguese court 
in Brazil of Beresford’s appointment, the evacuation of the British army from La 
Coruña, the relatively small numbers of British troops in the environs of Lisbon and 
the proximity of French forces, meant there was a need for immediate action.  The 
political context in Portugal in 1809 was also complex.  By autumn 1808, with the 
French evicted and the regency council re-installed there was no apparent need for 
the continuance of the juntas.  It could be argued that while they had served an 
important purpose throughout the summer of that year, the precarious hold that 
the social, political and judicial élites, as “elected” members of these juntas, had over 
the mass of the population and their reliance on the fervid Franco-phobia displayed 
by the mass of volunteers that flocked to the cause of the restoration of the prince 
regent, the possibility of further armed insurrection posed a problem not only for 
the French but also for the Portuguese ruling class and state.   
But the exigencies of the time were many and pressing and, consequently, the 
Junta Provisional do Supremo Governo set up the year previously was immediately re-
established, proclaiming a “call to arms” to the people of Oporto and its 
surrounding provinces.  However, the same problems that had emerged in the 
previous year persisted.  While there was a great deal of outward patriotic fervour, 
the same levels of indiscipline and violent disturbances also surfaced: with 
denunciations of anyone suspected of sympathy with the French cause; the targets 
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of these denunciations referred to as Jacobins, or Franc-maçons rather than 
afrancesados as they were also frequently called in Spain.  Not only in Oporto, but in 
many of the major settlements in the north of Portugal, confusion and public 
disorder were common place, and the authorities struggled to restore some limited 
form of authority and control.  The people had been exalted and called “to arms” by 
the regency council and the élites realised that should a second invasion take place, 
and from December this threat seemed imminent, they would once more have to 
rely on the people to resist.  However, they neither wanted uncontrolled 
insurrections nor for the population’s enthusiasm to arm themselves and to protect 
their localities to detract from the process of formal military recruitment and 
mobilisation.  224  
Throughout the north of Portugal, there was widespread support for military 
opposition to the French and volunteer enlistment, but the authorities did have 
considerable difficulty in organising and recruiting to the regular, organised 
military.  Indeed, it has been argued that an underlying reason for support for the 
Leal Legião Lusitana, was political and based on the need to maintain an independent 
military presence, solely for the defence of Oporto and adjacent provinces in the 
north of the realm.  The activities of the Junta Suprema, moreover, were not 
restricted solely to addressing the immediate political situation.  Given the lack of 
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central political authority, it could not otherwise be so.  For example, the Junta 
ordered the lifting of the embargo on British shipping and trade in British goods in 
order to stimulate the economy.  Indeed, throughout the period 1808 to 1810 it has 
been estimated that, rather than diminishing, the volume of British shipping and 
trade with Britain was maintained, and even increased, with no perceptible effects 
on the free passage of shipping.  225  Clearly, then there were many indications of 
popular support for more active and organised resistance to the French in the north 
and specific, tangible outcomes in the form of new civil, judicial and military 
structures – or rather, their combination in a new and highly political regional 
authority.  Certainly, in these areas, the vast majority of the Portuguese people 
vocally and physically supported these new forms of provincial government and a 
substantial number of them were ready to physically oppose the French if necessary 
in future.    
Throughout Portugal in early 1809 the situation was desperate.  The 
authorities had to raise and fund the necessary military forces to oppose invasion to 
all intents and purposes from nothing.  And they did so, in the main, by public 
subscription and, as in Galicia, with support from the church.  The regency council 
had started to reorganise and recruit to both the first line regiments (infanteria) and 
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those of the second line (milícia).  However, a substantial proportion of these 
regiments were mere cadres, destitute of officers, armaments and equipment and - 
most of all - lacking in discipline.  A major difference, though, between the situation 
faced by Portugal in early 1809 when compared with the previous invasion threat in 
late 1807, and the early stages of the occupation in 1808, was that the Portuguese 
government, the military and the people were united in their determination to resist 
the French.  So, too, of course, were the court in Brazil and, therefore, the regency 
council.  226  The Junta Provisional do Governo Supremo had not only an established 
and legitimate role in the organisation of military and popular opposition to the 
French in the north in 1808 there was a great deal of continuity into 1809.  While the 
juntas had technically been dissolved once the regency council had been appointed, 
the Bishop of Oporto remained in the northern power-base of Oporto in preference 
to taking up his seat on the regency council in Lisbon and continued to preside over 
the activities of the Junta Suprema.  There is more than a hint of suspicion that the 
Bishop did not want to leave this power-base in the north, or lose the authority he 
had enjoyed in 1808, when he had presided over the activities of both the Junta 
Suprema and the appointed military commander, Bernadim Freire de Andrade.  One 
of the underlying reasons was the extent of continuing popular animosity towards 
the civil, judicial and military authorities in the north of Portugal.  Indeed, 
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Bernadim Freire de Andrade had written to Dom Miguel Pereira de Forjaz on this 
very subject, presciently warning him about the violent and unpredictable nature of 
popular activities and the extent of animosity towards the authorities.  Again, the 
participants in these insurrectionary acts were people from the lowest classes 
within Portuguese society, agricultural workers, day wage labourers, and artisans – 
people with little or no property.  227  A further development in contradistinction to 
1808 was the very active role of the clergy.  An extreme example was the 
establishment of an ecclesiastical regiment in Oporto, formed of two battalions.  
Similarly in Spain, ecclesiastical companies were formed, styled on those of the 
miqueletes, and which played an important role in the struggle against the French – 
notably in the defence of Gerona.  228  
By early 1809, general Bacelar commanded a force of all arms of 
approximately 6,400 troops in Beira Alta, general Bernadim Freire de Andrade had 
command of 10,700 troops to protect against a potential invasion via the Entre 
Douro e Minho region and to cover the city of Oporto, while general Silveira had 
7,800 troops in the Trás-os-Montes region.  229  But, it is not clear how the process of 
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recruitment and mobilisation had been progressing immediately prior to the 
invasion of 1809.  Even after taking into account the very substantial progress that 
had been made, numbers would not be enough: 
“The country people declare that they will fight ... they are willing to think … that 
they are capable of performing wonders.  But let a formidable French army present 
itself … [and] confusion, dismay and distraction [will] be mingled in the probable 
annihilation of thousands.”  230  
The Portuguese in the north, though, were also helped by the good relations 
they were developing with the Spanish across the border.  Silveira, the commander 
of the most northerly armed forces, was in contact with the Spanish general La 
Romana; and Oporto received regular reports from these two outposts.  The 
peripheral location of Chaves, the centre of Silveira’s operations and Braga, Freire’s 
base, assisted in the intelligence-gathering process.  And the information they 
collected was also very useful in understanding the military situation throughout 
northern Portugal in 1809.  While the two Portuguese military forces, concentrated 
in the north of Portugal to oppose the invasion threat, appear adequately resourced, 
in reality they comprised an imprudent mixture of first, second and third line 
troops of variable quality.  The firearms available were of inconsistent quality and 
calibre.  Moreover, the majority of troops were poorly armed and only a small 
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number of the volunteers and ordenança had personal firearms, the majority of these 
ancillary troops had only agricultural implements or pikes made from whatever 
materials were to hand.  231 
Silveira quite possibly commanded a total force of between 10,000 and 12,000 
troops of variable quality and unpredictable temperament to protect the north 
against Soult: less than one half of which were from first and second line regiments 
and the remainder were composed of inadequately trained and poorly armed 
ordenanças and civilian volunteers.  232  The Spanish under La Romana were pushed 
back by Soult; therefore Silveira, the commander of the Portuguese forces in Trás-
os-Montes, resolved to take up a better defensive position beyond Chaves.  
However, the Portuguese commander was undermined by the indiscipline of a 
minority of the forces under his command and, and as a result, his small force was 
split.  He therefore had to retire even further than he originally intended, losing 
Chaves in the process to the French.  Eventually, though, Silveira was able to retake 
Chaves, capturing 400 French combatants, and a similar number of wounded and 
convalescents, and taking back into service those elements of the Portuguese 
regiment no. 12 that had surrendered and taken up in French service.  He thereafter 
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continued to successfully harass and disrupt the lines of communication of the 
invading French army.  Silveira was forced into this situation by the indiscipline of 
a minority of his own troops and the lack of coordination with his Spanish allies.  233  
French losses at Chaves are difficult to determine given some may have been lost in 
taking the town and others in its subsequent capitulation.  The 31ème léger had 
lieutenant Galabert wounded, the 4ème Suisse reported captain Thomas wounded 
and the 4ème léger reported a surgeon called Mauget was lost in that town (although 
the date given, the 4th April, may be a mistake or when he died from his wounds) 
and the chirugien aide-major Soum was wounded in the affaire de Chaves (although 
the date of 20 mai must surely be mistaken).  Total casualties cannot have exceeded 
150 (see appendix, table 1).  But Soult was forced to leave behind a substantial 
number of invalids and a small guard of walking wounded, that had accumulated 
through the campaign, with a small number of able bodied troops to try to ensure 
their safety.   234   
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Bernadim Freire de Andrade was much less fortunate, totally losing the 
confidence and support of the forces he commanded, and faced with a great deal of 
animosity (and outright anarchy) from the local population.  Bernadim Freire had 
ordered the retreat from Braga following the loss of the pass at Salamonde given his 
orders were to defend Oporto.  In his military opinion, he discounted the defence of 
Braga, believing from a strategic point of view it was not worth defending.  His 
orders were refused and, ultimately, he paid with his life.  The consensus view is 
that he was undermined by a combination of indiscipline and fervid animosity 
towards the French amongst the assortment of regular troops, milícia and ordenanças 
under his command and the mass of civilian volunteers who rallied in a determined 
effort to resist the French.  235  The Portuguese troops had stubbornly, but ultimately 
unsuccessfully, defended the passes against overwhelming numbers of well armed 
and disciplined French troops, determined to dispute every defensible position in 
what was, after all, their homeland.  When Bernadim Freire ordered his troops to 
retire from positions they wanted to defend in compliance with his orders from the 
Junta Suprema, they rebelled.  Baron Eben, a German officer in Portuguese service 
was able to impose a modicum of discipline over the troops and volunteers and, 
although the corregedor had vanished, he appointed two capable people to 
                                            
235.  Soriano attests to the anarchic character of the insurgents in Braga and to the extent to which 
afrancesados were hunted down and killed and, not least, some settling of old scores, História da 
Guerra Civil, 2.ª época, vol. 2, pp. 109-10.  Freire’s force probably comprised no more than three very 
weak regiments of first line troops (2,200 other ranks including artillery) and eight equally deficient 
battalions of milícia, ibid. p. 115 and was severely deficient in experienced officers.    
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undertake the sourcing and forwarding of supplies to troops.  He communicated 
his intention of disputing the terrain in front of Braga to officers in command of the 
outposts, and distributed his regular troops (and the few pieces of ordinance 
available) to strengthen the forward positions and demonstrate to the French they 
had regulars to their front.  By doing so, the Portuguese were able to mount a 
credible, if ultimately unsuccessful, defence of Braga.  236   
It is impossible to say how many French casualties were incurred on the 
approaches in front of Braga and during the combat for the positions immediately 
in front of the town itself: the total number of killed and wounded officers suggest a 
possible total of some 350 to 400 French casualties.  Portuguese losses were 
disproportionately much higher, therefore suggesting the passes in front of Braga 
and the town itself were disputed quite vigorously and some intense fighting took 
place – albeit not between two armies equally well led, armed and disciplined (see 
appendix, table 2).  237   That the Portuguese were still numerous to be considered a 
threat to his lines of communication is evidenced by Soult detaching Heudelet’s 
division to ensure against a counter attack against his rear whilst manoeuvring on 
                                            
236.  For a useful biographical sketch for Bernadim Freire de Andrade see Soriano, História da Guerra 
Civil, 2.ª época, vol. 2, pp. 76-84 and see ibid pp. 149 et seq. for details of the campaign and his 
murder in Braga.  For Eben’s report see Soriano, ibid, pp. 137-40.  Livermore, ‘Beresford and the 
reform of the Portuguese army’, pp. 127-28 provides a less partial summary of Freire’s problems and 
activities in relation to the defence of Braga.   
237.  For the defence of Braga see Soriano, História da Guerra Civil, 2.ª época, vol. 2, pp. 131 et seq.  
Soriano also asserts that the continued harassment of the French by parties of irregulars resulted in 
the French killing all partisans they came across rather than taking them prisoner.  ibid, pp. 142-43  
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Oporto.  Indeed, the general of brigade Henri Antoine Jardon was killed whilst 
securing the lines of communication at Guimarães on the 25th March.  238 And the 
French recorded substantial losses defending the ponte de Amarante.  
The loss of Chaves and Braga, and the impending arrival of the French in front 
of Oporto, led to further and increasingly violent insurrections in the regional 
capital.  The mob seized the former brigadeiro Luís de Oliveira along with 14 other 
alleged traitors from prison, murdered them and paraded their corpses through the 
city then established an impromptu court to arraign further suspects and 
afrancesados who they sought out in the streets of the city.  239  The city of Oporto 
was defended by approximately 24,000 troops of which only 4,000 to 4,500 were 
first line; and many of these were either former soldiers who had completed their 
military service or new recruits and hardly trained or drilled in military 
manoeuvres let alone the defence of a strategic position.  240   The remainder were 
comprised of milícias and ordenanças, of whom only a minority were armed with 
firearms and those of various calibre and provenance.  241   The defence of Oporto 
was a disaster for the Portuguese forces, the most substantial part of the irregular 
forces defending the entrenchments deserted their posts as soon as the line of 
                                            
213. Martinien, Tableaux, p. 18. 
239.  Soriano, História da Guerra Civil, 2.ª época, vol. 2, pp. 144-45. 
240.  Soriano asserts the number of regulars was fewer – perhaps only 4,4oo, ibid. p. 146. 
241.  Oman states the two Oporto regiments n.º 6 and n.º 18, and two single battalions from the 
regiment n.º. 21 Valença and n.º. 9 Viana plus the second battalion of the Leal Legião Lusitana. See also 
Soriano, História da Guerra Civil, 2.ª época, vol. 2, pp. 108-09 and 149-50. 
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entrenchments had been pierced, the defence left to the small number of regulars 
under the command of brigadeiro Victoria, and the senior officers Champalimaud 
and Azeredo.  242   Although the city’s defence has variously been described as a 
fiasco and massacre, the taking of the city would appear to have been neither as 
easy as described nor without consequences for Soult.  Table 3 in the appendix 
provides a summary of French losses in the various combats in front of Oporto and 
its seizure at the end of March 1809.  Four officers were wounded in preliminary 
operations.  Detailed investigation confirms more than 47 casualties between the 
29th and 30th March amongst whom general of division Merle and captain Pagaud of 
the état-major (wounded), four chefs de batallion (two killed, two wounded), inferring 
perhaps a total loss of up to 900 officers and other ranks (see appendix, table 3). 243 
Portuguese losses were much more substantial, but the vast majority, both civilian 
and military, resulted from the stampede over the bridge of boats: many drowning 
when the bridge submerged or were crushed under the weight of the masses 
evading capture.  While not a few were killed under the crossfire of artillery and 
some slaughtered during the subsequent sack of the city by the French.  The seizure 
of Oporto added little to the glory of Soult or to the French army he commanded.  
More importantly for the Portuguese, the dispersal and disorganisation of the 
French army as a result of protracted manoeuvres and two substantial combats and 
                                            
242.  ibid. pp. 149-56. 
243.  Martinien pp. 33, 44,  
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the demoralising effects of the nature of the campaign, the loss of many sick and 
wounded to the Portuguese (for example in the retaking of Chaves), and the 
constant harassment of their lines of communications meant the French could not 
push on towards Lisbon.  Indeed, with the limited resources at his disposal, Soult 
was struggling to retain the ground he occupied.  244      
Accordingly, despite the lack of success in terms of formal military operations, 
the extent of determined, popular resistance to the French invasion was such that, 
as in Spain, French troops controlled only the territory they occupied.   They were, 
with one or two exceptions, able to subdue the Portuguese during the first invasion, 
but the second invasion of 1809 was a somewhat different experience.  After taking 
the city of Oporto, Soult was obliged to make provisions for a number of possible 
eventualities.  One portion of the disposable troops was needed to provide a 
garrison for Oporto itself: despite the Portuguese army having been pushed back 
some way, it continued to represent a threat.  A detachment, of considerable size 
needed to be posted south of the Douro to observe and, if necessary, contain these 
Portuguese troops. The division that had been detached on leaving Braga had to be 
sent north to replace the garrisons, temporarily lent to Soult and controlling the 
settlements of Tuy and Vigo, and to establish communications with Ney in Galicia.  
Loison, who had substantial experience of counter insurgency work in the first 
                                            
244.  Gates, The Spanish ulcer, p. 142 
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invasion, was despatched with a view to driving away Silveira and establishing 
communications with Lapisse.  245  The ongoing losses of detached troops, such as 
the 3 ème Suisse, attest to the difficulties the French had in maintaining outposts such 
as that of Tuy.  246  
However, rather than stressing the importance of this popular opposition and 
the scale of resistance “sapping the strength” of the French, the focus within both 
Portuguese and English histories of the second invasion has been on the negative 
impacts, for example the resulting indiscipline of the armed forces.  To date 
historians have tended to view these insurrection and popular opposition from a 
military point of view, rather than trying to understand it from the perspectives of 
those involved.  Clearly, one of the underlying factors for the insurrections was the 
sense that the people had “lost faith” in the ruling authorities.  In relation to 
popular opposition and resistance in 1809, it is clear from the discussion above that 
in addition to the social and economic drivers, we must also consider political and 
ideological factors given that insurrections resulting from a loss of faith in political 
                                            
245.  Gates suggests that these were very necessary precautions, “Soult’s position remained 
precarious.  The population was more hostile than ever and the partisan war ceaselessly sapped the 
strength of his field army.”: Gates, The Spanish ulcer, p. 142.  While Le Noble’s account of the 
campaign of 1809 is perhaps questionable in some respects he was an eye witness.  Le Noble, 
Mémoires sur les opérations des Français en Galice, en Portugal et dans la Vallée du Tage en 1809, sous le 
commandement du maréchal Soult, duc de Dalmatie, (Paris : Chez Barois l’Ainé, 1821. 
246.  According to Martinien, in addition to the loss of capt. Tscharner, lieut. Kunckler and s.-lieut.  
Garrard who were assassinés ... par des brigands, lieut. Hermann of the 3ème Suisse was also wounded 
on both the 13th and 28th March in the defence of Tuy.  
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direction are not the same as revolts against the availability or price of foodstuffs in 
times of need and famine.  247 
While none of the French diarists involved in this second invasion, and that 
have been viewed in the current study, would appear to have participated in more 
than one invasion of Portugal, they were veterans of the struggle in Spain 
throughout 1808.  They reported a number of similarities between the scale and 
nature of popular opposition in Galicia and Entre Minho e Douro.  They are also 
unanimous in their descriptions of the total dedication of the local population to 
protecting their homes and property and the cumulative and deleterious effects of 
consistent, if at times desultory, guerrilla war and formal military opposition.  That 
Soult had to march a considerable distance inland in order to be able to cross the 
Minho given the resistance of popular forces to his efforts to force a crossing further 
downstream is sufficient testimony in itself, although the lack of formal bridging 
equipment would also have been a factor to take into account.  A French diarist 
reported:  
“On the 16th, at daybreak, we saw a multitude of Portuguese peasants, lining the 
opposite bank [of the Minho]. In spite of torrents of rain, their numbers grew with 
every minute that passed.  They wore overcoats of straw, their form merged with that 
                                            
247.  A fairly comprehensive review of the generally available literature has been undertaken, but so 
far nothing has been uncovered investigating the concept of ideology in relation to popular 
opposition to the French in Portugal between 1807 and 1811, although more recent work on Spain 
would suggest that this has been generally, but not completely, discounted as a possible 
interpretation of day to day struggle and resistance individually and collectively. 
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of rocks, several of them advancing to the river’s edge, firing on all who approached 
the river.”  248  
  A number of casualties were incurred in the manoeuvres into Portugal.  For 
example, three officers of the 3ème Swiss were assassinés by brigands in Spain, 
Captain Gard of the 4ème léger was wounded on the 7th February 1809 (contre les 
insurgés Espagnols).  Capt. Spitzer of the 22ème chasseurs was wounded and died on 
the 16th February, another officer, lieutenant Narjot of the 15ème ligne, was drowned 
in attempting as crossing of the Minho on the same day.  Captain Garreau of the 
same regiment was wounded on the 1st March in an affaire at Port Marin and sous-
lieutenant Moré of the 86 ème ligne on the 5th of that month at Vérin, while lieutenant 
Sialleli was killed on the 13th March (dans une maison en Portugal par des paysans) and 
his colleague captain Gaulis was wounded on the 13th March in an affaire at Bascara 
and two sous lieutenants, Maurin and Fabre, of the 22ème chasseurs were wounded 
between the 20th February and 5th March.  249  The 17ème léger reported one officer 
killed and seven wounded defending Amarante in April.  250  Leaving aside the 
drowning of one officer, which could have been as a result of reconnaissance as 
                                            
248.  De Naylies, Mémoires sur la guerre d’Espagne, p.61   But by the time the French had taken Braga, 
according to Fantin des Odoards, the fate of the Portuguese was already sealed, Fantin des Odoards, 
Journal, p. 216.  Esdaile, A new history, pp. 176-78 paints a very bleak picture of the ability of the 
Portuguese to oppose Soult and, perhaps, significantly understates popular resolve in the north – in 
common with many other studies which have a primary focus on military aspects of the struggle.     
249.  Martinien, Tableaux and supplement. Tableau p. 152,   
250.  Défense d’Amarante, April 1809, 17ème  léger : s.-lieut.  Jouanne +, capt. Itaralde *, cdb. Schroffer, 
capt. Barelier, lieut. Darraq, lieut. Jacquier, lieut. Lacomblée, s.-lieut.  Meunier.  + killed outright, * 
died 20th April, Martinien, Tableaux, Martinien, Tableau, p. 432. 
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opposed to action, the above casualties clearly show the French had to fight their 
way into and through Portugal.  Similarly, Portugal it would appear was one of 
those places that was relatively easy to get into, it was not a place in which it was 
easy to remain in position or from which it was easy to leave.  Leaving aside losses 
incurred during the French defence of Oporto in May in which they were engaged 
with British troops only, French casualties throughout the campaign were fairly 
substantial – the majority of which were incurred in front of and assaulting the 
defences of Oporto from the Portuguese at the end of March.   
To recapitulate then, the invasion of Portugal, the various combats along the 
route and the taking of Oporto was a much more sanguinary affair than we have 
been led to believe in some accounts.  Moreover, a substantial number of officers 
were wounded in small combats at specific points along the retreat route that 
confirm they were wounded or killed in action against Portuguese troops that had 
closed in behind them when they took Oporto.  For example lieut. Citron and Tixier 
of the 1er hussards at the combat of Santillo on the 10th May were amongst many 
killed, wounded or missing in the retreat from Portugal – although it is difficult to 
ascertain how many resulted from combats against Portuguese or British troops.  
The desperate bravery displayed by the French in the coups de main at the bridges 
over the Cávado and ponte de Misarella may have obviated substantial losses had 
the French been caught between the pursuing allies and the Portuguese irregulars 
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to their front.  251  But in total, over 100 officers were wounded and not a few killed 
(or perished due to the severity of their wounds) as a result of combat action against 
the Portuguese in the campaign: probably equating to some 2,000 casualties in total 
or around 10% of Soult’s invasion force, after taking into account some troops had 
to be left behind in garrison duties in Spain.  252   
These data suggest that, for the purposes of this study, much of the subject 
matter in the French diaries is entirely appropriate and relevant to a study of the 
second French invasion of Portugal, specifically in order to establish the extent of 
popular resistance.  Of course, the majority of French losses were incurred in formal 
combats – most especially in front of the defences of Oporto and during its taking.  
But we know from French accounts, confirmed by Martinien’s tables that a 
substantial number of casualties resulted from much smaller affairs, during the 
invasion and when consolidating their positions upon taking Oporto – losses being 
reported at Ponte de Amarante, Ponte de Lima, Ponte de Misarella, Mesão Frio and 
Guimarães to name but a few.  253  It may be that some of the French dairies 
                                            
251.  For example, s.-lieut.  Charas (killed) and s.-lieut.   Lottin (wounded) of the 32ème léger on the 12th 
May, major Dulong de Rosnay of the 31ème léger and capt. Charvais of the 15ème léger on the 16th May 
at the ponte de Misarella. 
252.  Estimates for losses incurred between February and May, excluding those incurred during the 
defence and evacuation of Oporto against the British, based upon details for officer casualties in 
Martinien, Tableaux and supplement and the principle established by Oman relating to the ratio of 
officers to other ranks in the French army.    
253.  Capt. Laguette killed and Lieutenant Duston of the état-major wounded at Pont de Amarante,  p. 
44, s.-lieut.  Mondot of the 26ème ligne (supplement p. 34) and s-lieut Mondot of the 36ème ligne, p. 203, 
capt. Roy of the 70ème p. 279,  s.-lieut.  Desbiats of the 66 ème at Guimarens [Guimarães]  on the 4th 
May, pp 270, capt. Brige (killed) and s.-lieut.  Chevé (wounded) of the 82ème  Pont de Lima, p 202, 
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overstate matters and we do have to take into account the questionable nature of 
the texts.  Their reliability as sources is at times problematic, for example in relation 
to the number of French troops involved in combats and those of their adversaries 
as seen, for example, in Le Noble’s estimate for Soult’s force committed to the 
invasion of Portugal and is well documented.  254    Nevertheless, they remain the 
best sources we have and, together with the documented evidence set out above 
and secondary Portuguese accounts, they point to significant indigenous and 
popular opposition to the French during this invasion.    
There are numerous examples in these French diaries and journals of 
individuals, families and the population of small settlements, fighting to the death 
to protect their farms and homes (on both sides of the border) and of cooperation 
between Spanish and Portuguese irregular forces.  Men and women alike opposed 
the invader. In one instance women dug defensive earthworks alongside their men, 
their children who were too small to work carrying their wine and food, to prevent 
the crossing of the Minho; in others women fought against the French and exacted 
retribution on the wounded and sick left behind the main army.  
                                                                                                                                
capt. Basle of the 2 ème léger (killed) and capt. Rafy (wounded) at Amarante, p 388, lieut. Dorthon, 
Mésinfrio [Mesão Frio], p, 388, capit. Péruset, wounded affaire de Maison-Froide [Mesão Frio], p. 426, 
major Dulong capt. Charvais wounded at Misarella (both of the 15 ème léger).  Martinien also lists 
lieut. Decto as wounded dans une émeute in  Spain on the 4th May and two captains Doldenel and 
Burgel as wounded in a combat at Coimbra on the 10th May p. 503.  
254.  Le Noble, Mémoires sur les opérations militaires des Français en Galice, en Portugal, et dans la vallée du 
Tage, en 1809, sous le commandement du maréchal Soult, duc de Dalmatie, (Paris : Chez Barois l’Ainé, 
1821).  Oman used French sources extensively to support his account of the invasion: Oman, History 
of the Peninsular War, vol. 2, pp. 223-72.  
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“In few hours they had constructed a battery, in which they placed two iron guns of a 
very small calibre.  More than four hundred women, among whom were many nuns, 
working on the embrasures, some with shovels or picks in hand, competing with the 
strongest men; others carrying the earth in baskets or in their skirts, throwing it out of 
the trench.”  255    
One French diarist, de Naylies, was not only convinced that the entire 
population was armed and prepared to fight, he also reported the women in some 
cases exacted cruel retribution, however refusing to provide further details relating 
to the nature of the exactions committed against one French officer.  256    
 It is often claimed in these sources that the larger Portuguese forces that 
attempted to oppose the invasion lacked formal military discipline and 
organisation.  The lack of uniformity, arms and equipment, and the extent of 
indiscipline was a direct result of the demobilisation of the Portuguese military by 
Junot in early 1808 and the absence of a powerful military authority.  This meant 
that the French did not know exactly who it was they were fighting against, often 
reporting they had engaged with large groups of armed peasants, or a combination 
of armed peasants and soldiers.  257   
                                            
255.  De Naylies, Mémoires sur la guerre d’Espagne, p. 62. 
256.  ibid. p.94.  See also Journal du général Fantin des Odoards, p295 confirming the exasperated and 
energetic defence of the line of the river and of the involvement of women and children in its 
defence.   
257.  De Naylies account confirmed the composition of the forces defending Chaves and Fantin des 
Odoards provides corroborative information to this effect.  
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The civil and judicial authorities were able to call up the cadres of line 
regiments, and reform regiments around the limited number of experienced officers 
and other ranks (those who had been demobilised and had not been dispatched to 
serve in la légion portugaise, or who had avoided mobilisation or deserted French 
service).  However, despite popular enthusiasm for military recruitment and 
mobilisation, the lack of officers, uniforms, arms, equipment and, most importantly, 
military training led to the formation of highly undisciplined and ineffective forces.  
The cases of Chaves and Braga clearly exemplify this.  A major difference between 
1808 and 1809, despite similarities in outcomes when the Portuguese forces came up 
against the better organised, if numerically inferior, French, was that by 1809 the 
state, the regional and local authorities, and the military, were more or less united 
in their resolve to oppose the French.  And, so, too, it would seem, were the people.   
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IV 
Britain had made a number of important changes in strategy.  Since 
Beresford’s appointment Canning had been pressing the cabinet to commit to the 
defence of Portugal as the “most suitable strategic objective for Britain in the 
Peninsula”, Wellesley’s memorandum on the defence of Portugal in March 1809 set 
out a compelling case for the defence of Portugal and her transformation as Britain’s 
“most powerful ally” in the Peninsula.  This document, together with intelligence 
from Villiers in Lisbon and his argument for a stronger and more active military 
presence, unabated pressure from Canning in the cabinet, and the convergence of 
several separate British detachments into a more substantial force in Portugal 
appear to have tipped the balance.  The cabinet and the King reluctantly agreed 
both to Wellesley’s appointment as commander in chief and Portugal as the main 
theatre of operations.   
“More by good luck than good judgement the ministers had hit upon the best possible 
strategy for the British to pursue in the Peninsula, although it took a considerable time 
for them to appreciate the fact.”  258 
Wellesley’s successful campaign to retake Oporto is not of immediate concern 
here.  However, Beresford’s efforts had resulted in a number of more or less 
completed regiments of first line infantry, in formal brigades, well trained, 
equipped and officered in direct contrast to the inadequacies in resources, 
                                            
258.  Muir, Britain and the defeat of Napoleon, pp. 84-87, Hall, British strategy, pp. 176-77.   
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equipment, training and military experience of the Portuguese who faced the 
invasion of Soult.  259  The Bishop of Oporto, and the Junta Suprema, presented 
further complexities given their insistence on dictating military strategy, 
undermining the authority of the appointed general, and governador das armas, 
Bernadim Freire de Andrade.  Some officers refused to obey orders and openly 
challenged military authority.  
Beresford’s appointment changed all this.  Close analysis of the movements of 
Beresford in the summer and autumn of 1809 reveals the improvements he had 
instilled in the Portuguese army and the development of the system for its 
brigading.  This system was to take shape, more fully, in 1810, but the nucleus for 
the brigading first becomes apparent in the campaigns of 1809.  When Wellesley 
returned from the Oporto campaign, via Coimbra, Tomar and Constância 
[contemporaneously named  Punhete], arriving in Abrantes on 17th June, Beresford 
also returned with the Portuguese army under his command, leaving three or four 
battalions to strengthen Silveira in the north, to the cantonments between the 
Zêzere and the Tejo and the neighbourhood of Castelo Branco.  Beresford was to 
cooperate, with the remaining (Portuguese) troops under his command, with 
Wellesley against Victor who had concentrated on the Guadiana.  260  
                                            
259.  Gates, The Spanish ulcer, pp. 139-42, Esdaile, A new history, pp. 178-79 
260. Soriano História da guerra civil, 2.ª  época,vol. 2, pp. 281-82 
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Essentially, Beresford and the Portuguese army were to form a strong 
independent corps, protecting the vulnerable left flank of the Anglo-Spanish army 
as they advanced towards Victor.  By the end of July Beresford had crossed into 
Spain and one week later had managed to coordinate the movements of all of the 
Portuguese troops, including those in the north not yet under his immediate 
command, and had concentrated on the position Wellesley had chosen for him on 
the Agueda.  In contrast to the Portuguese forces that had been mobilised until 
now, this was a substantial combined force in excess of 10,000 men: fully armed, 
adequately equipped, well-officered manoeuvring under proper military discipline.  
The Portuguese division maintained its position and discipline and, in addition to 
securing the vulnerable flank of Wellesley’s line of operations, gained very useful 
experience of mobilisation, deployment, manoeuvres and outpost work.  The 
Anglo-Portuguese army envisaged by Wellesley in August 1808 was finally coming 
into being.  261    
Soult had failed to seize Portugal.  Joseph, together with Victor, was defeated 
at Talavera and, despite at least a semblance of better coordination, the French were 
ultimately disappointed in their efforts to entrap and defeat either the British army 
                                            
261.  Beresford’s total force comprised some 18,000 of all arms: Infanteria - 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 
15, 18, 19, & 23; Caçadores - 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 & 6; two independent regiments, the Leal Legião Lusitana and 
the academicos de Coimbra; Artilheria – four brigades of 9, 6 & 3 calibre. ibid. 
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of Wellesley or the Spanish army of Cuesta.  262  Sir Arthur Wellesley remained in 
the vicinity of Badajoz for a while but, despite the entreaties of his brother Richard 
Marquess Wellesley as ambassador to Spain to maintain joint Anglo-Spanish 
military operations, he retreated into Portugal to concentrate on its defence when he 
became convinced of the futility of such joint operations.  263  A variety of Spanish 
forces continued to hamper French occupation and subjugation of Estremadura and 
Andalucía.  Meantime, informal popular opposition and guerrilla warfare 
intensified.   
 On the surface, the period towards the end of 1809 was a relatively quiescent 
time for Portugal.  But the year was an important moment if not a definitive 
watershed, in terms of the struggle for supremacy in the Iberian Peninsula.  
Although Wellesley had resolved to retreat into Portugal he still, at this stage, had 
to continue to convince the cabinet in London that the struggle should be 
maintained, if not intensified, and that the main theatre of operations should be 
Portugal.       
                                            
262.  For further details of the temporary deviation from the defence strategy (for Portugal) the 
campaign in Spain in the summer of 1809, and the outcomes of the battle of Talavera, see Muir, 
Britain and the defeat of Napoleon, 94-99; and for domestic intrigues and some fluctuation, but not 
complete about turn, in foreign policy, ibid. pp. 105-12.  Hall is also mindful that the scare of 
invasion was still a factor, even until 1809, and therefore a consideration in relation to the 
cautious approach to escalation of the war in the Iberian Peninsula, Christopher D. Hall, British 
strategy in the Napoleonic war, 1803-15, (Manchester University Press, 1992), p. 83.    
263.  John K Severn, ‘The Wellesleys and Iberian diplomacy’, in Norman Gash, (ed.), Wellington: 
studies in the military and political career of the first duke of Wellington, (Manchester : Manchester 
University Press, 1990). 
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Chapter five: the effects of the French invasions on Portugal 
I 
As we have seen, Portugal’s involvement in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic 
wars resulted in substantial economic, political and social change and yet the 
existing literature in English has not considered the scale, nature and effects of 
many of these changes in detail.  However, these changes should be taken into 
account and critically assessed given they inform not only our understanding of 
events and outcomes in Portugal but also British foreign policy in relation to Iberia 
and South America.   
Economic and political change was precipitated by the flight of Dom João, the 
removal of the court and Portuguese ministries to Rio de Janeiro, and the 
appointment of a regency council in Lisbon.  In relation to Portuguese political 
economy, the government of the metropolis and its apparatus were transferred to 
its major colony, Brazil.  The French occupation of Lisbon precluded its continued 
role as entrepôt and, in order that the Luso-Brazilian economy could continue to 
function, Brazil’s ports were therefore opened to foreign vessels and restrictions on 
manufacture and inter-regional trade in the colonies were lifted.  However, an 
alternative viewpoint is that the opening up of trade, and British occupation of 
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Madeira, was the price Portugal paid for British support.  264  Day to day 
governance in Portugal was handed over to the regency council but with strict 
limitations imposed on its autonomy.  Even the unprecedented decision to transfer 
the Portuguese court and government to Brazil, and the repercussions for Portugal 
and Brazil, despite their importance for British military and economic strategy, 
remain under-examined.  As Parry observed, “The removal of the court from 
Lisbon to Rio [de Janeiro] had stood the Empire on its head, and powerful vested 
interests had been created in [Brazil’s capital city].”  265 
Ultimately the intensely profound nature of these changes would encompass 
the collapse of the Luso-Brazilian colonial system, and a transition to neo-
mercantilism and an embryonic form of proto-industrialised capitalism in Brazil.  In 
Portugal the scope of political change included demands for constitutional reform 
and a constitutional monarchy, civil war, the establishment of parliamentary 
democracy and, ultimately, a republic.  266  The period heralded a major shift in the 
nature of inter-dependency between Portugal and Brazil and the complex 
relationships between the Portuguese crown, the colony of Brazil and citizens of the 
                                            
264.  For former see Fernadon Dores Costa, ‘O governo a seis meses de distância. A relação entre a 
Corte do Rio de Janeiro e os governadores do reino em Lisboa a consagração de um governo misto’, 
Departamento de História - ISTCE, undated and, for the latter, Soriano, História da Guerra Civil, 1.ª 
época, vol. 2, pp. 438-39. 
265.  Parry, Trade and Dominion, p. 199. 
266.  José Luís Cardoso, ‘A guerra peninsular e a economia do império Luso-Brasileiro’, in Instituto da 
Defesa nacional, Guerra peninsular, novas interpretações: da europa dividida à união europeia, Actas do 
congresso realisado em 28 e 29 de Outubro de 2002, (Lisboa : Tribuna de História, 2005), see 
especially, pp. 239-40.     
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empire’s territories.  267   Paradoxically, and despite the commencement of a political 
process that would lead to Brazilian independence, conservative vested interests in 
Brazil would resist the abolition of slavery.  Ironically, the force for change would 
appear stronger in the metropolis and weaker in its former colony. 268   
While the majority of these changes fall outside the scope of the present study, 
it will necessary to identify and analyse a few that are pertinent to understand how 
and why Portugal and Brazil were changing during this period and would continue 
to evolve in future years.  For now, the focus will be on the paradoxical nature of 
political authority and representation in Portugal and Brazil.  The Portuguese were 
confronted by a “world turned upside down” in which governance, while 
ostensibly in the hands of a regency council, had been relocated to Dom João’s 
“tropical Versailles” in Brazil.   269  Dom João insisted that royal authority remained 
his sole prerogative as prince regent in the palacial Quinta de Boa Vista in Rio de 
Janeiro: as such, all matters of importance were subject to discussion and agreement 
                                            
267.  Kirsten Schultz, ‘Royal authority, empire and the critique of colonialism: political discourse 
in Rio de Janeiro (1808-1821)’, Luzo-Brazilian Review, vol. 37, no. 2, Special Issue: State, Society and 
Political Culture in Nineteenth-Century Brazil, 2000, 7-31 and ‘The crisis of empire and the problem 
of slavery: Portugal and Brazil, c. 1700- c. 1820’, Common Knowledge, vol. 11, no. 2, 2005, 264-282. 
268.  Kenneth R. Maxwell, ‘Why was Brazil so different?  The contexts of independence’: John H. Parry 
Memorial Lecture, April 25th 2000, Harvard University, 1-24 
269.  Schultz reports the term “tropical Versailles” was first used by the Brazilian historian Manuel de 
Oliveira Lima comparing the palace of the Sun King Louis XIV to that of the Portuguese King Dom 
João VI (the prince regent would become the first King of the United Kingdom of Portugal and 
Brazil).  See Kirsten Schultz, Tropical Versailles: empire, monarchy, and the Portuguese royal court in Rio 
de Janeiro, 1808-1821, (New York and London, Routledge, 2001), pp. 1-2, citing Manuel de Oliveira 
Lima, Dom João no Brasil (1808-1821), (Three vols., Rio de Janeiro, José Olympio, 1945) – not viewed.   
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in minha real presença.  270  In relation to political economy and foreign affairs, the 
first administration formed by Dom João in Brazil, with three powerful ministers 
sharing responsibility for six portfolios, policy was decidedly pro-British (anglófilo) 
than that witnessed in the period prior to 1804.  However, this was entirely due to 
the dynamism of D. Rodrigo, and lethargy of the other portfolio holders D. 
Fernando José de Portugal and the Conde de Anadia, in dictating policy and in 
which he was poles apart from his fellow ministers:  “These ministers were like 
three clocks.  The first, D. Rodrigo, was always ahead of his time, D. Fernando José 
de Portugal kept poor time; while the third, the Conde de Anadia, had stopped 
entirely.”.  271 
Even so, with the French invasion of 1807, the occupation and insurrections in 
1808, and continued and intensified British military, political and economic 
intervention it could not otherwise be so.  In January 1809 a carta régia was sent 
from Rio de Janeiro to reaffirm the strict limitations imposed on the remit and 
activities of the regency council, the intention of which was to prevent the 
development of a potentially conflicting power base in Lisbon.  272   
                                            
270.  Fernando Dores Costa, ‘O governo a seis meses de distância. A relação entre a Corte do Rio de 
Janeiro e os governadores do reino em Lisboa a consagração de um governo misto’, Departamento 
de História, ISTCE, undated, p. 2. 
271.  This contemporary observation by Hipólito da Costa is cited slightly incorrectly, as a comparison 
between the two ministers Sousa Coutinho and the Conde de Anadia, in Maxwell, Conflicts and 
conspiracies: p. 232.  For the full text see António Paim, ‘A Corte no Brasil. D. Rodrigo de Sousa 
Coutinho’, Estudos Filosóficos, nº 3, 2009, 266-269. 
272.  Dores Costa, ‘O governo a seis meses de distância’. 
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Although António de Araújo remained influential, these shifts in policy were 
underpinned by the concentration of ministerial and diplomatic power within a 
triangle connecting Brazil, Lisbon and London.  Increasingly, the Sousa Coutinho 
family were determining the direction of Portuguese political economy and foreign 
affairs.  But their attempts to seize and retain control were by no means 
straightforward or undisputed.  While localised governance and administration in 
Portugal was nominally undertaken by the regency council, there continued to be a 
number of competing interests, economic, political and familial, both in the short 
and long term.  This period was therefore a watershed, resulting in a defining shift 
in Luso-Brazilian political economy and national governance – both in metropolis 
and colony.   
As we have established, the influence of the Sousa Coutinho faction had been 
relatively influential in Portuguese politics at the turn of the century but was now 
the dominant force behind the Portuguese throne.  D. Domingos António de Sousa 
Coutinho was the Portuguese minister plenipotentiary in London.  Amongst other 
tasks, he edited O Investigador portuguez em Inglaterra, a politically motivated 
periodical opposed to the equally polemical Correio braziliense, edited by Hipólito 
José da Costa; a Brazilian radical and critic of the excesses of mercantilist capitalism 
(for which see chapter two).  D. Domingos would later briefly have tenure of office 
in the regency council in 1821 and is often referred to in the literature as Cavaleiro de 
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Sousa (or Chevalier de Sousa).  D. José António de Meneses e Sousa Coutinho (also 
known as the Principal Sousa) would soon be appointed governador on the regency 
council in 1810 following the illness and death of the Marquês das Minas.  He 
continued in that office representing the clergy, until 1820, given his status as 
Deacon of the Patriarchical Church in Lisbon and was also instrumental in calls for 
the return of D. João in 1817.   
The Principal Sousa, and other members of the regency council, came into 
conflict with Wellington over the implementation of his strategy for the defence of 
Portugal.  Despite having agreed to the construction of the Lines of Torres Vedras, 
the Principal Sousa employed delaying tactics preventing the implementation of the 
strategy for withdrawal in face of the French invasion and put forward plans to 
oppose the French on the frontier with Spain.  Wellington fought a running battle 
with Sousa Coutinho holding him personally responsible for the intransigence of 
the regency council during the campaign of 1810 to 1811.  273  However, detailed 
examination from a Portuguese perspective reveals growing resentment towards 
the subordination of the Portuguese administration to British military strategy was 
an underlying factor.    It has only been possible to include the briefest summary of 
the main points relating to Wellington’s protracted battle with the Principal Sousa 
                                            
273.  The interested reader is referred to two excellent articles by Donald D. Horward: ‘Wellington and 
the Defence of Portugal’, The International History Review, vol. 11, no. 1 (Feb., 1989), 39-54, and 
‘Wellington as a strategist, 1808-14’, in Norman Gash, (ed.), Wellington: studies in the military and 
political career of the first duke of Wellington, (Manchester : Manchester University Press, 1990). 
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(and the Bishop of Oporto) in relation to their opposition to his strategy, or the 
crucial involvement of Forjaz and Stuart in ensuring its successful implementation, 
but clearly these issues evidence divergence on defence strategy.  274 
Although the focus of the current study is on changes effected in Luso-
Brazilian political economy, specific changes of a political-cultural nature were 
brought about by the transfer of the court in Brazil.  For Brazilians, their world 
would be irrevocably changed.  For example, the right to directly petition the 
monarch was a key feature underpinning the rule of the Bragança dynasty.  When 
the monarchy resided in Portugal this was a right that could not be enjoyed by 
vassals in Brazil without an expensive and arduous journey to the metropolis.  
Moreover, the right of slaves to petition the crown was unimaginable prior to the 
transfer of the court; the opportunities afforded by open audiences at court in Brazil 
were therefore enormous for Brazil’s citizens.   Conversely, Portuguese subjects 
who were not able to travel to Brazil personally, or who did not have recourse to 
political, commercial or familial representation by proxy, were effectively denied 
these rights. In the short term, expediencies such as being forced to relinquish their 
homes to accommodate the massive influx of nobles, and high ranking officials, 
were outweighed by advance in personal and political privileges.  275   
                                            
274.  Dores Costa, ‘O governo a seis meses de distância’. 
275.  Whilst it has not been possible to identify and analyse these changes in detail to support the 
current study, see Kirsten Schultz, Tropical Versailles: empire, monarchy, and the Portuguese royal court in 
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At the heart of these shifts in absolutist power and political authority, and the 
pre-eminence of Brazil in determining the trajectory of foreign and economic policy 
was the third member of the Sousa Coutinho faction.  D. Rodrigo de Sousa 
Coutinho (later entitled Conde de Linhares), had served as minister plenipotentiary 
in Turin and from 1796, held the portfolio in government for the navy and colonies 
(Secretário de Estado da Marinha) and the influential treasury portfolio (Presidente do 
Real Erário) until his resignation in 1803.  As we saw above, D. Rodrigo now held 
the crucial portfolio for war and foreign affairs, (Ministro da Guerra e dos Negócios 
Estrangeiros) at court in Rio de Janeiro.  276  Increasingly, and as de facto prime 
minister, his influence was instrumental in determining the direction of political 
economy and, therefore, ironically the budget deficit in Portugal and the 
accumulation of sovereign debt.   
Paradoxically, the Sousa Coutinho faction were diametrically opposed to 
French invasion and occupation, but at the same time sought to undermine British 
influence and their most stalwart supporter in the regency council, D. Miguel 
                                                                                                                                
Rio de Janeiro, 1808-1821, (New York and London, Routledge, 2001), pp. 1-2, and 151-72 and Andrée 
Mansuy-Diniz Silva, ‘Imperial re-organisation, 1750-1808’ and Dauril Auden, ‘Late colonial Brazil, 
1750-1808’, in Leslie Bethell, (ed.), Colonial Brazil, (Cambridge University Press, 1987).   
276.  I am grateful for many of the above insights into the Sousa Coutinho faction to Jorge Quinta 
Nova and Moisés Gaudêncio.  While it has not been possible to source the following works to 
support the current study, it will be useful to investigate the Sousa Coutinho faction, the governance 
of Portugal and rule from Brazil in further detail in future: Brian R. April, The Sousa Coutinho 
family and the influence of Portugal on British policy, 1808-1812, (Unpublished PhD thesis : 
University of Cambridge, 1994) and Ana Canas Delgado Martins, Governacão e arquivos: D. João no 
Brazil, (Instituto dos Arquivos Nacionais, 2007).  
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Pereira de Forjaz.  The Sousa Coutinho faction sought to address both their waning 
influence in Portugal and the imbalance of power between the secretaries of the 
regency council and its members.  Their intention was to achieve the appointment 
of the Principal Sousa and others amenable to their influence to the regency council.  
British policy and activities in Portugal and, in particular, the important position 
held by Forjaz as secretary to the regency council were increasingly becoming 
obstacles to the achievement of their political objectives.  Forjaz was not only a 
protégé of António de Araújo (Sousa Coutinhos’ nemesis), but was also attaining a 
more prominent position and relationship with the British undertaking day to day 
management of the portfolio of Secretary for War and Foreign Affairs in Portugal.  
277  There were also signs of change at a micro-political level, not least of which was 
the improved working relationship that Charles Stuart quickly developed with 
specific members of the “new nobility” and, in particular, Dom Miguel Pereira de 
Forjaz.  278 The designs of the Sousa Coutinho faction had already, according to 
Charles Stuart, undermined [Cypriano] Freire’s position and prompted his 
resignation from the council.  Their jealousies and intrigues were now focused on 
Forjaz and were fuelled by political and familial interests according to Nogueira – 
one of the newly elected council members.  Forjaz was related to both D. Fernando 
                                            
277.  In a further  bizarre twist of fate, Hipólito José da Costa, the editor of the polemical Correio 
braziliense and champion of Brazilian independence, w as the recognised protégé of D. Rodrigo de 
Sousa Coutinho.   
278.  De la Fuente, ‘Dom Miguel Pereira de Forjaz’, p. 225 et seq.   
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José de Portugal e Castro, the Conde de Aguiar, and D. João de Almeida Mello e 
Castro , Conde das Galvêas, the former of whom was politically opposed to D. 
Rodrigo de Sousa Coutinho (Minister for War and Foreign Affairs).  Ironically, then, 
Forjaz received strong support at court from men who were most closely aligned 
with the partido francês and the former (and disgraced) members of the regency 
council despite, perhaps, his  instrumental role supporting British policy and 
interests in the regency council.  At the same time, Strangford in Brazil sought to 
promote the interests of the Sousa Coutinho faction, and the appointment of the 
Conde de Redondo and subsequently that of the Principal Sousa to the regency 
council and, thereby, helped to undermine the very man who most fervently 
supported Stuart in the council, Wellington’s strategy for Portugal’s defence and 
British interests in Iberia.  279 
Paradoxical as many of these potentially conflicting alliances and interests are, 
they help to explain the pervasive power of the absolutist state and the relative ease 
with which the state’s apparatus and Portuguese hierarchy were able to impose the 
rule of law despite the lack of central power and authority.  Careful consideration of 
the relatively informal governance, sustained by a juxtaposition of appointment, 
patronage and privilege, underpinning the extension and imposition of royal 
                                            
279.  For all of these important considerations, see De la Fuente, ‘Dom Miguel Pereira Forjaz’, pp. 109-
113 although I think De la Fuente does not correctly cite the identity, and political allegiance, of 
Conde das Galvêas.  See, Maria Graham (Calcott), Journey of a voyage to Brazil and residence there, 
during part of the years 1821, 1822, 1823, (London : John Murray, 1824), p. 51.   
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authority throughout the history of Portuguese empire illustrates the innate 
capacity of the Portuguese absolutist state to impose its authority despite an 
ostensibly weak political and juridical colonial apparatus.  In comparison to 
Spanish dominions in the Americas, for example, Portuguese captaincies in the 
Atlantic islands and the Brazils, appear to have been sustained with much less 
elaborate structures underpinning imperial rule compared to those supporting 
Spanish territorial domination. The same echelons of political authority maintaining 
colonisation, supported by powerful magistrados and corregedores, that had enabled 
the successfully imposition of the various strata of society into Portuguese colonies 
such as India and Brazil, sustained royal authority in the metropolis, despite the 
inverted direction and the enormous distance separating the new seat of the Luso-
Brazilian empire and Portugal.  280 
II 
Accordingly, some of these changes were wrought by necessity, and were 
therefore more pragmatic and short term in nature.  Others were founded upon 
ideological principles and resulted in profound politico-economic change.  For 
example, the easing of trading restrictions and the development of Brazilian 
domestic production resulted in some very specific long term effects on the 
Portuguese and Brazilian economies and, for both of these states, trading relations 
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with Britain.  Disruption to Portuguese domestic output and international trade in 
this period, while well-known within the Portuguese literature, has only recently 
become the focus of historical investigation in English. Moreover, despite British 
subsidies, the enormous deficiency in fiscal receipts to the Portuguese treasury 
resulting from the transfer of the court, the resultant loss of revenue on imports and 
exports, and the limitations that war and wholesale military mobilisation imposed 
on the productive capacity of the domestic economy and its principle sector, 
agriculture, restricted Portuguese autonomy still further.   281  While they were 
welcomed, the prorogation of specific seigneural and clerical dues provided little 
meaningful amelioration of popular well-being.  Moreover, the imposition of 
customs duties, which went some way in adjusting the burden of taxation from the 
point of consumption (given the significant increase in demand for imported 
foodstuffs), did little to augment fiscal receipts in the metropolis or ameliorate 
economic conditions for the Portuguese population.  282  The flight of the court to 
Rio de Janeiro presaged the end of the primacy of colonial-mercantilist economics, 
and the relative dependency of the colonies towards the metropolis.  Prior to the 
opening of Brazilian ports to the shipping of friendly nations, exports that could not 
be carried on Portuguese ships were transported by foreign vessels under licence to 
                                            
281.  See Donald D. Horward, ‘Wellington and the Defence of Portugal’, The International History 
Review, vol. 11, no. 1 (Feb., 1989), 39-54 and Fernando Dores Costa, ‘Conflictos entre Wellington y los 
gobernadores de Portugal durante la campaña de 1810-1811 contra Masséna’, Cuadernos de Historia 
Moderna, Anejo IX (2010), 123-145. 
282.  Dores Costa, ‘O governo a seis meses de distância’, pp. 4-5. 
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the crown.  To address the resultant loss of revenue, an ad valorem impost was 
levied on cargoes – with preferential rates for British shipping.  The lifting of long 
standing prohibitions on the manufacture or process of raw materials and primary 
products in Brazil was a further factor in ultimately establishing free trade and 
reducing income that would normally have found its way to Portugal by way of 
taxes on the import and re-export of Brazilian produce.   283  Therefore, the scale and 
nature of disruption in the volume of trade, exports to Brazil and Brazil’s exports to 
and re-exports from Portugal were substantial.  Portugal had maintained a position 
of some strength due to Pombal’s reforms in the third quarter of the century and 
she retained an intrinsic involvement in the general development of Euro-Atlantic 
trade in the last quarter of the eighteenth century.   
“During the second half of the eighteenth century and early years of the nineteenth 
…Portuguese colonial policy was largely in the hands of three remarkable men: 
Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melo [the Marquêz de Pombal; holding office as 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and War and later Secretary for internal Affairs 
and President of the Érario Régio (Treasury) and effectively Portugal’s prime minister 
between 1750 and 1777] … Martinho de Mello e Castro [Conde de Galveias; Secretary 
of State for the Navy and Overseas Territories (1770-1795)] ... and Dom Rodrigo de 
Sousa Coutinho [Conde de Linhares; Secretary of State for the Navy and Overseas 
                                            
283.  Cardoso, ibid. p. 239-40.   
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Territories (1796-1801, President of the Érario Régio (Treasury, 1801-1803) and, finally, 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and War (1808-1812).”  284  
Throughout this period, then, the most important components of Portuguese 
government had remained unaltered during a period in which the interdependency 
of metropolis and Brazil intensified.  Brazil had attained an unparalleled position in 
relation to wealth creation; despite the reduction in gold output, the range and 
volume of Brazilian produce became a principal contributor to the Portuguese 
crown through a complex system of imposts on consumption in the colony and 
metropolis, internal colonial trade and exportation and - especially - re-exports from 
Lisbon to a wide range of commercial centres across Europe and beyond.  Therefore 
the secretary of state for the treasury, for the navy and colonies, and for foreign 
affairs maintained a significant influence on Portuguese policy development.   All 
three of these minsters upheld the principal aim of strengthening Brazil’s position 
as mainstay of the Portuguese economy by concentrating and reinforcing the 
absolute power of the monarchy and the “colonial pact … to the exclusive benefit of 
the metropolis.”.  285  
This position was now irrevocably altered.  For example, one of the most 
notable characteristics of Portuguese economic growth in the final quarter of the 
century was the export of domestic manufactures to Brazil: exceeding one third of 
                                            
284.  Andrée Munuy-Diniz Silva, ‘Imperial reorganization’, in Leslie Bethell (ed.), Colonial Brazil, 
(Cambridge University Press, 1987). 
285.  ibid., p. 246-47. 
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total exports to that colony and outstripping the share comprised of European 
goods (the balance of which was derived from Asian markets, including cotton and 
silk cloth).  As O’Brien notes, in many ways the relationship between core and 
periphery was more often uni-directional rather than symbiotic. 
“Connexions between trade and growth are not exhausted by a consideration of 
trade’s impact on the accumulation of capital.  And the new history of development is 
also properly concerned with the gains Western Europe derived from the patterns of 
specialization promoted by trade with other continents… But the trend in the core was 
towards variety and specialization while the trend in the periphery was towards 
monoculture.”  286 
Portugal’s involvement in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, whilst not 
immediately fatal, by 1808 had stifled this component of economic growth and 
irrevocably interrupted her development as a major trading nation.  In the short to 
medium term, the changes signalled a significant increase in Brazil’s gross domestic 
output and, therefore, the Luso-Brazilian empire’s overall aggregate product, with a 
commensurate and substantial decline of output, and fiscal receipts, in Portugal.  In 
the longer term these changes presaged the development of the United Kingdom of 
Portugal, Brazil and the Algarves and, ultimately, the development of Brazil as an 
                                            
286.  Patrick O’Brien, ‘European economic development: the contribution of the periphery’, The 
Economic History Review:  Second Series, vol. 35, no. 1, 1-18, pp. 9-10.   
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autonomous economy and ultimately as an independent state.  287  The value of re-
exports of Brazilian goods exhibited an almost consistent year on year increase in 
the last quarter of the eighteenth century: peaking in the period 1801-02 at 15 billion 
réis compared to 2.7 bn réis in 1776.  Despite a short trough in the interim years, re-
exports briefly rose to a value of 14.5 bn réis in 1806, after which time they declined 
year on year to a nadir of 0.5 bn réis in 1811.  Exports to Brazil exhibited a similar 
pattern, peaking in 1801 and 1804, respectively, at 10.6 bn réis and 10. bn réis; 
falling to a low of 1.4 bn réis in 1808 and not rising above 3 bn réis until 1813. The 
exports of Portuguese goods also followed a similar pattern: comprising 
approximately one third or more of total exports to Brazil in the decade to 1804, but 
their share of total exports to the colony fell significantly between 1806 and 1810.  
The scope of Portuguese trade and exports was not merely confined to its colonies: 
“At the turn of the century, [the value of] foreign trade per capita was larger in 
Portugal than in Spain, Italy or Germany, and 5 to 7% of all European exports 
moved through Portuguese ports.” 288  The minister exercising a most significant 
influence on Dom João and Portuguese policy at this time was D. Rodrigo de Sousa 
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especially pp. 845-53.          
154 
 
Coutinho.  Formerly as Secretary for the Navy and Colonies and now as Secretary 
of State for Foreign Affairs and War, he energetically and ruthlessly effected the 
change to a political economy increasingly based upon proto-industrialisation and 
liberated commerce rather than state monopoly, protectionism and barriers to inter- 
and intra-national trade.  289   
The effects on the Portuguese economy were nothing short of disastrous.  Two 
years after arriving in Brazil, the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce of 1810 was 
negotiated, representing a further and decisive shift in Luso-Brazilian political 
economy and the emergence of an Anglo-Brazilian economic and political axis.   
“The decree [of 1808] proclaiming Brazilian ports open to the ships of all friendly 
nations … was envisaged as a temporary solution … but, in fact, put an end to the old 
colonial system.”  [First blockade, invasion and then all out war meant that] “the 
Portuguese merchant economy collapsed … Destruction and turmoil hampered both 
industrial and agricultural production. International trade was almost paralyzed and 
large quantities of foodstuffs were imported from 1811-1815.” … “exports of 
[Portuguese] national commodities to Brazil … [fell] to 22.4 percent of the value 
reached in 1796-1806.  Re-exports of Brazilian goods [sank] to 11.6 per cent of the pre-
war yearly average and overseas shipments of European goods fell to 10 per cent of 
the former value.”.  290 
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290.  ibid. p. 850. 
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However, while there was an identifiable relationship between the fall in 
international trade to blockade, invasion and war, the invasion of 1807-08 had only 
a temporary effect on longer term trends.  The substantial decline in shipping 
tonnage derived directly from the implementation of the continental system and the 
Royal Navy’s blockade, but was also symptomatic of a “broad economic structural 
change … within the emerging capitalist world economy… and represented the 
demise of the old-world Atlantic economies dependent upon luxury colonial 
products and the emergence of modern trade servicing the development of the 
Industrial Revolution.” 291 
Taking the above into account, the following chart provides an indication of 
the effects on the Portuguese economy of the French invasions.  Due to missing 
data, the measures for fiscal receipts (receitas fiscais) and public expenditure 
(despesas públicas) are based upon an average for those years for which data are 
available – the data therefore provide an indication of scale for the period in 
question rather than actual trend lines.  From the data available they do not appear 
to have exceeded, respectively, 11 and 12 milhares de contos per annum during the 
period before and after the war.  The apparent deficit of receipts over expenditure 
therefore also indicates the accumulation of public debt.  In contrast, imports and 
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exports averaged, respectively, 30.8 and 31.1 milhares de contos per annum in the 
decade prior to the first French invasion.  The consensus would appear to suggest 
Portugal enjoyed a favourable balance of trade during the period immediately 
spanning the fin de siècle.   292   In contrast, imports peaked at 43 milhares de contos 
during the war in 1811: the balance of trade deficit gradually receding from -35 to -
12 milhares de contos between 1811 and 1814.   
Figure 1 Portuguese imports, exports, receipts and expenditure, 1799-1831  
 
Source: Nuno Valério, ‘Avaliação do produto interno bruto de Portugal’  293 
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e Gestão – GHES Documento de Trabalho/Working Paper nº 34, 2008. 
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The data clearly show the catastrophic effect of the war on the Portuguese economy, 
taking into account the increase in public expenditure, and the commensurate 
decline in income from taxation due to the commitment to the war effort.   
The maintenance of the Luso-Brazilian Empire was almost solely predicated upon 
the relationship with Britain from 1808 and the Portuguese economy was 
increasingly and ultimately totally committed to the war effort.  Certainly, in 
addition to British subsidies, there was a substantial demand for funds to sustain 
the war effort drawing on Portuguese reserves, national income, private capital 
and, crucially, human resources and economic assets.   
III 
The extent and intensity of human resources devoted to preventing a repeat of 
the invasions of 1807 and 1809 and French occupation and subjugation of the 
country have, until recently, received little proper assessment and analysis.  
Although, there has been a recognition of the most visible indications of the 
investment of human capital, the numbers of men called up for service and the 
manpower committed to constructing the Lines of Torres Vedras, there has been no 
study examining the effects of wholesale military mobilisation.  294   
                                            
294.  There are a number of important studies in respect of the military including: Manuel Amaral, 
‘Portugal e as guerras da revolução, de 1793 a 1801: do Roussilhão ao Alemtejo’, in Guerra peninsular, 
novas interpretações: da Europa dividida à união Europeia, Actas do congresso realisado em 28 e 29 de 
Outubro de 2002, (Lisboa : Tribuna de História, 2005); ~, A luta política em Portugal nos finais do antigo 
regime: a proposta de reforma do exército português de 1803, (Lisboa : Tribuna de História, 2010); and ~, 
"Fontes da História Militar dos Séculos XVIII / XIX";  and João Torres Centeno, O exército português na 
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As early as October 1808 the process of recruitment and mobilisation had been 
afforded priority by Forjaz.  In principle, the foundations for military re-
organisation had already been laid but not fully implemented in the period 1806 to 
1807.  The first French invasion of 1807 and the subsequent mobilisation of many of 
the senior officers and more experienced troops into la légion portugaise resulted in a 
significant reduction in military capacities.  Attempts to mobilise troops in 1808 
were severely constrained by the low ratio of good officers and troops available 
with training and experience in each regiment and these deficiencies would 
continue to pose substantial problems for some time to come.  On November 21st 
1808 all men who had been discharged between 1801 and 1807 were recalled to 
their respective units; deserters pardoned if they returned within one month; the 
terms of service reduced to four years; and, finally, all troops were promised 
preferential consideration upon demobilisation for employment.  By December 
1808, a further decree ordered all males to arm themselves, those between the ages 
of 15-60 were to present themselves for military training, and each settlement was 
to take measures for its own defence.   
The very substantial efforts made to mobilise in the summer of 1808 were 
made infinitely more difficult in that the model or pattern for military mobilisation 
                                                                                                                                
guerra peninsular, Volume 1, do Rossilhão ao fim da segunda invasão francesa 1807-1810, (Lisboa : Prefácio, 
2008).  I am grateful to João Centeno for clarifying specific aspects of military history in connection 
with a review undertaken of this first volume; and the second volume to accompany this title has 
now been published.   
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at a national level had been shattered, but the establishment of the juntas, together 
with wholesale popular support, ensured that localised recruitment and 
mobilisation remained intact.  The result was an enthusiastic but defective military 
force comprising regulars, irregulars and civilian volunteers, inadequately provided 
for in terms of arms, equipment, officers and, most importantly, training and 
discipline.  295 
Within this re-organisation, the twenty four regiments of the line were each to 
comprise a total of 1,550 officers, rank and file (plus a staff complement); each of the 
12 regiments of cavalry was raised to a total effective force of almost 600 (although 
the continued lack of suitable mounts meant whole regiments were assigned 
garrison duties and a smaller number of serviceable regiments formed for active 
service); the organization and complements of the four regiments of artillery 
remained unaltered at 1,200 each; and the regiments of milícia were increased to 48 
in total each comprising a strength of 1,100 troops.  The paper strength of the first 
and second line troops therefore exceeded 105,000.    296      
                                            
295.  French eye witness accounts testify to the general lack of uniformity of the forces mobilised 
against them, their lack of formal military attire, arms and accoutrements.  They also stressed the 
extent of popular opposition throughout settlements, particular in close proximity to the border with 
Spain both in 1809 and also in 1810.  Whilst those firearms that were available were of a wide 
variety, and the general absence of firearms amongst the hastily organised ordenança created 
problems in terms of military capabilities, the great problem for the senior officers was the lack of 
military organisation and discipline amongst the forces they were able to mobilise. 
296.   AHM 1/3 caixa 2, decree of October 27, 1807; AHM 1/14 caixa 286, decree of 14 October, 1808; 
and AHM caixa 25 decree of December 11, 1808; cited in Francisco A. De la Fuente, ‘Dom Miguel 
Pereira Forjaz: his early career and role in the mobilization and defence of Portugal’, (Unpublished 
PhD thesis : Florida States University, 1980), pp. 182-85 – in this latter edict two further stipulations 
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Military recruitment and mobilisation continued to be supported by the 1807 
royal charter (alvará), which established a supporting infrastructure comprising 
twenty four brigadas de ordenança.  297  The recruiting districts varied in terms of their 
jurisdiction for physical territory in order that approximately similar populations 
were covered.  Each was tasked with recruiting and mobilising one regiment of 
infanteria (first line) and two regiments of milícia (second line) troops. Two districts 
combined to provide recruits for one regiment of cavalry. Finally, the artillery was 
recruited from the combined area covered by all of the defined territories districtos 
da circumscripção, which contained the twenty four component brigadas.  For obvious 
reasons, recruitment and mobilisation were more difficult in relatively sparsely 
populated areas, and a further complicating factor was that the boundaries for civil, 
judicial, military (and religious) jurisdiction were not necessarily coterminous.  The 
regions and number of regiments supported were as follows: Algarve, 1; Alentejo, 
2; Beira, 5; Estremadura, 6; Oporto, 4; Minho, 4; and the Trás-os-Montes, 2. Their 
distribution took into account population densities and the pattern of major 
settlements in each of the seven regiões militares.     
                                                                                                                                
decreed aiding the enemy to be a crime punishable by death and settlements not resisting the enemy 
would be razed to the ground ibid. pp185-86.  Grehan though asserts that the total number of 
effective first line troops did not exceed 44,000, Grehan, ‘Wellington’s fighting cocks’, p. 176. 
297.  The law of 1807 therefore represented a notable progression in these methods for 
recruitment.  Fryman refers erroneously to a “feudal” system of recruitment: a description that 
fails to acknowledge a complex set of procedures that took into account age, marital status, 
occupation,  number of dependants and previous service, see Fryman, ‘Charles Stuart and the 
“common cause”’, pp. 68-75. 
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Eligibility for, and terms of, military service were quite complex.  All males 
between 17 and 40 years were liable for ten years service in the first line infanteria 
(no activo) and thereafter eight years in the ordenanças.  Recruits joining the second 
line (milícias) served for 14 years in the first instance and a further eight years in the 
ordenanças.  From 1808, and particularly following the appointment of Beresford, 
various (progressive) reforms increase eligibility, and reduced exemptions, thereby 
eventually extending compulsory military service (potentially) to all (single) males 
aged between 18 and 60. Moreover, some males previously exempted from service 
in the infanteria (for example, married males with dependants) were subsequently 
decreed eligible for active service (i.e. as opposed to more limited terms of service 
within the milicia and ordenança.  298 
There are two further, and fundamental, issues to take into account.  
Recruitment and mobilisation for military service would under normal conditions 
be to provide replacements for casualties and to replenish the losses incurred by 
regiments due to retirement (completion of the terms of service) and natural 
wastage due to sickness, disabilities or infirmities.  Although recruits continued to 
be drawn by lot (sorte), the number of recruits required to bring each respective 
regiment up to a proper combat effectiveness and to replenish its needs throughout 
                                            
298.  V Cesar, A evolução do recrutamento em Portugal: desde os seus primórdios até a lei de 1807, 
Revista Militar, 2.ª Epocha, n.º 8, Agosto de 1909, pp 513-24; and A evolução do recrutamento em 
Portugal: desde 1809 até 1901, Revista Militar, 2.ª Epocha, n.º 9, Setembro de 1909, pp 577-92.  
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five years of almost continuous campaigning were both substantial and 
unprecedented.  299  And while energetic and enthusiastic popular support for 
military mobilisation assisted recruitment, the specific conditions of 1809 and the 
lack of experienced officers meant that in some cases the extent of popular support 
for opposition and resistance to the French created problems of a different kind.  
Indeed, indiscipline and disobedience were key factors undermining the 
performance of the Portuguese military, most particularly in 1809.   
Clearly it was difficult to develop a military strategy for the defence of the 
northern regions of Portugal when order could not be maintained and the local 
population had their own priorities for defence.    Furthermore, an ongoing 
problem, underpinned by a complex combination of political, military and 
economic factors, was the fragmentation of the officer class into distinct military 
factions.  Whilst neither faction could be said to be steadfastly pro-French or pro-
British, at this time, they had become much more clearly defined as such with the 
impending third French invasion of Portugal, and most particularly, once the 
invasion had commenced and the French army approached Lisbon’s defences - the 
Lines of Torres Vedras - in October 1810.   
The theoretical establishment suggested above relate solely to the 
establishment at any given point in time and do not take into account additional 
                                            
299.  ibid. 
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and replacement demand for manpower between 1808 and 1810 to make up losses 
sustained in battle, or due to sickness, injury and desertion.  The following data 
have been put together to establish the stocks and flows of military recruitment in 
the capital and two regions - Lisbon and Estremadura.  As indicated above, each 
regiment was composed of just over 1,500 other ranks.  However, in addition to the 
standing complement of regiments, additional recruits had to be furnished to make 
up losses sustained in campaigning and through natural wastage.  In 1809, 1,250 
recruits were forwarded to make up the deficiencies in line regiments n.º 4 and n.º 
19: approximately 950 of which came from the capital, Lisbon, and just over 300 via 
the capitães móres from their recruiting comarcas, and a further fifty or so recruits for 
the milícias  of Alcacer, Leíria and Soure.  In 1810, the numbers recruited to meet 
demand had swelled to almost 5,200.  Of these, 2,700 men were recruited directly 
for the general reserve and line regiment n.º 22, during the months of June and 
August from Lisbon, while a further 2,400 were furnished for the general recruiting 
reserve by the capitães móres, the majority of which were furnished in June with 
almost 300 more in November.  A further 40 milícia recruits were furnished for the 
regiments of Alcacer, Setubal, Louzã and Tondella.  In June and October 1811, 
mostly in the earlier month, 1,900 men were forwarded by the capitães móres, for the 
general recruiting reserve, and 930 for regiment n.º 22 from Lisbon.     
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 In addition to meeting this level of demand, which equated to a total 
exceeding 9,000 recruits in these three years, a further 3,800 recruits in 1812 and 
almost 1,840 in 1813, were required for the general recruiting reserve.  Almost 3,000 
additional recruits were needed to make good losses in the seven regiments of the 
line, two regiments of cavalry and one of artillery, which recruited from Lisbon and 
Estremadura, within a return of October 1813. 300 Even after taking into account that 
the capital Lisbon and its environs were home to around one in ten Portuguese 
people, and Estremadura was one of the most fertile and populous regions, the 
sustainability of such intensive recruiting methods must have been seriously 
questioned.   
 These intensive recruitment methods(and for such a sustained period of 
active service) were a relatively recent development, traditionally recruitment had 
been managed within the recruiting district (comarca) by the capitães móres, the 
allocation to first, second and third line being undertaken once the lot (sorteamento) 
had been drawn; with varying eligibility criteria and conditions of service.  Service 
in the first line had normally been restricted to those best able to serve away from 
home, single men without dependants, with service in the milícias being a preferred 
option for married men with dependants, and service with the ordenanças 
compulsory for anyone not already in first or second line service.  Although it has 
                                            
300.  All data from Chaby, Excerptos Historicos, vol. VI, pp. 481-82: the line regiments were n.º 1, 4, 7, 
13, 16, 19 and 22, cavalry regiments n.º 1 and 4, and artillery regiment n.º 1.   
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been argued that the provisions for recruitment were adequate and that the reforms 
instigated by Beresford and Forjaz were both excessive and repressive, this 
argument fails to consider properly the extraordinary demand for manpower, given 
the sustained and unprecedented nature of the armed conflict to 1814.  301   
 To return to the total under arms for 1810, of almost 435,000 including those 
serving in the ordenança, this total represented approximately 43% of the total male 
population eligible for military service, which could be estimated at approximately 
1,000,000 based upon data from the Census of 1801.  The population of the Minho, 
which had exhibited much faster rates of populatin growth would have been better 
placed to meet such extensive recruitment, certainly in comparison to Estremadura 
where population change had flat-lined, and that of the Alemtejo which was 
declining substantially (promoting an agricultural crisis due to the lack of land 
labourers – a factor that impacted substantially on military recruitment in this 
region).   302  Of course, men serving in regiments of milícia would be allowed 
furlough when their posts were not in immediate danger, ordenança operations were 
localised and more temporary nature, and all family members would contribute to 
household productivity.  However, even after allowing for these factors, a reduction 
of this magnitude on the potential agricultural and productive labour force would 
                                            
301.  V Cesar, ‘A evolução do recrutamento em Portugal’. 
302.  João Pedro Ferro, A população portuguesa no final do antigo regime (1750-1815), Lisboa, 1995 pp 29-
34, and see Oman for the difficulties of recruiting in the Alentejo, Oman, History of the Peninsular 
War, vol. ii, pp. 629-31 and vol. iii, pp. 556-57      
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have had substantial negative effects, for example in terms of the aggregate output 
of the agricultural sector, food production and processing of foodstuffs.  Moreover, 
a substantial and growing proportion of the population - perhaps 600,000 people, or 
one fifth of the population, lived in urban areas and almost twice this number, 
1,100,000 overall, did not contribute to agricultural output.  303  As we have seen 
above, quite apart from agriculture the effects of the war on Portugal’s other 
productive sectors and - most importantly - international trade were also 
significant.  304       
Data for the Beira Alta demonstrate the effect of mobilisation of the milícias on 
the economy in that region and also, in a similarly negative sense, on military 
efficiency.  The fortress city of Almeida was garrisoned by two regiments of the line 
and six milícia regiments.  Cox, the British governor of Almeida, decided to disband 
three under-strength regiments of milícia and distribute their equipment and 
accoutrements to the remaining three.  The three disbanded regiments went home 
to Arouce, Tondella and Viseu, while the remaining three regiments were from 
Guarda, Arganil and Trancoso.  305     
                                            
303.  Jaime Reis, Conceição Andrade Martins and Leonor Freire Costa, ‘New estimates of Portugal’s 
GDP per capita’, paper presented at the Portuguese Economic history Workshop, ICS, University of 
Lisbon, 12 December 2011, 1-38, pp. 15-16 
304.   See above pp. 155-57 
305.  Arganil is situated in the comarca of Coimbra, a substantial city and important seat of learning, 
with a population of over 16,000 in 1801.  Trancoso is a settlement in the comarca of Pinhel: the most 
populous settlements of which were Almeida (2,296), Villa Nova de Foz Côa (1,904), Pinhel itself 
(1,990), Trancoso (1,377), Sirdim (1,293) and Almendra (1,190).   
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 That these men represented a significant proportion of the adult male 
population, had been in service for a protracted period and away from their homes, 
is in no doubt.  Viseu, Tondella and Arouce are a considerable distance from 
Almeida, and it must be remembered than many men although belonging to the 
respective recruiting comarca would have lived even further away than the main 
settlement within these districts.  Many of them deserted.  Initially, Cox reported 
800 men of the remaining three regiments were absent without leave, five weeks 
prior to the investment of the fortress, by the end of June this number had risen to 
1,000.  The total paper strength of these three milícia regiments would have been 
around 3,300; so clearly around one man in three had left his post.  At this time 
there were serious complaints about the failings of the Portuguese commissariat 
and Cox himself had complained on numerous occasions about the lack of 
provisions for the troops at his disposal. It would appear that where men remained 
at their posts for prolonged periods of service, this had deleterious effects on the 
agricultural economy.  Furthermore, the problem of desertion affected both military 
efficiency and morale.  Cox concluded that it would be impossible to defend the 
fortress of Almeida with milícia regiments, given they had to be retained by physical 
force and, where caught, examples made of deserters by summary execution.  306 
                                            
306.  Wellington consistently complained about the lack of logistical support and provisions for the 
Portuguese regiments, eventually undertaking to supply those units incorporated within the 
divisional structures by the British commissariat.  For further details of the problems Cox faced see 
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 Crucially, though, the vast majority of these enlisted men would have been 
recruited from rural areas in each comarcas, compounding still further the naturally 
lower agricultural productivity of the region.  The rural population accounted for 
around 85% of the total population in Portugal at the turn of the century.  However, 
the distribution was uneven and north of the capital the concentration of 
population in non agricultural urban settlements was more marked.  For example, 
the rural population comprised 86% of the total population in the comarca of 
Guarda, 84% in Trancoso but only 80% in Pinhel, 77% in Arganil and just 73% in 
Viseu.  In the Beiras overall, with a population of almost 806,000, the rural 
population was ten times larger than the population living in urban settlements 
(82,000.  These data confirm that the burden of recruitment fell disproportionately 
on the rural poor of each region, with a commensurately negative effect on the 
economy and the livelihoods of the inhabitants of these rural settlements.  307    
Wellington observed: 
“By the first of May [1810] a total of 51,280 troops of the line and 54,229 
militiamen were under arms, seconded by 329,016 ordenanza (sic) mobilised 
for the defence of the Kingdom. “The Portuguese are in a good state“ [he] 
declared.  “We have arms for the militia and, upon the whole we have an 
                                                                                                                                
Donald D Horward, Napoleon and Iberia: The Twin Sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, 1810, 
University Press Florida, 1984, pp 267-68.  Southey provides a somewhat contradictory, and more 
positive, account of the conduct of the three milícia regiments at capitulation.   
307.  Ferro, População portuguesa, pp 47-51.     
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enormous military establishment at our command.  We only want money to 
put it in operation and to keep it up.”” 308 
But however significant a factor as the mobilisation and recruitment of such an 
enormous proportion of the male population of working age into the Portuguese 
military was, it does not equate to the concept of a nation in arms, which implies a 
much more substantial contribution over and above national military service.  309  
The mobilisation and recruitment of a substantial proportion of the male 
working-age population into the Portuguese military was a major factor 
precipitating social and economic change.  There were three main stages to reform 
of Portuguese military service and mobilisation representing a significant shift in 
relation to former methods of recruitment to, and deployment of, the Portuguese 
military.  The result was a discernible change in the social basis of military service 
on all levels.  At one end of the military spectrum, the scale and nature of 
recruitment and military mobilisation resulted in a significant expansion in the 
standing army, the involvement of a wider range of mend by social class and status, 
and the development of the milícias and ordenanças into a more capable, military 
                                            
308.  Donald D. Howard, Napoleon and Iberia: The Twin Sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, 
1810,  (University Press Florida, 1984), p. 78.  PRO/FO, 342/19, “Mappa geral em rezumo da força 
armada em todo o Reino em mez do abril de 1810”, cited in Horward, Twin sieges, p. 78, fn 17.   
309.  However, the concept had significant currency within Portuguese historiography of the late 
nineteenth century, see Mendo Castro Henriques, ‘1812 e a geopolítica da Guerra peninsular’, in 
Guerra peninsular, novas interpretações, especially pp. 172-76, but its earliest use that I have been able 
to find is in the Gazeta de Lisboa and the work of the historians Mario and Soriano, all of which in 
relation to the Miguelite or civil war that took place between 1820-1834.  Investigation of the 
politicisation of the military, of course, is a relatively recent development within historiography.  
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force.  310  The combination of these two factors resulted in a metamorphosis in the 
inter-relationships between the armed forces and Portuguese society and the 
emerging concept of a nation in arms (nação em armas) if only in terms of the wider 
social base for military service.  The concept of Portugal as a nation in arms (nação 
em armas) has been the focus of considerable attention within Portuguese 
historiography and is inextricably linked to the concept of the nation state.  
However, its applicability to Portugal at this time is probably somewhat 
anachronistic.   311    
In relation to the officer class, the changes led to the formation of a discernible, 
albeit at this stage nascent, politico-military elite.  As indicated above, one of the 
unexpected results of the disastrous War of the Oranges was a programme of 
military reform that was begun in December 1801 and completed in early 1802.   
That reform was necessary was not in question: defeat by the French in the War of 
Roussillon in 1793, continued neglect, driven in part by supposed savings on 
military expenditure, poor military leadership and the deplorable and ever-
deteriorating state of the Portuguese army, resulted in the humiliating defeat by the 
                                            
310.  It would be inaccurate to describe the milícias as a citizen force, but their mobilisation and 
recruitment had a much more ideological foundation in this period than previously and their social 
basis much more representative of the population at large.  As Esdaile suggests, the ordenanças, could 
with some justification, be likened to a form of “home guard”, incorporating younger and older 
Portuguese subjects, those with familial responsibilities and those too infirm for more regular 
military service.   
311.   See the chapter on ‘popular proto-nationalism’ in Eric J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism 
since 1780: Programme, Myth and Reality, (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1990).   
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Franco-Spanish alliance in the War of the Oranges in 1801.  312  Although many of 
the proposed reforms instigated by the commission were not thoroughly, or 
immediately, implemented, the commission represented a clear shift in military 
policy.  Moreover, those reforms that were implemented challenged not only the 
social basis of localised military and judicial power but also the hierarchy of 
Portuguese military command and control of the standing army.   
I would argue that the social basis of the officer class within the Portuguese 
regular army changed dramatically between 1808 and 1814.  Firstly, as a direct 
result of the exodus to Brazil, secondly the raising of la legion portugaise - many 
senior and very able officers helped with its mobilisation and left to take up service 
in France.   313  Thirdly, Beresford’s reforms, purges of antiquated, incapable and 
inefficient army officers and the involvement and promotion of a new class of 
officer on the basis of merit and commitment to the “common cause” led to a major 
shift in the social basis of the serving officer class.  314  A fairly recent Portuguese 
work on the social history of the Portuguese army has calculated, based upon the 
work of Veríssimo Ferreira da Costa, that more than 900 officers left the service of 
                                            
312.  Amaral, ‘Portugal e as guerras da revolução’ 
313.  Livermore, ‘Portugal on the eve of the Peninsular War’, passim.   
314.  Amaral, Beresford, Ordens do dia. 1809, 1810 and 1811, passim. 
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the Portuguese army throughout this period, during the French invasions and 
Peninsular war and almost 350 British officers took up service in that arm.  315 
Army officers throughout the eighteenth and into the early nineteenth century 
“enjoyed the respect of others for both their military role and for their position as 
members of the local nobility.”  316  While a general statement relating to the 
European military, it would appear to be entirely appropriate for the Portuguese 
military.  All senior general officers in the fin de siècle Portuguese army were titled 
nobles (fidalgos): throughout the eighteenth century, the nobility retained all of the 
most elevated military ranks and completely dominated its higher echelons.  A 
specific rank of cadete had been created by Pombal in the mid eighteenth century 
specifically to promote access for nobles to a career in the military.  Until the end of 
the Napoleonic Wars, at the very least, access to this specific rank and accelerated 
career path was restricted to the higher nobility with strictly controlled eligibility 
including provenance of candidates’ noble status.  It would appear that only upon 
attaining the rank of major, could a cadete be considered a fidalgo both in terms of his 
military rank and status and position in society.  Lesser ranks in the Portuguese 
                                            
315.  Fernando Pereira Marques, Exército, mudança e modernização na primeira metade do século XIX, 
(Lisboa : Edições Cosmos, 1999), p. 83 et seq.  This work, and the following work by the same author, 
has only been viewed cursorily, to support the current study, but would appear to warrant much 
further detailed investigation: Fernando Pereira Marques, Exército e Sociedade em Portugal no declínio 
do antigo regime e advento do liberalismo, (Lisboa : Publicações Alfa, 1989). 
316.  Alan Forrest and others (eds.), Soldiers, citizens and civilians: experiences and perceptions of the 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1790-1820, (Basingstoke and New York : Palgrave, Macmillan, 
2009), p. 5.   
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army could be attained by officers who had gained promotion on merit and dint of 
service.  The contemporary observations of Dumouriez and Halliday confirm that 
“the subaltern ranks (for example alferes and porta bandeira) are filled from the 
inferior classes” and “even captains had not the rank of gentlemen”.  317   
These types of institutional barriers to progression were soon to change.  
Immediately upon his appointment in February 1809, Beresford acted with speed 
and ruthlessness “[B]etween 15 March and 4 July 1809” … he “relieved 108 officers 
of their commissions and a month later he ordered a further 107 to be retired.”.  318  
British officers were encouraged to serve in the Portuguese army, the initial 24 
officers who volunteered and who were already serving in Portugal amongst 
Cradock’s small force were given a step in rank in the British army and one in the 
Portuguese army; subsequent appointments receiving a single step in Portuguese 
rank.  Not a little Portuguese pride was dented, and some British humility imposed, 
by the policy of replacement and advancement given the importance of seniority in 
both armies.  But it proved to be a workable and successful solution to the 
operational difficulties brought about by the lack of training, poor organization, and 
indiscipline of the Portuguese troops and limitations of the officer class.   
                                            
317.   Dumouriez (1776), p. 17 and Halliday, Observations on the present state of the Portuguese army, 
(1811), p. 106 both cited in Oman, History of the Peninsular War, vol. 2, p. 209.  I am grateful for the 
insights into the rank and career path of cadete to Jorge Quinta Nova and Moisés Gaudêncio.   
318.   John Grehan, ‘Wellington’s fighting cocks: the Portuguese army in the Peninsula’, in Ian Fletcher 
(ed.), The Peninsular War: aspects of the struggle for the Iberian Peninsula, (Staplehurst : Spellmount, 
1998), pp. 174-75.   
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That Beresford was able to fulfil his intentions to get the Portuguese army to 
submit to his will was due in no small part to the support he received from 
Wellington, Charles Stuart and, most importantly, Dom Miguel Pereira de Forjaz.  
Beresford’s reforms caused quite a number of upsets (in the regency council and at 
court in Rio de Janeiro) but eventually he was able to implement the changes 
required, dismiss old and inefficient officers, re-model the army along British lines, 
and promote those who were deserving – British and Portuguese alike.  Despite a 
number of setbacks, in less than a decade spanning the turn of the nineteenth 
century, three major innovations in Portuguese military policy had already taken 
shape.  Firstly, the reforms led to the re-organisation of military structures on all 
three levels, troops of the first line (infantry, cavalry, artillery and engineer corps), 
the milícia(s) and the ordenanças.  While reform principally reaffirmed the traditional 
methods for recruitment to, and mobilisation of, the landed armed forces, the 
processes of recruitment, mobilisation and training were given a modern footing.  
Secondly, and linked to this first point, there was a more concerted effort to ensure 
that the burden of military mobilisation reflected the spatial distribution of the 
population and the prevailing structures of the Portuguese economy. 
IV 
An indication of the extent of devastation in Portugal resulting from the third 
invasion, and of government policy, is provided in near contemporary 
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documentation and accounts.  There are two important reports providing empirical 
evidence.  Firstly, a report relating to devastation in the diocese of Coimbra during 
the invasion itself and, secondly, the specific instructions for the investigation of 
devastated areas and summary of the distribution of funds voted by the British 
parliament to alleviate the suffering in the affected areas – both of which focus on 
two regions, Estremadura and Beira.  There is a wide range of evidence within 
secondary sources in English, for example summarising first-hand accounts in 
British journals and diaries, attesting to the scale and nature of devastation.   From 
French mémoires, it is clear that the indiscipline, unwarranted aggression, unbridled 
cruelty, and indiscriminate looting of valuables and foodstuffs accompanying 
French foraging à la debandade, directly affected morale and the operational abilities 
of the French army of Portugal.    319  
The French army could not rely upon supplies forwarded from their depots.  
Not only had the army’s ordonnateurs exhausted the foodstuffs available in their 
forward magazines in order to put together transportable rations for the initial 
stages of the invasion, the scarce supplies they brought with them were quickly used 
up.  The troops very quickly resorted to widespread and wholesale pillage.  A 
                                            
319.  Oman, citing Guingret’s account, provides an indictment of the typical outcomes of these foraging 
parties as follows.  “Guingret of the 39th in Ney’s VI Corps, mentions in his diary that he had seen a 
detachment return to camp, after having surprised a half deserted village, with a number of peasant 
girls, whom they sold to their comrades, some for a couple of gold pieces others for a pack horse.”, 
Guingret, Relation  historique et militaire de la campagne de Portugal sous le maréchal Massena, prince 
d’Essling,  (1817)  pp. 124-6; cited by Oman, A history of the peninsular war, vol. 4, p. 12. 
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detailed report made in 1812 for the Diocese of Coimbra sets out the following 
atrocities perpetrated in the advance along the valley of the Mondego by French 
troops.  Six villages in the Serra were razed to ground.  In the freguesia de Espinho 
(just over one league distant) eight small hamlets were reduced to ashes, in the 
freguesia de Pala, 34 houses were torched, in Santa Comba Dão almost two entire 
villages were destroyed and in the freguesia of Sobral, three smaller settlements 
suffered the same fate.  When considering this evidence, the geography of rural 
Portugal, especially in these areas to the north of Lisbon, needs to be taken into 
account.  The distribution of settlements is quite distinct: the rural provinces in the 
regions of Estremadura and the Beiras were, and remain still, typically comprised of 
relatively densely populated concelhos and more sparsely populated freguesias; with 
the largest settlements in each freguesia and the concelho itself acting as epicentres for 
administration, trade and commerce.   
The implications for the rural population therefore went much deeper than the 
loss of their homes: as devastating as this undoubtedly was.   Moreover, all of the 
above mentioned settlements are located on the right, or northern bank, of the 
Mondego and therefore must have occurred during the initial stages of the invasion.  
The French not only laid waste the built infrastructure, but also destroyed the 
agricultural base and, in particular, staple resources such as vines and olive trees, 
which are expensive to replace given the lead time before they could begin to yield 
177 
 
fruit.  The reports suggest the French carried away all the crops they could, 
destroyed all they could not and drove the cattle in front of them.  320   
 A table detailing the atrocities committed in each locality, and from which the 
extent of incendiary activities, robbery and murder committed by the French army 
of Portugal can clearly be seen, presents a terrible indictment of the activities of the 
French army en route for Lisbon.  Even leaving aside the relatively flimsy nature of 
peasant houses in these more rural settlements, compared to major towns and cities 
and which, with a modicum of finance, tools and other resources, can be rebuilt, it is 
possible to obtain an idea of the extent of wholesale destruction caused to the built 
environment, people’s homes and livelihoods as well as the long term damage to the 
economy and its principal sector, agriculture.  In addition to the 3,000 that were 
assassinated by French troops it has been estimated that a further 35,000, 12.5% of 
the regional population, died from disease and pestilence as a result of the invasion 
and occupation of Portugal.  321 
Following the expulsion of the French, two commissioners were appointed to 
visit the devastated areas, consult with local public officials and distribute funds, 
                                            
320.  All this is taken from Memoria breve dos estragos causados em Coimbra pelo exercito Francez 
commandado pelo maréchal Massena, (Impressão Regia, anno de 1812) and cited in Soriano, Historia da 
Guerra Civil, 2.ª época, vol. 3, pp .  Soriano details the following acts of pillage in respect of cereals.  In 
the arcyprestado de Aréga (an enumeration district within the Diocese), to the south east of Pombal, 
the French took 12,054 “moios de cereaes” – one moio being the equivalent of a bushel.  In Miranda, 
10,897 alqueires (the nearest equivalent measure would appear to be somewhere between 15 and 20 
litres), freguesia de Alvarge 19,240, Arganil 20,000, Levegada 5,551, São Martinho do Bispo 3,619, 
Coja 5,044 and Salviza 4,002 more.   
321.  Dores Costa, ‘Conflictos entre Wellington y los gobernadores’, p. 124. 
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cattle and other resources (such as metal and timber) to alleviate distress in those 
areas most affected and assist with their reconstruction, for example the rebuild or 
refurbishment of destroyed and damaged houses and the construction of carts.  
While government policy dictated that resources should be allocated on the basis of 
evidenced need, there was a clearly defined prioritisation for the allocation of 
funds, oxen and cattle.  The prioritisation was those families whose sons had died 
on active service, or who were currently serving in the army; the families of those 
who had served or continued to serve in the milícia over a considerable period of 
time; those who had only recently served; those people who had fled the invaded 
areas and lost their cattle.  In contrast those people who had refused to obey the 
government’s decree to abandon the invaded and occupied territories were 
excluded from the programme of compensation altogether.   
A cursory examination of the data reveals that the largest single group of 
recipients of aid, receiving the largest share - if not the majority - of resources 
allocated, were the families and dependants of those men serving (or who had 
served in) the milícia.   The population of Estremadura received almost 1,800 oxen, 
and over 220 head of cattle; and the population of Beira received, respectively, 
approximately 1,500 and 250 oxen and head of cattle.  Population density and the 
extent of cultivable land would need to be taken into account when interpreting the 
data but the programme of reconstruction was to be focused on those areas in 
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which the army was actively engaged and the comarcas  receiving monetary aid 
were as follows: Extremadura – Alcobaça, Alemquer, Cinco Villas, Leíria, Ourem, 
Santarém, Tentugal, Tomar; Beira – Arganil, Aveiro, Castelo Branco, Coimbra, 
Crato, Guarda, Linhares, Pinhel, Trancoso, Vizeu.  The more fertile Estremadura 
had a significantly greater concentration of the population and proportion of land 
under cultivation in comparison to Beira which then, as now, is typified by a more 
mountainous terrain, a relatively dispersed pattern of settlements, and a lower ratio 
of good quality arable land.  322   
V 
The construction of the Lines of Torres Vedras as a ‘cornerstone’ of 
Wellington’s strategy for the defence of Portugal is widely known.  Yet while they 
have received considerable treatment in the historiography, there has been no 
comprehensive assessment of the cost of their construction over and above the direct 
financial costs involved.  Indeed, based purely upon construction costs they have 
been described as one of the cheapest investments in military history at £200,000.    
Wellington had anticipated the invasion of Portugal would be via the Beira Alta.  
His proposals for the successful defence of Portugal, given that the French could 
bring an overwhelming force, was based upon a judicious combination of military 
                                            
322.  See Soriano, História da Guerra Civil, 2.ª época, vol. 5, part 2.   The commissioners were the 
desembargador João Gaudêncio Torres and Mr John Croft.  The guidance and instructions for the 
commission and their activities are set out in Documento n.º 100-D (cited in the narrative of vol. 3, on 
p. 497) pp. 286-89; and a summary of the oxen and cattle distributed in Documento n.º  100-E (cited 
in vol. 3., p. 502) pp. 289-291. 
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technology, Portugal’s naturally defensive topographical features, and the expected 
difficulties of finding and gathering sufficient provisions, foodstuffs and forage to 
sustain such a substantial invading army.  Work had commenced on the lines of 
Torres Vedras more or less one year prior to the appearance of the French army in 
front of the outlying positions at Sobral de Monte Agraço in October 1810.  
However, “The Lines” as they came to be known, had been identified as an integral 
component of Wellington’s strategy for the defence of Portugal as early as March 
1809.  The works stretched for 24 miles from end to end, from the Tejo to the 
Atlantic, and comprised the construction of redoubts and abbattis, scarping of the 
terrain, and the blasting of roads to render the ground impracticable for French 
troops.  323   
 What has not been considered is that the construction of the fortifications 
would effectively subsume a substantial geographical area, much of which was 
good quality agricultural land, and effectively deny its use to the inhabitants of the 
region for over three years.  The land was taken without reference or compensation 
to its owners.  Moreover, even once the land had been turned back over to its 
previous owners and agricultural uses it would be many more years before some of 
                                            
323.  See John Grehan, The lines of Torres Vedras: the cornerstone of Wellington’s strategy in the 
Peninsular War, 1809-1812, (Staplehurst – Spellmount, 2000); Soriano, História da Guerra Civil, 2.ª 
época, vol. 3, p. 8; and pp. 12-13. 
181 
 
the destruction could be addressed and the land become productive again.   324   The 
main period of construction itself lasted from October 1809 to October 1810, and the 
French were in place in front of the lines and in their cantonments in and around the 
Santarém quadrilateral for a further five months.  Although the French retreated in 
March 1811, the majority of the land in the environs of the fortifications would be 
unavailable for agricultural production for at least two years up until 1812, however 
construction was still being undertaken to complete the fortifications for two further 
years.  Even after the expulsion of the French, and the advance into Spain in the 
campaigns on 1812 and 1813, the land would not begin to yield until at least one 
year after agricultural activities had been re-commenced.  Moreover, whilst arable 
crops, cereals and vegetables, could be grown more or less immediately, and the re-
planting of vines and olives undertaken almost as quickly, it would take many  
years before vines and trees would begin to yield  fruit.  325 
 Accordingly, it is clear that although arable use (and the production of annual 
crops such as cereals and vegetables) comprised a substantial component of 
agricultural production, the region had a complex ecological structure and its 
inhabitants and livestock were dependent upon mixed land use, forestry, arable 
                                            
324.  A very promising work was obtained, unfortunately too late to be of substantial use in the 
current study, Fernando Manuel da Silva Rita, ‘Os exércitos de Massena e Wellington no concelho 
de Santarém (1810-1811): reflexos no quotidiano social, político, económico e castrense’, 
(Unpublished Masters Thesis, Universidade de Lisboa, 2010).  See in particular the geographical 
context of Santarém set out between pp. 8-27.       
325.  For a detailed description of the works see Soriano, História da guerra civil e do estabelecimento do 
governo parlamentar em Portugal, 2.ª época, vol. 2, pp. 541-604.   
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farming and animal husbandry, olives, and of course vineyards.  Other land would 
have been in the form of montado; a term more usually associated with agricultural 
terrain in the Alemtejo describing land given over to mixed agricultural uses, wild 
and managed woodland, and supporting the husbandry of swine and the rearing 
and hunting of small animals and game etc.  With such a complex and inter-related 
ecosystem it would have been much longer than the two to three years in which the 
land was unavailable due to the construction and defence of the fortifications for it 
to start to become productive, and still longer for it to become fully productive – 
taking into account the predominant forms of agricultural use, crop production, 
food processing and the complex operations of domestic and export markets.  
 To support and oversee the construction of “The Lines”, Wellington 
appointed Colonel Fletcher as engineer in overall command.  No person was to be 
permitted to interfere with this work irrespective of rank.  To work on road 
blocking, Beresford was ordered to send 6,000 troops of the milícias to Torres Vedras, 
500 to Sobral, and 800 to São Julião.  In addition, works were also undertaken to 
block the main Torres Vedras–Loures–Lisbon road.  Even if the area had not been 
given totally over for military purposes, the blocking of these main arteries would 
have had significant repercussions for agricultural and commercial activities.  
Moreover, “Fletcher observed there were a great many trees on both sides of the 
road and he recommended they should be cut down and left to lie where they fell to 
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further impede the French advance.”  In addition, 20,000 palisades and 10,000 
fascines were constructed – obviously the majority of material procured would be 
local, thereby negating its use for any other agricultural purposes.  326 
The total manpower committed to construction of these fortifications was 
substantial and included both forced labour and volunteers.  Forced labour was 
supplied via conscription of eligible males within a forty mile radius of the works; 
four entire regiments of milícias were used as pioneers, undertaking alternate 
“tours” in pairs of regiments.  On 20th December 1809, notices were placed in the 
region’s settlements, exhorting volunteer labourers and “skilled mechanics” 
(artisanatos) to help with the construction programme.  The milícia were paid an 
additional two vintems per days, labourers paid six and “mechanics” twelve vintems, 
respectively, in total per day.  Although the labourers and craftsmen were provided 
with rations, a deduction was made from their weekly payment for their provision.  
In total, approximately 5,000 to 7,000 men were working on the lines at any one time 
throughout the entire period of their construction.  327 
Collectively provide substantial evidence of the material effects of the 
invasions on Portugal and her people, the majority of which were extremely 
negative and long lasting.  However, some less immediately tangible outcomes 
appear to presage substantial longer term economic, social and political change.  
                                            
326.  Grehan, The Lines of Torres Vedras, pp. 48-52.   
327.  ibid. pp. 49-53. 
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Chapter six: the French invasions of Portugal - a recapitulation 
As we have seen, the antecedents of the French invasions of Portugal are 
many and complex.  It has been necessary to retrace historical alliances, dynastic 
pacts, political and familial allegiances and territorial conflicts beyond the 
Revolutionary, Consular and Napoleonic wars.  By the time of the French 
revolution, war had become increasingly, if not exclusively, predicated upon 
economic causation as opposed to dynastic aggrandisement or religious 
motivations.  But to argue the primacy of economics is not the same as economic 
determinism: individuals, accidents and nature could all be decisive influences at 
one point or another.  In addition to consideration of conflict, the investigation of 
these origins needed to trace a course across the Atlantic Ocean and travel overland 
through Spain and France into Europe in order to understand correctly the influence 
of trade.  The spectre of revolution and regicide has needed to be weighed alongside 
polity and political economy.  While we have seen that demands for economic and 
constitutional reform in Iberia did not mature fully in this period, they had begun to 
take shape as a force to overthrow absolutism in the near future.   
Consular aggression towards Portugal resulted in a short but disastrous war 
in 1801, the ceding of frontier territories to Spain and substantial reparations to 
France.  While subsequent attempts to draw Portugal fully into the sphere of 
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Consular influence failed, the bullying diplomacy of Lannes and Junot after 1804 
and the death and resignation of key figures within the partido inglês culminated in 
the appointment of ministers decidedly more amenable to French pressures and the 
ascendancy of the partido francês at the Portuguese court.  Events in 1805, the 
crowning victory of Austerlitz and the equally momentous triumph of Trafalgar did 
nothing to resolve the predicament that Portugal found herself in.  Indeed, they may 
have worsened it.  These victories presaged an interminable and irresolvable 
commercial war, given France’s invincible grande armée and Britain’s unquestionable 
maritime supremacy, which was ratcheted up by Napoleon in 1807 when at the 
pinnacle of his success in central Europe.  Thanks to the Treaty of Tilsit, Napoleon 
was able to implement the continental system fully in an attempt to defeat Britain by 
economic means by preventing British trade with all continental European states.  A 
further objective was to secure the deep water harbour of Lisbon and the Portuguese 
fleet.  328  Canning had denied seventeen Danish ships of the line to Napoleon by 
their successful seizure from the harbour of Copenhagen.  Although six Portuguese 
ships of the line accompanied the prince regent to Brazil, Canning was resolved to 
either the capture or destruction of the Portuguese fleet in the event the royal family 
did not set sail for Brazil. 329   
                                            
328.  Glover, ‘The French fleet, 1807-1814’, pp. 233-34.   
329.  Robson, ‘The Royal Navy and Lisbon 1807-1808’.   
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As a result, Portugal was unable to continue the policies of diplomacy and 
appeasement that had proved successful in the past.  Napoleon’s ultimatum to Dom 
João to close all Portuguese ports to British shipping precipitated a crisis, but he 
could not have envisaged the invasion of Portugal would presage quite such change 
of a political, economic and social nature.  A definitive choice had to be made 
between the two super powers.  But while the invasion in 1807 effectively ended the 
prevarication and ambivalence in Portuguese politics, the transfer of the Portuguese 
court to Brazil prompted Portugal to turn away from France, rather than side with 
her, and towards Britain.  Moreover, ultimately it resulted in the commitment of the 
Portuguese economy and a substantial proportion of its people to the overthrow of 
French aggression in the Iberian Peninsula.     
While the transfer of the Portuguese court to Brazil was a pragmatic response 
to the French invasion of 1807, its conception was predicated upon ideology, 
political economy, preservation of the Luso-Brazilian empire and, ultimately, the 
maintenance of hegemony.  The act precipitated the transition of the Luso-Brazilian 
economy from its mercantilist, colonialist and protectionist foundations onto the 
cornerstones of laissez-faire economics, free trade and competitive advantage.   As 
such it was an unprecedented step for a European monarchy in terms of the 
relocation of political authority, state policy and international political economy.  
With the waning influence of the partido francês the initiative passed to the partido 
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inglês and the Sousa Coutinho family.  While Portugal’s economy, and specifically its 
dependence upon mercantilist colonialism, had been the key driver of state policy 
throughout the eighteenth century, the renaissance of the Sousa Coutinho family at 
the heart of Portuguese government heralded a historic sea change in Luso-Brazilian 
political economy.     
The analysis and discussion undertaken within the current study has 
confirmed that a proper examination of the French invasions of Portugal requires at 
one and the same time consideration of Iberian and European polity and the Euro-
Atlantic economy.  Both Spain and Portugal were economically dependent on 
colonial territories – not least of which in the Americas – and this dependency 
shaped both foreign and domestic policy in the two countries.  While for Spain a 
long standing enmity of Britain had developed upon disputes over trade with its 
colonies, the seizure of a substantial treasure fleet and, more recently, direct military 
intervention in South America, Portugal treated Britain as a long term ally – 
although disputes over trade related issues had started to emerge at the turn of the 
nineteenth century, involving Spain, Portugal, France, Britain and the Americas.  330 
Portugal looked to the Atlantic, south to its colonies in Africa and westwards 
to Brazil for its wealth, to ensure the provision of slave labour, the accumulation of 
                                            
330.  In addition to the seizure of Buenos Aires and occupation of Montevideo, the British expeditionary 
force ultimately dispatched to Portugal was initially assigned to assist in the insurrectionary forces 
commanded by Miranda in Venezuela, Esdaile, A new history, p. 23.    
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gold and diamonds, the production of raw materials for importation and re-export, 
and also protected markets for its domestic agricultural and industrial produce.   
The Portuguese economy was founded upon classical mercantilist principles and a 
complex trade triangle.  Slaves, principally from the east coast of Africa, Guinea 
Bissau and Angola, furnished Brazilian plantation and sugar mill owners with the 
necessary labour to clear land, plant and harvest cotton, sugar and coffee and, of 
course, extract minerals, and manage and harvest forests.   Staple Brazilian products, 
brown sugar, raw cotton, coffee beans and red wood, were exported to Portugal for 
domestic consumption and, crucially, re-exported throughout Europe, the 
Mediterranean and the Baltic, the British Isles, France (and many of its satellite or 
client states) and the Russian Empire.  State monopoly on all colonial trade 
comprised one of the principal revenues to the Portuguese treasury in the form of 
imposts exacted, as value added, on all imports and re-exports of Brazilian produce 
and domestic and foreign exports to the colonies transported on Portuguese and 
foreign shipping.  Indeed, the state monopoly on the harvesting, supply and re-
export of Brazilian hardwood was retained when Brazilian ports were opened to 
foreign merchant vessels and the stranglehold on primary production and 
processing industries released to allow foreign, principally British, investment, 
technical innovation and processes to improve productivity.  Finally, the colonies 
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themselves provided opportunities for capital accumulation and investment, 
voluntary emigration and also avenues for enforced expatriation.  331 
Consideration of trade then, commercial and competitive advantage, the 
protection of metropolitan industries and exploitation of dominions, and the 
development of both formal and informal colonialism, were drivers of policy and 
helped to determine the relationships between Britain, France, Portugal, Spain and 
the Americas.  Just as Spain and Portugal had substantial colonial territories, and 
were dependent upon them for raw materials and produce for internal consumption 
and re-export, and for the revenues they attracted and their enormous contribution 
to the balance of trade, these satellite dominions and their economic potential 
received the attention of both Britain and France.   
While Britain and France had formal colonies, both their own and European 
economies were also dependent upon the outputs and markets of the Ibero-
American colonies and therefore the monopoly on trade that Spain and Portugal 
enjoyed with their respective dependencies.   If British people could neither legally 
own slaves, nor directly profit from their exploitation, they could establish and 
sustain significant mercantilist interests in Portugal (for example the English Factory 
in Lisbon and Oporto).  And, by virtue of the treaty of 1808 they could own and 
                                            
331.  Russell-Wood, A world on the move, passim and, for the Luso-Brazilian political economy, Cardoso,  
‘Free trade, political economy’, passim. 
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manage estates, and invest in production and processing enterprises, in Brazil and 
therefore continue to profit indirectly from slavery.   Trade with Brazil and the 
Americas was an important factor: and played a crucial role in the development of 
state policy in Britain and throughout Europe.  The French economy was no less 
dependent upon staple imports such as cotton for its own industrial and 
manufacturing sectors, much of which it sourced from Brazil (via Lisbon) and later, 
ironically due to implementation of the continental system, from North America and 
the Levant.  Although the abolition of slavery formed an important clause in the 
subsequent treaty of 1810, between Portugal and Britain, this iniquitous practice 
managed to flourish in Brazil despite decades of British gun boat diplomacy given 
the strength of vested interest enjoyed by a slave owning and mercantilist oligarchy.     
At the risk of being accused of teleological causation, the analysis strongly 
suggests the primacy of economic interests in determining British involvement in 
South America.  Its primacy can be seen in the development of trade treaties, the 
occupation of Madeira to sustain the triangulation of slave trade, exports and re-
exports of colonial produce, capital investment and “informal colonialism”, and the 
development of export markets for British manufactures.  332  There were political 
                                            
332.  Parry asserts (pace Gallagher and Robinson) that British policy, even in this mercantilist period, 
was formed on the basis of “Trade with informal control if possible, trade with rule when necessary”.  
Parry, Trade and dominion, p. 276, citing Gallagher and Robinson, ‘The imperialism of free trade’, 
Economic History Review, Second Series, VI, 1953, p. 13.  The “neo mercantilist” stranglehold exerted by 
the metropolis, according to Maxwell, was exemplified by the imposition of a decree prohibiting 
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and individual influences to consider also: the policies espoused by Talleyrand, 
Godoy, Pinto de Sousa Coutinho and Canning are but four of many possible 
examples.  The French invasion of Portugal, and the subsequent war with Spain and 
Portugal created a power vacuum in these two countries.  That in Spain was caused 
by the seizure and imprisonment of Charles and Ferdinand and was partially filled 
by a process of regional politicisation and the election of a national, and liberal, 
Cortez.  The political void in Portugal resulted from a relatively powerless regency 
council installed by Dom João to govern Portugal in his absence on leaving for 
Brazil.  Although quickly dismissed by Junot, even upon their reinstallation in 
September 1808 the governadores fluctuated between prevarication and inactivity 
due, firstly, to the restricted powers bestowed upon them and, secondly, to their 
limitations as individuals.  In both countries, the absence of a monarch had 
significant long term effects.  In both cases, constitutional reform was neither a 
principal nor direct determinant of popular opposition of the French, but was a 
substantial longer term outcome of the seven year long struggle in both countries – 
along with civil war. 
                                                                                                                                
manufacturing (in 1785) amongst other reforms designed to be even more beneficial to Portugal (and at 
the expense of Brazil) than had the policies of Pombal; while reforms of the taxation system led to 
direct conflict between Brazilian mine owners and the Portuguese state.  For the first time in its history 
Portugal had a favourable balance of trade with Britain, deriving from longer term effects of Pombaline 
reforms and policies, rising sugar prices and the British textile industry’s insatiable demand for cotton: 
see Maxwell, Conflicts and conspiracies. 
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 The position of Spain has received considerable attention, particularly 
recently, whilst that of Portugal has not been afforded the deliberation it deserves 
within English historiography of the Peninsular War.  The reasons for this are 
complex and not unrelated.  The contribution of Spain, and the Spanish people, to 
the expulsion of the French from the Iberian Peninsula has been overshadowed, 
with notable exceptions, in a historiography that has principally focused on British 
intervention and the activities of the Anglo-Portuguese army.   Portugal’s wider 
contribution has been overlooked, and in some cases entirely dismissed.  These 
accounts range from hagiographic studies of Wellington, with Britain helping 
Portugal in extremis, to an unholy alliance of left and right polemical literature with 
Portugal reduced to an English “colony” or “protectorate”.  In reality both British 
and French intervention in the Iberian Peninsula was determined by a combination 
of factors including the design and mishap of military opportunism and economic 
aggression.  The lines of analysis to help understand this conflict therefore can be no 
less comprehensive or complex in order to address these difficult concepts.   
While the Peninsular War is the dominant expression in English 
historiography, the war is referred to in France as the Spanish War Guerre d’Espagne, 
in Spain as the war of Spanish Independence (Guerra de la Independencia Española)  
and in Portugal as the French Invasions (as invasões francesas).  However, they have 
been increasingly been referred to in Portugal in the context of a wider struggle and 
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as distinctive episodes within a protracted war for the Iberian Peninsula (episódios da 
Guerra Peninsular).   333  French and Spanish experiences in the Peninsular War were 
characterised by the scale and protracted nature of military conflict, the complex 
juxtaposition of formal and irregular warfare, and the specific contribution of 
ordinary Spanish people and, yes, guerrilleros.   
The experiences of Portugal were somewhat different, being predicated upon 
the power vacuum, the establishment of the juntas and popular opposition to the 
French, during the first and second invasions, and on the enormous scale of military 
recruitment and mobilisation throughout the third invasion until the end of the 
conflict in 1814.    The dislocation of political authority is therefore an important 
consideration and warrants further investigation and the findings of this study 
support a number of linked conclusions about popular action and intervention in 
the economic, social and political spheres.   Firstly, popular insurrections in 1808 
were a response to the violent exactions of the French military government but were 
also directed against perceived collaborators.  They resulted in turn in violent 
French reprisals and a powerful response from the provincial ruling elites: the 
nobility, the magistracy and the clergy.  Although there were clearly economic and 
social grievances underlying specific insurrectionary activity, and indeed one 
                                            
333.  See for the example the collection of papers in Instituto da Defesa Nacional, Guerra peninsular, novas 
interpretações: da europa dividida à união europeia, Actas do congresso realisado em 28 e 29 de Outubro de 
2002, (Lisboa : Tribuna de História, 2005) 
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response of the ruling élite was to criminalise these acts, the balance of political and 
popular resolve to oppose the French from the summer of 1808 in Portugal had, in 
overall terms decisively shifted towards resistance and away from appeasement.  
The ruling élite ultimately embraced popular fervour and, together with the clergy, 
sought to harness and control its power and excesses, and direct it against the 
French.   
One result was that popular support for issues such as constitutional reform 
was a later and longer term outcome of the war in the Peninsula: at the time, these 
types of demands were not a driving force within Portuguese politics.  Neither were 
they linked to popular opposition to the French.  The influence of the partido francês 
would remain important at court in Rio de Janeiro, but was no "French Party" as 
such in Portugal.  Moreover, after 1807 anyone who supported the French was 
denounced as a jacobin, franc-maçon and traitor – see for example the treatment of the 
setembristas.  There were some people in Portugal and Brazil who espoused greater 
political and economic independence, and who were either banished or had to live 
in exile, perhaps one of the reasons why vested interests in Portugal, the rural 
nobility and the clergy, and the population in general were even more determined to 
oppose the French.  334 
                                            
334.  That the Portuguese did not accept the French as liberators, and that subsequent Portuguese 
history continues to treat the French as aggressors, is a constant theme in the work of Caillaux de 
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British and French intervention resulted directly from the implementation 
and escalation of Napoleon’s Continental System, and the resulting, and direct, 
confrontation via the Orders in Council and naval blockade of Europe.  But, as set 
out in the introductory chapter, the context and contest was not restricted to the 
struggle for European supremacy but also operated at the level of global political-
economy.  For France, given the alliance with Spain until the insurrection in May 
1808, Portugal represented one of the final gaps in a continental economic system to 
deny European outlets for British trade (and also access to a substantial navy and 
colonial commerce).  While for Britain, appeals for financial (and military) aid from 
Spanish and Portuguese deputations presented an opportunity for a shift in policy 
from opportunistic strikes at targets in the Mediterranean and Americas, to 
sustained military intervention on continental Europe (in addition to the denial of 
Portuguese naval and economic resources to France).    335  For Portugal, the 
acceptance of direct British intervention represented a major shift in foreign and 
domestic policy and resulted from and helped to consolidate the ascendancy of the 
partido inglês, in general, and the growing influence of the Sousa Coutinho family, in 
particular, in Portuguese politics.   
                                                                                                                                
Almeida and Vicente. A key issue for these historians is the paradox that the Portuguese were subjects 
of an absolutist monarchy, yet opposed the French armies: which they see as revolutionary liberators as 
opposed to military oppressors.  See Rives méditerranéennes, n° 36, 2010/2 Napoléon and le Portugal, in 
particular António Pedro Vicente, ‘Raisons de la défaite de Napoléon au Portugal’ pp. 13-26 and Tereza 
Caillaux de Almeida, ‘L'échec des campagnes napoléoniennes au Portugal dans les Mémoires des 
Officiers Françaises’, pp. 59-69. 
335.  Michael Glover, The Peninsular War, pp 56-61.  
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A final consideration is that the decision to oppose Napoleon militarily in 
Portugal was not taken centrally.  Rather it came in response to spontaneous, 
localised, popular opposition to the French occupying forces.  Despite that much of 
the opposition to Junot in 1808 was localised and sporadic in nature, it nevertheless 
represented a significant transformation: in effect, overturning the prince regent’s 
decree to the Portuguese nation to receive the French amicably.  But, despite the 
establishment of a number of localised juntas, in defence of the Portuguese absolutist 
monarchy, the call for a Cortez style government, and regional representation, did 
not come until much later and was strenuously resisted by the Portuguese 
government.  It has been argued that popular support for the absolutist state, in 
defiance of the French, represented a paradox, but the Portuguese and Spanish 
people, obviously, “did not like armed missionaries”.  Much of the opposition in 
Spain was directed against old enemies, not necessarily against the French.  In 
Portugal, the insurrection took the form of an anti-French fervour in defence of “o 
principe regente nosso senhor”: but the unifying factors, in both cases, were not 
necessarily an uncomplicated patriotism or nationalism.  336  
It may be anachronistic to use the term populist, but there would appear to be 
a case for investigating the complex nature and form of relationships within and 
                                            
336.  See Esdaile, The Peninsular War: a new history, p. 268 and The Spanish army in the Peninsular War, p. 75 
for a useful discussion of complex concepts in relation to Spain such as “Dios, Rey y Patria” and “rey, 
patria y religion”.  As yet, as far as has been ascertained in the present study, there is no 
commensurately sophisticated analysis of these concepts in relation to the struggle in Portugal.   
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between the clergy, the apparatus of provincial governance, and the rural 
population in the north of Portugal.  Like Spain, there were a great many factions: 
but a unifying factor was anti-French fervour, the drivers of which included the 
political vacuum, the questionable legitimacy of the regency council, the role of the 
clergy and, moreover, the alienation of the population.  Demagoguery had a part to 
play in the complex set of factors that resulted in insurrection and indiscipline.  In 
two instances in 1809 the rule of the mob in defiance of military discipline resulted 
in a number of Portuguese murdered, mainly on suspicion of pro-French 
sympathies, and the arrest and murder of the Portuguese general Bernadim Freire 
de Andrade and his staff – accused of treasonous behaviour.   
It is clear that by 1810 the regency council was undertaking a much more 
active role in domestic affairs and, particularly due to the activities of Forjaz, in the 
re-organisation of Portuguese military forces. The restoration of legitimacy, and 
active governance, of the governadores came at a price: for example with the 
admission of the Principal Sousa (Coutinho) to and the dismissal of the Monteiro 
Mór from their number.  Moreover, there was direct British representation on the 
regency council in the form of the minister plenipotentiary to Lisbon, Charles Stuart.  
Beresford was Marshal of the Portuguese military and Wellington Marshal General 
of the Portuguese army and commander in chief of the Anglo-Portuguese army and, 
as such, eligible to attend regency council meetings convened to discuss the defence 
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of the realm, matters related to the military and finance.  In practice, this 
responsibility devolved to Charles Stuart with no little help from Forjaz and amidst 
much opposition from the Principal Sousa and the Bishop of Oporto.  Indeed, there 
is a great deal of irony that Forjaz received the support of members of the partido 
francês at court whilst his authority was constantly challenged and undermined by 
members of the partido inglês in Lisbon and Rio de Janeiro.   
However, the study of this formative period of Portuguese history should not 
simply concern itself with “conflicts and conspiracies” of a political or diplomatic 
nature or of battles between armies.  The period witnessed some clear shifts in 
public opinion and attitudes: although, again, there has been much less focus on 
these changes in Portugal compared to that in Spain.  Within recent historiography, 
there has been a considerable focus on popular resistance to French occupation in 
Spain and, in particular, the role and contribution of the guerrilla.  In the orthodox 
historiography, British and Spanish, the activities of the guerrilla have epitomised the 
struggle against the French at a popular level.    Recent, revisionist history based 
principally upon Spanish archival sources suggests that the guerrilla were more like 
the banditti referred to in official French correspondence than the Spanish patriots 
eulogised by Lovett, pace Arteche.  While making a compelling argument, and 
paving the way for further studies, including a similarly focused investigation of 
French and Spanish archival sources, in addition to the memoirs and journals of 
199 
 
serving French officers and the writings of ordinary Spanish people, the complex 
nature, role and contribution of the guerrilla has started to be uncovered.  337 
But there has been no commensurate study of Portuguese popular opposition 
to the French, although a recent work has investigated contemporary pamphlets, 
along with nineteenth century Portuguese literary and historical sources, to try to 
understand the underlying reasons for, if not the social basis of, popular resistance 
to the French.  In addition to reviewing the existing historiography, the current 
study has examined the memoirs and journals of serving French officers, 
contemporary documentation available within published sources, in order to begin 
to develop a better understanding of the social basis of this popular resistance.  In 
addition, analysis of military returns and the census of population have enabled an 
estimate for the extent of military service.  It is clear, from contemporary Portuguese 
military sources that a very substantial proportion of the Portuguese male 
population served, in some capacity, in the Portuguese military.  Moreover, not only 
was the extent of service in the traditional form of military service, for the majority 
of the population, in the ordenança and milícia, substantial in terms of the numbers 
involved, it was also more intensive in nature – for example in the length of 
continuous service, the distance in which service was required (i.e. from place of 
                                            
337.  For a succinct and definitive review, see Esdaile, Fighting Napoleon, and in particular the concluding 
chapter pp. 193-204. 
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residence) and the activities undertaken.  In this sense at least, the activities of the 
ordenança mirrored some of the activities undertaken by the guerrilla in the orthodox 
historiography for Spain.  338   
Whilst not providing a definitive account of a nation in arms, the analysis has 
pointed up some of the salient features, and ambiguities, in relation to Portuguese 
military forces and the nature of military service.  There was clearly a substantial 
proportion of the eligible male population in military service at one point or another 
throughout the conflict.  But this is not the same as asserting that Portugal was a 
nation in arms.  Although it is also clear that there was very substantial popular 
support for anti-French activities, like la guerrilla, the population enthusiastically 
supported localised opposition (as opposed to regional, let alone national service).  
And it would appear that, as in Navarre, Aragon, Catalonia, the Castilles, Leon, and 
Galicia across northern Spain, a common characteristic underlying popular 
resistance was land tenure, property relations and the social relations of production.  
French memoirs speak of Portuguese irregular opposition on the Spanish frontiers, 
large bands of irregular and poorly armed paysans - although the organisation of the 
companies of ordenança were much better organised and disciplined during the third 
invasion – men, women and children constructing fortifications to protect river 
                                            
338.  Dores Costa argues that military service was not necessarily universally or enthusiastically 
supported by the entire male population: citing avoidance of conscription and desertion, Dores Costa, 
‘Army size, military recruitment and financing’ 
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crossings and fighting to the last to protect their homesteads, entire towns and rural 
areas depopulated and laid waste.  339   
But what of popular resistance from the summer of 1809 to the eviction of the 
French from Portuguese soil in April 1811?  Wholesale military mobilisation and the 
almost total commitment of the Portuguese economy and her people to the defence 
of the realm, and the subjugation of the Portuguese military to British discipline , 
whether this is accepted in whole or in part, or rejected outright,  would appear to 
have precluded the development of independent guerrilla forces and warfare.  
Certainly, the consensus is that independent brigades of milícias, operating on the 
rear and flanks of the French, harried columns, disrupted communications and, in 
many cases, prevented all but the strongest and most determined foraging parties.  
However, there is also some evidence that the ordenanças, if not milícias, acted 
entirely independently of the command structure of the Anglo-Portuguese army 
and in the form of guerrilla bands as evidenced by the following order of the day.   
“Upon the invasion of the enemy … and the desertion of the majority of the capitães 
móres and officers of the Ordenanças, the men formed into guerrilla bands; and – now 
the enemy has been evicted from Portuguese territory, these bands have become 
unnecessary, and so, acknowledging their good service, Marshal [Beresford] orders them 
                                            
339.  The nearest Portuguese equivalent, paisano, literally means a countryman whilst, more recently, à 
paisana, signifies someone in civilian clothes as opposed to military service.  Given the number and 
variety of people working in rural areas, specific words such as lavrador, share cropper / farmer, would 
be used as opposed to generic terms for people working in the rural economy. 
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to disband and joining to the Companies of Ordenanças to which they properly belong, 
in order that the proper organization of the same Ordenanças can be restored, [and 
empowers] ...the Generals of the Provinces for the total fulfilment of this Order. His 
Excellency [Beresford] is going to reorganise the Ordenanças, and Provedencias ... [to 
prevent further incidences] ... [and] so that the Ordenanças can operate properly.”  340      
Albeit one example, the above suggests that guerrilla bands, similar to those 
that formed and acted independently against the French in 1808 and 1809, given the 
breakdown of proper military command and discipline, operated in a similar 
manner during the French invasion of 1810-1811.  The possible conclusion from this 
evidence, taking into account that one swallow does not a summer make, is that 
men in many localities behind the French lines and along their lines of 
communication, organised themselves in groups to harass and disrupt the French. 
Indeed, there is much evidence to support the view that the milícias and ordenanças 
performed these functions very well in 1810 and 1811: the assumption being that 
this was properly organised opposition under military command.  The order above 
cannot have been in response to one or two isolated incidents, otherwise why 
would Beresford have had to resort to an order of the day to disband these 
formations, and ensure their reintegration into the companies of ordenanças?  Also, 
                                            
340.  Beresford: Collecção das ordens do dia do illustrisimo e excellentisimo senhor Guilherme Carr Beresford, 
commandante em chefe dos exercitos de S.A.R. o principe regente nosso senhor, (Twelve volumes, Lisboa : 
Antonio Nunes dos Santos,  Impressor do quartel geral), Ordens do dia, 1811, pp 67-68, Quartel 
General d’Almendralejo 28 de Abril de 1811.   
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the direction (and authority to enforce the order) is given to generals in command 
in the provinces – not to an individual general of one province. 
Detailed analysis of the remainder of the order, exhorting the men operating in 
these guerrilla bands to return home and report to the civil authorities (in their 
respective villages and towns) and become reintegrated into the ordenanças would 
appear to be not only a military measure, but is also a measure for political and 
social control (to avoid further problems arising from armed men roaming the 
countryside).  The inference is that some of these armed bands were already 
presenting problems of this nature – hence the severity of the order and that it was 
addressed to, and instructed, the military commanders in each province such as 
Bacelar and Silveira, as opposed to generals in the field army, to fully implement 
this order.  A key issue here is that these generals have military, civil and judicial 
powers and responsibility for policing and maintaining security in the provinces. 
The Portuguese reaction is wholly understandable.  British memoirs relate the 
numbers and pitiable state of the Portuguese people, of all social groups, taking with 
them the little of their possessions they could gather together and carry off, and their 
inexorable journey to the safety of “The Lines of Torres Vedras”.  Both French and 
British memoirs corroborate the extent of damage unveiled by the French retreat 
and, in addition, contemporary documentation (for example citing murder, 
incendiarist activities and other damage to property, and the allocation of 
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compensation for damages), substantiate the degree and distribution of wastage and 
loss resulting directly from the French occupation and the social and economic 
status of the population affected.  In addition, assessment of the damage during the 
construction of “The Lines” and the extent of land put beyond productive use 
demonstrates a substantial proportion of agriculture and its supporting 
infrastructure was laid waste and its output denied to the Portuguese economy and 
dependent population.  341    
There was by no means universal support for military service.  In addition to 
the preference for localised service, and the extent of desertion and sickness from 
milícia and first line regiments, there was also considerable evidence for draft 
evasion and unwilling service.  Similar exemptions for military service existed in the 
Portuguese and Spanish military: conscription was by lot, and those with money 
could avoid service or pay for substitutes.  From the evidence available, it would 
appear that the majority of the burden of military service was borne by the rural 
poor.   Moreover, oxen and carts, the principal means of rural and agricultural 
transportation and all inland boats –  both in terms of the means of river 
transportation and river fishing – were expropriated for military service.  The 
supporting infrastructures for the principal sectors of the productive Portuguese 
                                            
341.  The interested reader is referred to the various edited works presenting excerpts from British 
diaries and French memoirs within the bibliography. 
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economy were given over to the needs of the military (despite which, the Portuguese 
commissariat still managed to under-perform, to the extent that want and desertion 
amongst Portuguese regiments was rife).  On top of this, a substantial proportion of 
the  principal infrastructure of the rural economy was destroyed or otherwise put 
beyond use: bridges, mills, ovens were destroyed, crops, foodstuffs and grain stocks 
carried off or ruined, olive trees and vineyards torn down, houses, agricultural and 
church buildings incorporated into fortifications, razed or otherwise put beyond use 
or human habitation.  342 
The effects on Portugal, and the extent of devastation, would need to include 
the number of people who emigrated never to return, men recruited to military 
service, wounded, killed and missing in action.  They would also need to include the 
losses to the agricultural sector, land, crops, and supporting infrastructure.  Finally, 
there would need to be an estimate for the losses caused both directly and indirectly 
by the war, malnutrition, starvation, disease, increased rates of morbidity and 
mortality and, from a counter factual perspective, the children who would have 
been born had the war not taken place.  The existing literature has put forward 
estimates, albeit largely unsubstantiated, for the total loss sustained by the 
population of Portugal.  Analysis of available data from the census of population, 
clerical and military estimates undertaken to support conscription and taxation, the 
                                            
342.  The definitive study in English remains that presented in Oman, History, vol. 3 and vol. 4, passim. 
206 
 
various estimates for lives lost as a result of the war, and the surfeit of deaths over 
live births and unfulfilled births, suggest a total in excess of 200,000 (perhaps as high 
as seven per cent of the Portuguese population in 1801). 
If strategic direction for British military intervention in the Peninsular and for 
the defence of Portugal was provided by Wellesley (the future Duke of Wellington), 
strategic direction for state policy and support for the Anglo-Portuguese alliance - 
albeit not unconditionally - was provided by the Sousa Coutinho family.  Just as the 
Sousa Coutinho faction determined Portuguese policy by virtue of the triangulation 
of political power between Lisbon, London and Rio de Janeiro, so too the family 
Wellesley played a not dissimilar (if somewhat less pivotal role) in that of Britain, 
Portugal and Spain.  But the period also presaged the ascendancy of new political 
and military elites, ironically with many complex French connections.  The ultimate 
success of the regency council in supporting Wellington and his strategy for the 
defence of Portugal was due, in no small part, to the relentless industry of Dom 
Miguel Pereira Forjaz and the relationship he forged with Beresford, Charles Stuart 
and Wellington in support of the “common cause”.   
There was also an identifiable shift in the social basis of the officer class 
serving during the Peninsular War and in comparison to previously.  Although 
Vicente has argued that the opposition to the French was paradoxical, given later 
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support by many of these officers for constitutional reform, this misses the point.  
The Portuguese military was polarised by the French invasions: many Portuguese 
officers left to serve in the Légion Portugaise whilst others fought for Portugal against 
the French in the Leal Legião Lusitana, some of those who left Portugal to undertake 
French military service actively supported the third French invasion, and served in 
the French army of Portugal, while others refused to serve or otherwise avoided 
service.  A substantial number of Portuguese officers rose to significant rank, and 
served with distinction throughout the war.  Many of these officers went on to fight 
in the ensuing civil war - some for constitutional reform others to maintain 
absolutism – others to serve in government.  343 
Whilst nationalism and patriotism were in no short supply during the 
Peninsular War they were not necessarily the only cause of opposition to the French 
invasions: alienation, disaffection and marginalisation were also very tangible 
drivers of popular and populist resistance.  The war did not bring about much 
immediate social and political change.  Demands for constitutional reform, and 
perhaps also citizenship, were longer term outcomes of the war and the ways in 
which it was fought.  The war acted as a catalyst for change, precipitated arguments 
and support for and against absolutism and constitutional reform, was the harbinger 
                                            
343.  António Pedro Vicente, Guerra Peninsular, 1801-1814 and ‘Portugal perante a política Napoléonica’, 
in Guerra peninsular, novas interpretações.  
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of civil war, and - more positively - presaged the development of the modern 
Portuguese nation state.    Much remains to be done.  But if the current study has 
helped identify and develop some new lines of analysis for further research, it will 
have served a useful purpose. 
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Appendix 
 
 
Table 1: Combat of Chaves, 11th March 1809   
 
Près de  
Chaves 
Chaves 
 
Killed Wounded 
4ème léger  chirurg. Mauget * 
lieut. Glaise 
lieut. Basavet 
17ème léger s.-lieut.  Marcouire #   
31ème léger   lieut. Galabert ^ 
2ème Suisse capt. Weiland ^   
4ème Suisse   capt. Thomas 
* died 4th April, # wounded 5th April, ~ cited as 11th March  
Source: Martinien, Tableaux,  p. 394, p. 432, p. 495 ; ^ Supplement, p. 76 and 84 
 
Table 2: Combat of Braga 18th to 20th March, 1809 
 Braga, 18th to 20th  March, 1809 Braga, 29th  March 
 Killed Wounded Killed Wounded 
General staff  gdb. Foy   
26ème ligne 
 
lieut. Glaise 
lieut. Basavet 
  
17ème léger 
lieut. Muirogès 
lieut. Bonnaire 
lieut. Braquemont 
  
31ème léger 
   
lieut. Rondeau 
capt. Savina * 
1er  Hussards  s.-lieut. Cassini   s.-lieut. Fargeot   
Légion 
Hanovrienne 
(infantry) 
capt. Weyhaupt 
 
cdb. Blum 
capt. Hermann 
capt. Stamm 
s.-lieut.  Leibhader 
s.-lieut.  Sauer 
  
Légion 
Hanovrienne 
(cavalry) 
 
capt. Eberhard 
capt. Burgel   
lieut. LaCourte 
  
Génie état-major  capt. Boulanger   
* (lost or missing) 
Source: Martinien, Tableaux, pp. 181, 432, 459, 502, 503, 615, 663.   
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Table 3: Combats in front of the city and the battle for Oporto, 1809  
 Devant 
Oporto 
28th, 29th, 30th 
March, 1809 
Subsequent to the 
battle for Oporto 
  Killed Wounded Wounded 
General  
staff 
capt. Taillandier 
capt. De Chevilly 
 
gdd. Merle 
capt. Pagaud 
 
15ème  ligne  
capt. Baron 
capt. Valet 
s.-lieut.  Cotterelle 
cdb. Molet 
capt. Pron 
capt. Teisseré 
lieut. Delarue 
lieut. Fages 
s. -lieut. Colsin 
s.-lieut. Guilhem 
s.-lieut. Perret 
capt. Dumas ^ 
 
47ème ligne   
major Dauture 
capt. Mercier 
lieut. Faes 
major Dauture ^ 
 
66ème ligne   
lieut. Montannier 
 
 
70ème ligne   
capt. Gratieux * 
lieut. Puton 
s.-lieut.  Gorjus ^ 
86ème ligne  
cdb. Guerrain #  
capt. Parisot 
lieut. Bourgogne 
cdb. Dolosie 
capt. Candy 
capt. Eyma 
s.-lieut. Desplantes 
s.-lieut. Lhuisssier 
s.-lieut. Thierry 
s.-lieut. Paschali 
s.-lieut. More ^ 
 
2ème léger 
s.-lieut. Dreux 
 
 
s.-lieut. Caplain 
s.-lieut. Argaud 
s.-lieut. Dédonnaire 
 
4ème léger s.-lieut. Cumin ~  capt. Flandin ^ capt. Roche ^ 
17ème léger  cdb. Roger **^  capt. Wallebrant + 
31ème léger  
lieut. Dardé 
 
capt. Menguin 
s.-lieut. Gay 
s.-lieut. Marmy 
s.-lieut. Chastain 
lieut. Rondeau = 
lieut. Campery = 
32ème léger   s.-lieut. Raffali !  
2ème  Suisse    capt. Fuslin + 
4ème  Suisse   capt. Bleuler  
Légion 
Hanovrienne 
  s.-lieut. Leibhader  
 Abbreviations : cdb. chef de bataillon ; capt. captain ; lieut. lieutenant ; s.-lieut. , sous lieutenant.   
* Gratieux died 15th April, # Guerrain died 10th June, ~ Cumin died 12th May, + Fuslin wounded 28th April, = 
Rondeau 1st May, ! Raffali died 5 th April, ** Roger “assassiné le 28 mars, dans la ville d’Oporto, par la par la 
populace.” 
Source: Martinien, Tableaux, pp. 33, 44, 152, 227, 270, 278, 299, 388, 394, 432, 459, 461, 492, 495. Named casualties 
marked ^ from Martinien, Supplement, pp. 30, 40, 48, 50, 66 and 90.  
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